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Abstract 
 
There are both substantive and methodological disagreements in the global justice 
debate between cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and statism and liberal 
nationalism on the other. The substantive disagreement avers that statists and liberal 
nationalists restrict the regulation of substantive inequality to the domestic sphere, 
whereas cosmopolitans extend it to the global level. The methodological 
disagreement is based on the fact that statists and liberal nationalists ground concern 
for distributive justice in the institutions of citizenship, whereas cosmopolitans focus 
on the moral equality of human beings. David Miller’s liberal nationalist account of 
distributive justice differs from the statist account by drawing on a premise about 
human nature: that a common nationality is a powerful motivational force in 
supporting the institutions of citizenship within a nation-state. This provides more 
ethically acceptable justification for restricting the regulation of substantive 
inequality in the face of the cosmopolitans’ insistence on respecting the moral 
equality of human beings. However, Miller’s account is incomplete because it fails 
to explain why human beings’ common moral intuitions and political emotions 
would justify restricting the regulation of substantive inequality to the domestic level. 
In this thesis, I will propose a way of extending Miller’s account based on the idea of 
deliberative democracy at the global level. I will argue that the regulation of 
substantive inequality could be grounded in institutions of global citizenship based 
on public deliberation at the global level that would adjudicate among different 
distributive principles and that this could help to resolve the two disagreements in 
the global justice debate. 
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Introduction 
 
 
From the early nineties, theorists have come to realise that the major concern of 
global justice should be the way various material advantages are distributed among 
human beings. This understanding has developed slowly, due to the fact that 
international organisations such as the United Nations have acquired increasing 
power to regulate common human affairs over and above their traditional concerns 
that relate to peace and stability, even if they do so only to a limited degree. Ideally, 
we would expect the global justice debate to generate widely acceptable distributive 
principles that contribute to international legal reform, corresponding policy changes 
in each nation-state, altered behaviour patterns of participants in global market 
transactions, et cetera. In practice, international law has not recognised socio-
economic rights as being part of basic human rights; nation-states have not 
developed a collective response to the apparently exploitative behaviours of 
multinational corporations; the ethical demands of distributive justice are still not as 
binding on the behaviour patterns of the participants in global market transactions as 
they are within nation-states. These are but a few examples.  
 
As many observe, the gap between our expectations of a fairer global economic 
order, regulated by clearly stated distributive principles and the actual state of affairs 
at the global level reflects the lack of motivation on the part of nation-states to take 
initiatives to transform the existing international system, together with its legal 
system. This can be seen to be true, insofar as many international organisations, with 
the exception of the European Union, have not even gained the authority from the 
member nation-states to enforce their decisions and policies, and efforts to empower 
these organisations have met with continual resistance in intergovernmental 
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negotiations. The fact that global justice theorists have not reached any consensus on 
the proper content of distributive principles at the global level, and that the global 
justice debate has been largely conducted within the confines of Western academia, 
further exacerbate this situation. In this thesis, I will focus on resolving the current 
impasses in the global justice debate by reconstructing David Miller’s account of 
deliberative democracy on the basis of Jürgen Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, I will not discuss how 
this proposal may gain the support of nation-states or how international organisations 
and international law will be transformed accordingly. However, my discussion at 
the conceptual level will have clear implications for the requisite political 
transformation and how this could be done in principle.  
 
The impasse which I attempt to resolve here is situated among the three main 
schools of thought in the global justice debate: cosmopolitanism, statism and liberal 
nationalism. First, the cosmopolitans believe that all distributive principles should be 
consistent with the moral equality of human beings. In other words, all material 
advantages should be distributed among human beings according to the belief that all 
human beings should be given equal consideration as part of our common humanity. 
It should be noted that there is a distinction between humanist and associativist 
cosmopolitanism. The humanist cosmopolitans believe that substantive equality in 
material terms is the fairest distributional pattern among human beings, as it reflects 
the moral equality of human beings, and any deviation from this default position 
should reflect genuine individual choices rather than brute luck. In contrast, the 
associativist cosmopolitans believe that substantive equality should be grounded in 
the ethical significance of the human relations within nation-states, although they 
respect the moral equality of human beings above all. Second, over and above the 
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recognition of the moral equality of human beings, the statists believe that 
substantive equality should be grounded in the institutions of citizenship—a 
rendition of the ethical significance of nation-states that focuses on the three 
characteristics of the existing citizenship within those nation-states. According to the 
statists’ accounts of distributive justice, citizenship imposes shared legal coercion 
upon individuals, confers on them involuntary membership and facilitates reciprocal 
cooperation among them. Lastly, the liberal nationalists argue that the three 
characteristics of citizenship should be combined with the motivational force of a 
common identity among citizens so as to ground substantive equality, in addition to 
respect for the moral equality of human beings. The differences between 
cosmopolitanism, statism and liberal nationalism cause them to endorse different 
global principles of distributive justice. Whereas the cosmopolitans support both the 
satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of substantive inequality at the global 
level, the statists and the liberal nationalists restrict the regulation of substantive 
inequality to the domestic level and support the protection of a limited number of 
basic human rights globally. Therefore, their dispute focuses on the proper scope of 
the regulation of substantive inequality. In this thesis, in order to resolve this dispute, 
I will examine David Miller’s works on social justice, global justice, nationality and 
the contextualist approach to political theory. I address his critics in Chapters 1 to 6. 
I proceed to discuss how these discussions would bear on the global justice debate in 
Chapters 7 and 8.  Insofar as Miller’s liberal nationalism stands a better chance than 
statism to respond to the challenge of cosmopolitanism, the discussion of his works 
will contribute to the resolution of the current impasse in the global justice debate. 
 
In this thesis I will argue that in order to resolve the impasse in the global justice 
debate, the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists all need to endorse 
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the further institutionalisation of global citizenship, because they require an 
institutionalised channel for public deliberation in order to adjudicate between the 
different global principles of distributive justice. This deliberation should be 
developed according to my reconstruction of Miller’s account of deliberative 
democracy on the basis of Habermas’s conception of communicative action, insofar 
as Miller’s account of it requires the notion of communicative action in order to 
interpret public deliberation as a collective learning process among all citizens, so as 
to reach a normative consensus on common global issues, a common identity and a 
shared public culture, and global regulative norms and values. 
 
The philosophical underpinning of this deliberative process is what Paul Gilabert 
calls ‘cosmopolitan justifiability’. Cosmopolitan justifiability is derived from the 
general respect for the moral equality of human beings. It requires all global 
principles of justice to be justifiable to all human beings, as free and equal moral 
agents (Gilabert, 2012, p. 10). On this basis, the global public deliberation aims to 
acquire human beings’ actual consent to all regulative norms and values including 
but not limited to the global principles of distributive justice. Nevertheless, it does 
not hold a clear view about the comparative advantage of actual consent in relation 
to the hypothetical one. By hypothetical consent I mean what is exemplified in 
Rawls’s notion of ‘original position’. Rawls aims to model the original position on 
the basis of certain, relevant facts about liberal society and the people within it, and 
then to show that people would possibly accept the principles of justice derived from 
this hypothetical setting, given right circumstances (Rawls, 1999, p. 17). 
Hypothetical consent differs from the actual one, in the sense that it does not require 
the relevant moral agents to give their consent verbally or through writing. Instead, it 
operates under the presumption that the relevant moral agents would have given 
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actual consent to the proposed principles of justice, given right circumstances. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the validity of each of these consent 
theories. The preference of actual consent over the hypothetical one is motivated by 
a pragmatic concern: that is, the two abovementioned impasses in the global justice 
debate. These impasses in the western academia have shown that the formulation of 
distributive justice based on good arguments alone fails to produce a wide consensus 
even among intellectuals. In light of global cultural pluralism, it is doubtful all 
human beings will give their actual consent to the same set of distributive principles, 
as all the existing theories of global justice presuppose. Therefore, the global public 
deliberation serves to adjudicate among these different distributive principles and 
form a normative consensus at the global level through acquiring actual consent 
from all human beings or their representatives. 
 
My account of global citizenship based on global public deliberation offers a more 
open-ended solution to the impasses in the global justice debate than all the existing 
theories of global justice. By ‘open-ended’ I mean what Martha Nussbaum means in 
developing her ‘capability approach’. Capability approach aims to formulate a list of 
central capabilities which all human beings ought to have in order to pursue the 
activities indispensable to their flourishing within any society. Open-endedness in 
this approach refers to how the list of central capabilities could be contested and 
remade and how the items on the list could be further substantiated by local beliefs 
and circumstances in each nation-state (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 70-7). However, my 
account of global citizenship departs from Nussbaum’s approach in a significant way. 
Similar to most global justice theorists, Nussbaum relies on hypothetical consent to 
validate her list of central capabilities, and leaves room for democratic politics only 
when the implementation of these central capabilities is at stake within specific 
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nation-states. This means that we can only resort to good arguments when there is a 
disagreement among people over the principles of justice, given global cultural 
pluralism. As she says, ‘here we must say that the good idea is just that, a good idea. 
It can be used by international agencies and nongovernmental organizations to 
pursue programs within nations that have not yet embraced it’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 
103). Therefore, my account of global citizenship based on global public deliberation 
is more open-ended than Nussbaum’s capability approach, because actual consent is 
acquired both in validating the global principles of distributive justice and in 
implementing these principles in specific nation-states. likewise, insofar as most 
global justice theorists rely on good arguments alone to demonstrate the validity of 
their principles, in comparison, my account is more open-ended than most existing 
theories. 
 
Nevertheless, the global public deliberation should operate within the normative 
constraints set by three guiding principles. The principles are the following: (1) all 
human beings or their representatives should have equal rights to participate in the 
global public deliberation, (2) all human beings or their representatives should have 
equal influence over the final policy outcomes, and, (3) all human beings or their 
representatives should aim to formulate a common identity and a shared public 
culture in the global public deliberation. The normative consensus resulted from the 
global public deliberation should not be deemed legitimate, if it undermines the 
equal status of all human beings as participants, biases towards a particular section 
of the world population, and poses a threat to the solidarities among human beings. 
These principles ensure that the global public deliberation operates in line with the 
principle of cosmopolitan justifiability and continues to be feasible in the long term. 
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In this sense, these principles should be seen as unavoidable normative constraints 
on the deliberative process. 
 
Therefore, this thesis is divided into three parts: Part 1 includes Chapters 1 and 2 and 
focuses on a discussion of Miller’s overall theory of distributive justice, which I call 
a split-level conception of distributive justice (SCDJ). I will demonstrate here that 
SCDJ could only be justified to cosmopolitans if, and only if, Miller could endorse 
the further institutionalisation of global citizenship that could in principle serve as a 
meta-theoretical framework for adjudicating among different theories of distributive 
justice through public deliberation. Part 2 includes Chapters 3 to 6 and focuses on 
discussing the reconstruction of Miller’s account of deliberative democracy on the 
basis of Habermas’s conception of communicative action. I will demonstrate that 
Miller’s account of deliberative democracy requires the notion of communicative 
action to explain how citizens may reach a normative consensus on common social 
issues, the definition of a common national identity, and regulative norms and values 
when they all have different moral intuitions and political emotions. Lastly, Part 3 
includes Chapters 7 and 8 and focuses on discussing how Miller’s SCDJ bears on the 
global justice debate. I will demonstrate that my reconstruction of Miller’s account 
of deliberative democracy could help resolve the impasse in the global justice debate 
because it could serve as a meta-theoretical framework within which to adjudicate 
among different theories of distributive justice. 
 
In Chapter 1, ‘Miller’s Conception of Social Justice and Its Critics,’ I will introduce 
the debate between the distributive and the relational egalitarianists; a debate which 
later informed the positions of the humanist cosmopolitans on the one hand and the 
statists and the liberal nationalists on the other. According to the distributive 
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egalitarian position on social justice, the humanist cosmopolitans argue that 
substantive equality in material terms is the fairest distributional pattern among 
human beings, and any deviation from it should track genuine individual choices 
rather than simple brute luck. In contrast, the statists and the liberal nationalists such 
as Miller believe that substantive equality should not be maintained for its own sake 
but should be anchored in a prior ideal of the equal relationship among citizens. I 
will argue in this chapter that Miller’s ideal of the equal relationship among citizens 
is more appropriate than the distributive egalitarians’ ideal of substantive equality for 
grounding the ethical demands of social justice. This is because the distributive 
egalitarians need to rely on a ‘luck-choice distinction’ that has to be anchored in a 
broader understanding of the equal relationship among citizens so as to justify 
different approaches to responsibility-insensitive basic needs satisfaction and 
responsibility-sensitive substantive inequality regulation. This line of reasoning 
implies that the humanist account of distributive justice could be subsumed into the 
statists’ and/or the liberal nationalists’ accounts, provided that the latter endorses the 
further institutionalisation of global citizenship. This is because, given the 
distributive egalitarians’ acknowledged weakness, they believe that their position 
differs from the relational stance in terms of their different attitudes towards the 
further institutionalisation of global citizenship. 
 
In Chapter 2, ‘Miller’s Split-Level Conception of Distributive Justice and Its Critics,’ 
I will compare Miller’s accounts of social and global justice, finding that there is a 
difference between their requirements. Whereas social justice requires both basic 
needs satisfaction and substantive inequality regulation to occur within nation-states, 
global justice requires only the satisfaction of a short list of basic human needs. I 
will term this the split-level conception of distributive justice (SCDJ) and examine 
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the validity of the three main reasons for subscribing to such a conception at the 
global level: the metric problem, the dynamic problem and the absence of formal 
institutions of citizenship at the global level. Firstly, with respect to the metric 
problem, I will demonstrate that the lack of sufficient normative understandings 
about globally shared distribution poses an obstacle to formulating a common 
conception of substantive equality. That said, the metric problem persists, primarily 
because Miller considers it imperative for each nation-state to preserve a distinct 
public culture among its citizens. Since the differences in the normative 
understanding about distribution among nation-states persist, due mainly to the 
nation-building process, the further institutionalisation of global citizenship could 
potentially solve this problem by facilitating a process of continual communication 
among different cultural values. Secondly, the dynamic problem demonstrates that 
every nation-state should take responsibility for past decisions that have distributive 
implications today. In response, I will show that the dynamic problem in and by 
itself does not serve to justify SCDJ, insofar as the notion of national responsibility 
needs to be situated within a prior theory of distributive justice that specifies which 
justifiable rewards nation-states could legitimately acquire from the global economic 
order and how they could take collective responsibility. Thirdly, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 1, Miller justifies the relevance of regulating substantive inequality on the 
basis of the existence of formal institutions of citizenship among the group of 
individuals in question. Since there is currently no formal institution of global 
citizenship, substantive inequality should not be regulated globally. This argument 
only works if it were morally undesirable and practically unfeasible to establish such 
institutions. I will demonstrate that Miller does have a normative reason for 
supporting the further institutionalisation of global citizenship. Given global cultural 
pluralism, Miller could only justify SCDJ to cosmopolitans if, and only if, there are 
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channels of public deliberation at the global level to adjudicate among different 
theories of distributive justice because human beings naturally have different moral 
intuitions and political emotions with regard to distributive justice. In this light, the 
notion of ‘cosmopolitan justifiability’ should be the philosophical underpinning for 
the said public deliberation, because most global justice theorists appeal to it in 
formulating distributive principles. 
 
In Chapter 3, ‘Miller’s Theory of Nationality and its Critics,’ I will begin to consider 
the question omitted in Chapter 2, as to whether it is feasible to further 
institutionalise global citizenship. As I will show in this and the ensuing three 
chapters, the further institutionalisation of global citizenship is not as unfeasible as 
Miller claims, based on his theory of nationality. Even though it is true that there is 
currently insufficient mutual trust among human beings at the global level, Miller’s 
theory of nationality could still be utilised to design a nation-building process, in 
order to support global citizenship in the long term. In this chapter, I will compare 
Miller’s theory of nationality and Jürgen Habermas’s constitutional patriotism. 
Miller claims that common national identity and a shared public culture serve to 
sustain the formal institutions of citizenship within a nation-state. In contrast, Jürgen 
Habermas’s constitutional patriotism aims to realise social integration through 
citizens’ participation through legally institutionalised communicative action. I will 
demonstrate that it is not possible to bypass the need for a common national identity 
and a shared public culture by resorting to Habermas’s constitutional patriotism for 
two reasons. Firstly, I will argue that the constitutional patriots do not have a valid 
explanation for why citizens are willing to participate in a legally institutionalised 
communicative action without having a common national identity. Secondly, it takes 
a more comprehensive public culture to supply the necessary normative background 
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for the democratic decision-making process to take place and fill in the gap between 
the existing political culture and the morally desirable one in favour of a legally 
institutionalised communicative action. In this light, in order for the global public 
deliberation to be possible in the long term, human beings or their representatives 
should aim to develop a common identity and a shared public culture, because they 
supply a sufficient level of mutual trust among human beings to support the 
functioning of global institutions of citizenship. This is the requirement of the third 
guiding principle of the global public deliberation. 
  
In Chapter 4, ‘Miller’s Account of Nation-Building and Its Critics,’ I will examine 
Miller’s account of nation-building. Miller attempts to balance the demands of 
nation-building with respect for cultural pluralism in the nation-building process. 
This is criticised by the liberal multiculturalists for not paying sufficient respect to 
cultural pluralism at the conceptual level. As I will demonstrate, my reconstruction 
of Miller’s account of nation-building as a two-level process of public deliberation 
may help ascertain that a conservative bias would not commit itself in favour of the 
cultural majorities. The existing national identity and shared public culture could 
serve as the basis for public deliberation about concrete social issues at the level of 
the pragmatic questions. When they become involved in public deliberation on the 
ethical-political questions, all citizens could discuss how to reformulate them 
according to the changing social circumstances. These two levels of public 
deliberation constitute a continuous reiterative process, which would help Miller’s 
account of nation-building avoid a conservative bias. In order for the global public 
deliberation to balance the need of developing a common identity and the respect for 
global cultural pluralism, it should be structured likewise to avoid conservative bias 
towards a particular section of the world population. This reflects the requirements 
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of the second guiding principle for the global public deliberation: that is, all human 
beings or their representatives should exert equal influence over the policy outcomes 
of the global public deliberation. 
 
Nevertheless, my reconstruction of Miller’s account of nation-building, although it 
may assuage the concerns of the liberal multiculturalists, constitutes a problem for 
the nation-building process itself. This is because Miller’s failure to elaborate on the 
exact parameters of the shared public culture necessary to preserve a national 
community makes it practically impossible for citizens to comprehend the extent to 
which the existing national identity and public culture might be challenged without 
posing a threat to the nation as a whole. In this light, it is necessary to arrive at a 
theory that explains why public deliberation per se could help citizens reach a 
normative consensus on a common nationality while each of them has a different 
normative understanding. I will propose that Miller’s account of nation-building 
should incorporate Habermas’s notion of a legally institutionalised communicative 
action since the latter could help him interpret the reformulation of common national 
identity and a shared public culture as a continuous collective learning process, so as 
to approximate the necessary level of mutual trust among citizens.  
 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I will demonstrate that incorporating Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action in Miller’s account of nation-building through a deliberative 
democracy is both necessary and feasible. In Chapter 5, ‘Miller’s Contextualist 
Approach to Political Theory and the Role of Common Moral Intuitions and Political 
Emotions,’ I will show that it is necessary to incorporate Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action because, in addition to Miller’s failure to specify the scope of 
a shared public culture at the level of substantive theory, his contextualist approach 
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to political theory at the methodological level cannot explain how citizens could 
arrive at a normative consensus on subjects such as nationality when each of them 
has different moral intuitions and political emotions. Such a failure at the 
methodological level will have an enormous impact on individual life prospects 
insofar as, according to Miller, political principles are meant to regulate the major 
social institutions and, equally importantly, to motivate common people to comply 
with their ethical demands. Since Miller cannot prove that any political principle is 
consistent with common peoples’ moral intuitions and political emotions ex ante, his 
account of deliberative democracy needs to be reconstructed on the basis of 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action, so as to serve as an 
institutionalised channel of actual public deliberation in order to adjudicate between 
different principles.  
 
In Chapter 6, ‘Habermas’s Conception of Communicative Action and the Role of 
Common Moral Intuitions and Political Emotions,’ I will show that such an 
incorporation is possible, because Habermas’s conception of communicative action 
would allow both common moral intuitions and political emotions to have a bearing 
on our moral reasoning about political principles and social institutions. Many 
constitutional patriots and liberal multiculturalists argue that a communicative action 
does not allow our political emotions to affect our moral judgements about political 
principles and social institutions. First, many constitutional patriots believe that 
Habermas’s notion of communicative action is a self-critical process that runs 
contrary to the very idea of having an affective identification with particular human 
associations. In response, I will demonstrate that a communicative action operates 
within a shared normative background and that it is as important to open this to 
contestation as it is to close it for stability. When this normative background 
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becomes open to contestation, it will be able to incorporate new normative 
understandings, thereby establishing more complex interpersonal relationships. Then, 
as it closes again for stability, this background relies on previously established, 
shared norms and values to instil a sense of affective identification among the 
interlocutors. In the sense that these interlocutors have to rely on previously 
established normative background and the corresponding affective identification 
when participating in communicative action, the notion of communicative action 
could allow political emotions to bear on people’s moral reasoning about political 
principles and social institutions. Second, many liberal multiculturalists believe that 
communicative action prioritises rational argumentation over emotional expression 
by making an arbitrary distinction between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary 
aspects of language use. In response, I will show that this prioritisation is neutralised 
by two concomitant moves on Habermas’s part. On the one hand, in his later career, 
he constantly downplays the importance of the distinction between illocution and 
perlocution. On the other, he claims that communicative action is a universal mode 
of human communication. These two amount to defining a communicative action in 
terms of the interlocutors’ intention to reach a mutual agreement rather than in terms 
of the manner in which the communication is conducted. Therefore, both rational 
argumentation and emotional expression could be adopted in communicative action, 
so long as the interlocutors’ aim is to reach a mutual agreement. In the sense that 
emotional expression serves as an alternative mode of communication to rational 
argumentation, a communicative action could allow political emotions to bear on 
one’s moral reasoning about political principles and social institutions.  
 
Based on the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6, the first guiding principle of the global 
public deliberation should be formulated as follows: all human beings or their 
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representatives ought to have equal rights to participate in the global public 
deliberation. This ensures that actual consent could be obtained from all human 
beings, as free and equal participants, in order to validate distributive principles on 
the ground that they cohere with human beings’ moral intuitions and political 
emotions. 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 aim to demonstrate that my reconstruction of Miller’s account of 
deliberative democracy on the basis of Habermas’s conception of communicative 
action could resolve the impasse among the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal 
nationalists in the global justice debate. In Chapter 7, ‘Resolving the Two Impasses 
in the Global Justice Debate: the Impasse at the Level of Substantive Theories’, I 
will show that an impasse occurs at the level of substantive theory because liberal 
nationalists cannot persuade the associativist cosmopolitans to accept the restricted 
scope of the regulation of substantive inequality on the grounds that the human 
relationships within nation-states are sufficiently different from those at the global 
level. Firstly, I will prove that the exchange between the humanist cosmopolitans on 
the one hand and the statists and the liberal nationalists on the other will only lead to 
a deadlock, insofar as the humanist cosmopolitans do not recognise the ethical 
significance of the human relationships within nation-states. Nevertheless, the 
statists and the liberal nationalists may reject humanist cosmopolitanism on the 
ground that the latter’s ideal of substantive equality has to be anchored in the notion 
of an equal relationship among citizens, so as to justify different approaches to 
responsibility-insensitive basic needs satisfaction and responsibility-sensitive 
substantive inequality regulation. This amounts to the partial or total subsumption of 
the humanist stance into the statists’ and/or the liberal nationalists’ positions on 
distributive justice. Secondly, I will prove that the liberal nationalists could indeed 
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subsume the statists’ accounts of distributive justice, insofar as it combines the three 
statists’ accounts and adds a new factor for consideration in our moral reasoning 
about distributive justice: the motivational force of a common nationality. Lastly, I 
will demonstrate that Miller’s liberal nationalist account of distributive justice will 
not serve to persuade the associativist cosmopolitans to accept the restricted scope of 
the regulation of substantive inequality, despite the fact that the associativist 
cosmopolitans recognise the ethical significance of the human relationships within a 
nation-state. This is because Miller cannot prove to the associativist cosmopolitans 
that the human relationships within nation-states are sufficiently different from those 
at the global level. 
 
In Chapter 8, ‘Resolving the Two Impasses in the Global Justice Debate: the 
Impasse at the Methodological Level,’ I will show that an impasse in the global 
justice debate occurs at the methodological level because the liberal nationalists 
cannot prove to the associativist cosmopolitans that their distributive principles are 
the only valid derivation on the basis of prevalent moral intuitions and political 
emotions at the global level. Firstly, I will demonstrate that the humanist and the 
associativist cosmopolitans either completely reject the importance of common 
moral and political intuitions or understand them as mere instruments for furthering 
universalist ideals. Secondly, I will show that liberal nationalism stands a better 
chance than statism of responding to the cosmopolitan challenge, because Miller’s 
contextualist approach to political theory aims to take account of common peoples’ 
motivation to comply with universalist ideals by allowing common moral intuitions 
and political emotions to affect our moral reasoning about political principles and 
social institutions. Lastly, I will prove that Miller could not persuade the associativist 
cosmopolitans to accept the restricted scope of the regulation of substantive 
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inequality, because he fails to explain why his own distributive principles are the 
only accounts consistent with human beings’ moral intuitions and political emotions 
at the global level. In this light, I will argue that the only solution to these two 
impasses at the levels of substantive theory and methodology is the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship based on deliberative democracy. Insofar as 
the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists all resort to universalist 
values in grounding their accounts of distributive justice, and each have failed to 
persuade the others, an institutionalised public deliberation is required to adjudicate 
among these universalist values on the basis of their consistency with common moral 
intuitions and political emotions at the global level. My reconstruction of Miller’s 
account of deliberative democracy on the basis of Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action could help resolve these impasses in that it could facilitate a 
collective learning process among human beings, so as to arrive at a normative 
consensus on a set of distributive principles on the basis of common moral intuitions 
and political emotions at the global level. Moreover, it aims at the same time to 
develop a common identity and a shared public culture among human beings so as to 
maintain the very functioning of the institutions of global citizenship. In this sense, 
my reconstruction of Miller’s account of deliberative democracy is both desirable 
and feasible in principle, against the background of the global justice debate. 
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Chapter 1: 
Miller’s Conception of Social Justice and Its Critics 
 
       Introduction 
 
Like many other liberal nationalists and statists, David Miller’s overall theory of 
distributive justice ascribes ethical significance to human association within 
nation-states and bears on our moral reasoning about distributive justice. As 
such, he develops a conception of social justice that situates concern with the 
regulation of substantive inequality among citizens above respect for the moral 
equality of human beings. In this light, substantive inequality regulation 
becomes relevant where there are already institutions of citizenship among a 
particular group of people. However, Miller and the statists have been 
challenged by the humanist cosmopolitans regarding the moral relevance of 
equal citizenship in the process of moral reasoning about distributive justice. In 
this chapter, I direct attention to a debate on social justice between the 
distributive and the relational egalitarians which have galvanised the global 
justice debate. It focuses on whether luck should always be factored out of 
differential distributive outcomes in societies. Whereas the distributive 
egalitarians ground the regulation of substantive inequality directly in the moral 
equality of human beings, which always necessitates the application of a luck-
choice distinction, the relational egalitarians ground substantive inequality 
regulation in the equal relations between citizens and, thereby, require the luck-
choice distinction to be anchored in a liberal understanding of citizenship.  
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Miller aligns himself more closely with relational egalitarians and develops his 
conception of social justice around the idea that distributive principles such as need 
and desert should be justified on the basis of their contribution to maintaining equal 
relations among citizens. In contrast, the humanist cosmopolitans share with the 
distributive egalitarians the conviction that the regulation of substantive inequality is 
a direct translation of the principle of the moral equality of human beings, and any 
deviation from it must be justified on the basis of morally responsible individual 
choices. I argue in this chapter that the distributive egalitarians’ sole reliance on the 
luck-choice distinction renders them incapable of justifying different approaches to 
the satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of substantive inequality. Common 
moral intuition would concur with the idea that the luck-choice distinction should be 
suspended when the individual’s basic human needs are unmet, whereas the said 
distinction should be applied in our judgment about the differential distributional 
pattern within society above the minimum threshold of basic needs. Therefore, the 
distributive egalitarians’ luck-choice distinction should be anchored in a broader 
ideal of the equal relationship among citizens so as to justify different approaches on 
the basis of their respective contribution to maintaining an egalitarian, democratic 
society.   
 
In section 1, I will introduce Miller’s three principles of social justice: need, desert 
and social equality. There, I will draw attention to the fact that, for Miller, the moral 
equality of human beings does not necessarily imply substantive equality in material 
terms, unless there are institutions of citizenship among the group of people in 
question. Section 2 discusses whether relational egalitarianism as a whole is better 
equipped conceptually than distributive egalitarianism to win the debate on social 
justice and suggest that Miller’s position of relational egalitarianism proves more 
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cohesive than that of distributive egalitarianism in applying the luck-choice 
distinction. This is because, in contrast to the relational egalitarians like Miller, the 
distributive egalitarians cannot justify different approaches to the satisfaction of 
basic needs and the regulation of inequality with a luck-choice distinction alone. 
This distinction does not in itself tell us why the idea of responsibility should often 
be suspended in satisfying all basic needs within society, whereas at the same time 
be consistently applied in the case of matching economic reward to individual 
contribution to market transactions based on responsibility. Section 3 refutes the 
non-discriminative and the discriminative strategy for restoring distributive 
egalitarianism. The non-discriminative strategy accords the luck-choice distinction 
across-the-board application and yet requires it to be compatible with the ethical 
demands of democratic/social equality. The discriminative strategy restricts the 
operational domain of the luck-choice distinction to the regulation of substantive 
inequality and avoids making any judgment about the satisfaction of basic needs. I 
will demonstrate that the non-discriminative and the discriminative strategy both fail 
because they amount to assimilation of distributive egalitarianism within relational 
egalitarianism. Thus, this chapter will prove that relational egalitarianism could 
subsume the distributive egalitarians’ notion of a luck-choice distinction, insofar as it 
could justify different approaches to the satisfaction of basic needs and the 
regulation of substantive inequality. It also implies that the statists’ and the liberal 
nationalists’ attempt to ground ethical concerns within the regulation of substantive 
inequality in an equal relationship among citizens is more plausible than the 
humanist cosmopolitans’ attempt to translate the moral equality of human beings 
directly into substantive equality in material terms. 
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1. Miller’s Conception of Social Justice: Three Principles 
 
David Miller’s conception of social justice is concerned primarily with the fairness 
of the distributional pattern within nation-states. Miller’s accounts of distributive 
justice have two characteristics that run through his conceptions of both social and 
global justice: (1) the weak sense of equality, and (2) the contextualist accounts of 
distributive justice. First, principles of social justice embody a weak sense of 
equality that can at most be equivocated with equal treatment: ‘where two men are 
equal in the relevant respects (so that their “dues” are the same), they should be 
treated in the same way’ (Miller, 1976, p. 21). This is called the moral equality of 
human beings, which, Miller argues, should not directly implicate the stronger sense 
of equality—the substantive equality of various currencies, including resources, 
wealth, welfare, et cetera. This distinction between moral and substantive equality is 
central to my discussion of Miller’s position on social justice because it serves to 
distinguish him from the distributive egalitarians, who subsume substantive equality 
into social justice itself. In contrast to the distributive egalitarians, who consider 
substantive equality to be a necessary corollary to the moral equality of human 
beings, Miller argues that the regulation of substantive inequality is grounded in the 
formal institutions of citizenship among groups of people within the same nation-
state.  
 
Second, in order to fairly render each his due, Miller resorts to a contextualist 
account of distributive justice that splits its operational domain into three contexts 
based on the prevalent type of human relationship within each of them: (1) 
solidaristic community, (2) instrumental association and (3) citizenship (Miller, 1999, 
p.25-32). Miller defines a solidaristic community as a context within which ‘people 
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share a common identity as members of a relatively stable group with a common 
ethos’ (Miller, 1999, p. 26). Specific to this context is the principle of need, that is, 
‘each member is expected to contribute to relieving the needs of others in proportion 
to ability, to the extent of liability depending upon how close the ties of community 
are in each case.’ The second mode of relationship is instrumental association, 
particular to which is the principle of desert. Here an individual relates to others in a 
utilitarian manner, that is, his/her aims and purposes can best be furthered by 
cooperation with others. In other words, ‘justice is done when he receives back by 
way of reward an equivalent to the contribution he makes’ (Miller, 1999, p. 28). 
Lastly, in modern liberal democracies, full members of a political society relate to 
each other as equal citizens, alongside possibly also their identity as members of a 
solidaristic community and/or instrumental association. To qualify and, more 
importantly, to be perceived as equal members of the same society, each citizen is to 
enjoy an equal status, that is, ‘each person enjoys the same set of liberties and rights, 
rights to personal protection, political participation, and the various services that the 
political community provides for its members’ (Miller, 1999, p. 30). Even though the 
ideal of an equal relationship among citizens can only, in reality, be approximated at 
best, the ideal in and by itself requires the distributional pattern within society to be 
arranged in the abovementioned way, so as to make this possible. 
 
In modern liberal societies, these three distributive contexts overlap to the extent that 
the ethical demands of need, desert and social equality will possibly pull in different 
directions. Miller is quite explicit about the overlapping of the three contexts of 
social justice: solidaristic communities, instrumental associations, and institutions of 
citizenship. In regard to that between citizenship and solidaristic community, he 
claims, ‘wherever the boundaries of the state coincide with the boundaries of the 
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nation… (people) will acknowledge obligations of justice to meet one another’s 
needs as identified within the national culture, and these obligations will tend over 
time to be incorporated into the definition of citizenship itself’ (Miller, 1999, p. 31). 
In regard to the overlapping between citizenship and instrumental association, he 
insists, ‘in recognising desert we do not compromise equality of status’ (Miller, 1999, 
p. 32). In this light, social equality requires that both the formal institutions of 
citizenship and all distributive practices in solidaristic communities and instrumental 
associations be formed on the basis of an equal relationship among citizens. As 
Miller says, ‘(social equality) requires that our most important associations be 
formed on the basis of equality…this then entails the claims about distributive 
equality… (that is) citizens must have equal voting rights, equal welfare rights, and 
so forth.’ Moreover, ‘a commitment to social equality may help shape other practices 
of distributive justice that are not themselves internally egalitarian...In many 
instances, our concern for justice will impose constraints on practices without fully 
determining their form’ (Miller, 1999, p. 241). Essentially, this means that those 
important advantages directly enabling citizens to remain equal to each other—
including goods which satisfy basic needs—should be distributed equally, whereas 
the distribution of other types of advantages—which is based on desert—can tolerate 
substantive inequalities in material terms to the extent that maintaining the equal 
status of citizens as possible. 
 
2. How Miller’s Conception of Social Justice Bears on the Debate between 
the Distributive and the Relational Egalitarians 
 
In the last section, I introduced Miller’s relational account of social justice, which 
consists of three principles: need, desert and social equality. In this section, in 
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agreement with Anderson, Sheffler and Wolf, I will show that the distributive 
egalitarians fail to justify their different approach to the luck-choice distinction with 
regard to responsibility-insensitive basic needs satisfaction and responsibility-
sensitive substantive inequality regulation. As Miller’s conception of social justice 
exemplifies, the luck-choice distinction needs to be anchored in a prior ideal of 
democratic/social equality, thereby justifying its suspension and application on the 
basis of its contribution to maintaining an equal relationship among citizens of the 
same nation-state.  
 
There is a debate between the distributive and the relational egalitarians over which 
is the most appropriate approach to social justice. According to the distributive 
egalitarians, also known as the “luck egalitarians”, the influence of brute luck on 
peoples’ lives ought to be mitigated, whereas, at the same time, individuals should 
be held responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their voluntary choices, 
against the background of equal opportunity. In contrast, the relational egalitarians 
believe that the point of social justice is to uphold an ideal of equal interpersonal 
relationships rather than substantive equality per se within society, and advance two 
claims. First, excessive weight on the luck-choice distinction will generate morally 
implausible conclusions in the following two senses: on the one hand, the sole 
reliance on the luck-choice distinction would not compensate individuals for their 
unmet basic needs if these individuals are deemed morally responsible for their own 
conditions. This conclusion is inconsistent with the common moral intuition that 
individuals should be compensated for their disadvantaged distributive outcomes 
regardless of their responsibility for them, if and only if, they are below a minimum 
threshold of basic human needs. On the other hand, the sole reliance on the luck-
choice distinction would compensate individuals for disadvantageous factors such as 
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physical or mental disability on the ground that they render the individuals in 
question less capable of taking moral responsibility for their distributive outcomes. 
Although these compensatory measures are often adopted in liberal societies, the 
reason given by the distributive egalitarians on the sole basis of a luck-choice 
distinction expresses a contemptuous attitude towards those who embody the less 
desirable characteristics that need to be compensated for. Second, the luck-choice 
distinction should be anchored in a prior ideal of the equal relationship among 
citizens, because in order to maintain an equal democratic society, the distributional 
pattern should be arranged in ways that ensure that the equal status of citizens as 
possible. 
 
To begin with the first claim, distributive egalitarians enjoyed a long period of 
popularity before its momentum was slowed by Elizabeth Anderson’s seminal piece, 
‘What is the Point of Equality?’ The distributive egalitarians maintain essentially 
that any deviation from substantive equality among human beings should be justified 
on the basis of a luck-choice distinction. Dworkin was the first of the distributive 
egalitarians to incorporate the luck-choice distinction into egalitarian justice. His 
theory of social justice is based on the conviction that differential distributive 
outcomes ought to reflect individual choices rather than the effect of their contingent 
social circumstances. In order to illustrate this conviction, he devises an ‘envy test,’ 
which operates in the following way. As he says, because ‘(E)quality of resources 
assumes a fundamental distinction between a person, understood to include features 
of personality like convictions, ambitions, tastes, and preferences, and that person’s 
circumstances, which include the resources, talents, and capacities he commands,’ 
the envy test aims to ‘make circumstances equal under an appropriate version of the 
envy test’ (Dworkin, 2002, p. 140, 141; my emphasis).  In the hypothetical setting of 
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an auction, individuals are to bid for resources on an equal footing in order to pass 
the envy test. The test demands that ‘people with full knowledge of their plans, 
projects, and attachments do not prefer the resources assigned to someone else’ 
(Dworkin, 2002, p. 141). After the auction, differential distributive outcomes 
accruing to individuals are legitimated as long as they only reflect the effect of 
‘option luck’ rather than ‘brute luck.’ As he defines it, ‘option luck is a matter of 
how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out—whether someone gains or loses 
through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have 
declined. Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense 
deliberate gambles’ (Dworkin, 2002, p. 73). Insofar as participants in the auction are 
fully aware of the risks they face in making certain choices, they should be held 
responsible for the corresponding distributive outcomes. In contrast, brute luck 
reflects mainly contingent circumstantial factors that are not consciously chosen by 
the participants, and they should be mitigated. 
 
Nevertheless, as Anderson correctly points out, placing too much weight on the 
distinction between choice and circumstances will render the theory of social justice 
so inflexible that various problems could arise: (1) abandonment of negligent victims, 
(2) discrimination against the disabled, (3) geographical discrimination among 
citizens, (4) occupational discrimination, (5) vulnerability of dependent care-takers, 
(6) exploitation and the lack of a safety net, (7) abandonment of the prudent 
(Anderson, 1999, p. 295-300). In these hypothetical cases, victims of option luck are 
left to suffer without state intervention because the disadvantages accruing to them 
can be traced back to their own voluntary choices in the past. For instance, does an 
injured driver who decided not to insure and later caused an accident deserve to be 
left without proper assistance? Does a blind man who caused his own disability 
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deserve to be treated differently by the welfare system than his counterparts who are 
born in that way? These examples not only expose a general conceptual defect in 
taking the luck-choice distinction to its extreme but also show a large difference 
between distributive egalitarianism and common moral intuitions. As problems (6) 
and (7) demonstrate, the state intervention required by distributive egalitarianism 
does not take account of how laymen think about social justice: they normally expect 
the state to compensate them for some part of their disadvantages, even if these 
derive from their own voluntary decisions. According to distributive egalitarianism, 
Anderson protests, ‘nothing would prevent people, even those whose gambles were 
prudent but who suffered from bad option luck, from subjection to debt peonage, 
sweatshops, or other forms of exploitation’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 298). This means 
that common moral intuition points to a threshold above which substantive 
differential inequalities could be allowed to track responsibility but below which 
compensation is available to all citizens regardless of responsibility. As Anderson 
argues, ‘without such a discriminative application of the luck-choice distinction, 
when someone’s option luck is sufficiently bad, she may have to switch resources 
from insurance to meeting her family’s basic needs’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 298). 
Nevertheless, this will set in motion a vicious cycle in which unmet basic needs and 
the inability to ensure feed into each other endlessly.  
 
In line with Anderson’s arguments above, Miller’s conception of social justice aims 
to capture people’s common moral intuitions and political emotions regarding 
distributive practices within society. He bases the formulation of the three principles 
of social justice on a ‘Humean approach’ which, rather than dismissing ordinary 
beliefs and sentiments out of hand unless they can be shown to have a rational 
foundation, leaves them in place until strong arguments are produced for rejecting 
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them (Miller, 2000, p. 25). Taking this methodological commitment as given, Miller 
argues that only a contextualist theory of justice would fit the bill. Contextualism, as 
opposed to universalism, ‘assumes that principles of justice are context specific 
rather than invariant across contexts.’ Accordingly, ‘the kind of theory we should be 
looking for is one that connects principles to contexts in a systematic way’ (Miller, 
2013, p. 43). With regard to social justice, therefore, ‘contextualists hold that it is the 
context of distribution itself that brings one or other principle of justice into play.’ 
Although different contextualist theories will identify this context in different ways, 
Miller finds it most convincing to define contexts ‘by reference to the kind of social 
relationship that exists among the parties between whom justice is to be done’ 
(Miller, 2013, p. 47-8).  
 
In this light, according to Miller, people’s common moral intuitions and political 
emotions suggest that human relations within a solidaristic community are bound by 
a common identity and, as such, shape distributive practices on the basis of members’ 
neediness. Here, distribution is less sensitive to the luck-choice distinction because it 
is hard to say that neediness is a personal quality that merits proportional reward. 
Even though Miller believes that a responsibility condition ought to guide the 
implementation of basic need satisfaction, distribution still aims primarily to relieve 
neediness, regardless of the luck-choice distinction. In other words, if the claimants 
are judged responsible for their neediness, there are two possibilities after the 
distribution is made on the basis of the need principle: ‘one is that their claims are no 
longer claims of justice, but claims of humanity or benevolence…the other is that the 
claims of need are still claims of justice, but that they carry with them an obligation 
to pay back to the community the costs of irresponsible behaviour’ (Miller, 1999, p. 
228). In contrast, people usually understand human relations within instrumental 
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association as purely utilitarian and oriented towards personal interests. As a result, 
they expect to acquire proportional rewards from an economic transaction under the 
working of free market forces. Here, the desert principle requires distribution to 
track individual contributions evaluated on the basis of market prices at equilibrium. 
Therefore, the luck-choice distinction is more salient, as Miller makes a distinction 
between two types of luck that in one way or another interfere with individual desert 
claims: (1) integral luck, and (2) circumstantial luck. Integral luck interferes with an 
individual’s performance itself, that is, what a moral agent actually achieves, whilst 
the circumstantial one determines the moral agent’s opportunity to perform in the 
first place. He argues,  
 
Integral luck nullifies desert…we have to factor it out when judging what 
people deserve on the basis of their performances—and circumstantial luck 
may lead us to qualify our judgements about the deserts of those who are its 
beneficiaries. But if we want to keep the notion of desert and use it to make 
practical judgements, we cannot compensate completely for luck of the 
second kind (Miller, 1999, p. 146). 
 
In other words, in order to track individuals’ moral responsibility for their choices in 
instrumental association, integral luck that directly affects individuals’ performances 
has to be compensated for, whereas circumstantial luck cannot be completely 
factored out of the calculation of individual contribution to the market, since it 
always lies in the background of individual performances. Despite the fact that the 
distinction between these two types of luck may be debatable, the point remains that 
Miller goes to great lengths to apply the luck-choice distinction to the substantive 
inequality resulting from market transactions above the minimum threshold of basic 
human needs. This is consistent with Anderson’s argument above, that common 
moral intuitions usually distinguish basic needs satisfaction from distribution above 
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a minimum threshold of basic human needs in terms of different applications of the 
luck-choice distinction. 
 
Moreover, sole reliance on the luck-choice distinction would distinguish certain 
personal characteristics as being disadvantageous and, as such, express a 
contemptuous attitude towards those who possess these characteristics. As Anderson 
observes, the distributive egalitarians have to depend on a paternalistic state 
apparatus in order to cope with the impact of brute luck on individuals. She cites 
Arneson’s 1988 argument for equal opportunity of welfare as the ideal of substantive 
equality: ‘he argues that it is sometimes unfair to hold people responsible for the 
degree to which they are responsible agents. The capacities needed for responsible 
choice…are partly a function of genetic endowments and partly of the good fortune 
of having decent parents. Thus, the imprudent are entitled to special paternalistic 
protection by society against their poor choices’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 300). 
Essentially, this means that certain personal qualities can be considered as conducive 
to imprudent choices and thereby ought to be treated as disadvantageous vis-à-vis 
the rest. Because of these disadvantageous personal qualities, the decision regarding 
state intervention to compensate for brute luck should be sensitive to them. 
Nevertheless, this type of paternalism necessitates undue intrusion into individual 
privacy in order to decide whether the possession of certain unfortunate personal 
characteristics entitles them to compensation for their own poor choices, which 
shows insufficient respect for the individuals in question (Anderson, 1999, p. 306). 
 
Jonathan Wolff makes a similar case, saying that under distributive egalitarianism, 
people are forced to make ‘shameful revelations,’ which erodes their equal standing. 
The notion of shameful revelation is predicated on the assumption that each 
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individual has something she would like to keep to herself. During the process of 
benefit claiming, ‘one is required not merely to admit but to make out a convincing 
case that one is a failure, unable to gain employment even when there is no difficulty 
for others…this removes any last shred of dignity from those already in a very 
unfortunate position’ (Wolf, 1998, p. 114). Even if the state does not directly pry 
into an individual’s private life by collecting personal data and confirming details 
regarding unfortunate disadvantages, it invites all citizens to reflect on the personal 
qualities for which she cannot be judged responsible, which is an exercise 
humiliating enough in and by itself. As Scheffler maintains,  
 
We cannot know whether an individual’s disadvantage entitles her to 
egalitarian compensation without disentangling the respective contributions 
made by her will, on the one hand, and by unchosen features of her talents 
and personal circumstances, on the other hand, to the processes that put her 
at that disadvantage. For this reason, luck egalitarianism encourages her to 
look inward in deciding whether she has a legitimate claim on fellow 
citizens (Scheffler, 2003, p. 21). 
 
Hence, the primary critique of distributive egalitarianism establishes that the 
distributive egalitarians cannot apply the distinction between brute and option luck 
consistently, while at the same time catering to common moral intuitions that see 
value in compensating individuals regardless of responsibility below a minimum 
threshold of basic need. Moreover, by extending the notion of brute luck to cover 
certain personal qualities that supposedly inhibit people from making prudent 
decisions distributive egalitarians fail to show equal respect for all individuals.  
 
A second critique of distributive egalitarianism points out that the luck-choice 
distinction needs to be anchored in a prior ideal of the equal relationship among 
citizens, in order to capture the essence of egalitarianism. Anderson claims that the 
point of egalitarianism is not the equality of substantive outcomes per se; rather, it is 
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the equal social relations that justify such distributive patterns in the first place. The 
track record of historical egalitarian political movements shows that their woes 
concentrate on what Iris Young identifies as the faces of oppression: marginalisation, 
status hierarchy, domination, exploitation, and cultural imperialism. ‘Such unequal 
social relations generate, and were thought to justify, inequalities in the distribution 
of freedoms, resources, and welfare’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 312). Therefore, to take 
substantive equality in material terms as being the fundamental ideal is to miss the 
point of egalitarianism. In contrast, as a social ideal, democratic equality fits the bill 
better. As Anderson conceives it, 
 
First, democratic equality aims to abolish socially created 
oppression…Second…democratic egalitarians are fundamentally concerned 
with the relationships within which goods are distributed, not only with the 
distribution of goods themselves…third…democratic equality is sensitive to 
the need to integrate the demands of equal recognition with those of equal 
distribution. Goods must be distributed according to principles and 
processes that express respect for all (Anderson, 1999, p. 313- 4). 
 
This means that egalitarianism is concerned with equal social relations at the 
fundamental level which, under specific circumstances, has direct distributive 
implications.  
 
In the same vein, Miller argues that substantive and social/democratic equality are 
fundamentally different and yet closely related, insofar as social equality anchors 
substantive equality in the ideal of equal relations among citizens of the same nation-
state. Firstly, substantive equality is connected to a specific distributional pattern, 
whereas social equality constrains the shape that the distributive pattern within 
society could legitimately assume. As Miller says, ‘(substantive equality) specifies 
that benefits of a certain kind…should be distributed equally, because justice 
requires this… (social equality) identifies a social idea, the ideal of a society in 
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which people regard and treat one another as equals.’ Secondly, distributive equality 
is individualistic, whereas social equality is holistic. Miller claims, ‘(i)n the first case 
we can explain what is wrong with inequality by pointing to particular individuals 
who can justly claim more than they are getting, whereas in the second case the 
badness of inequality resides in the character of the whole society’ (Miller, 1999, p. 
222-3). In other words, distributive equality remains individualistic because it 
focuses on the distributive outcomes of the particular scheme backed by the major 
social institutions, whereas social equality regulates major social institutions in a 
holistic manner by investigating what type of distributive scheme is required for an 
equal relationship among citizens. Therefore, rather than requiring the equalisation 
of material advantages among human beings for the sake of substantive equality as a 
default distributional pattern, social justice should be concerned first and foremost 
with the background conditions that justify such an egalitarian distribution.  
 
In this light, state intervention should be prepared to override the moral demands of 
substantive equality in the name of democratic equality when the need arises, 
because some substantive inequality arising from social contingencies should be 
tolerated so long as it does not undermine equal relations among citizens. As 
Sheffler maintains, ‘(t)he social and political ideal of equality…itself has distributive 
implications. Furthermore, even if that ideal emphasises the importance, for certain 
purposes, of abstracting from the differing contingencies of individuals’ situations, it 
must also concede the necessity of attending to such differences for other purposes’ 
(Sheffler, 2003, p. 22). In other words, even though substantive inequality in 
material terms will probably emerge from different social contingencies associated 
with individuals, they should not be neutralised in particular cases. In effect, it is the 
ideal of an equal relationship among citizens that determines the extent to which 
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substantive inequality in material terms should be tolerated above the minimum 
threshold of basic human needs. As Sheffler explains, 
 
(P)eople whose basic needs have not been met…cannot participate in 
political life or civil society on a footing of equality with others, or can do so 
only with great difficulty. Even if basic needs have been met, a society 
cannot be considered a society of equals if the resources that individuals 
have available to pursue their most cherished ends are left entirely at the 
mercy of market forces. (Sheffler, 2003, p. 23) 
 
In other words, above the threshold of basic needs, substantive inequalities in 
material terms are regulated not because of the ideal of substantive equality but 
because of the need to preserve the equal status of citizens. 
 
As mentioned in the last section, Miller believes that social equality should constrain 
distribution according to need and desert in any given society. With regard to 
distribution according to need, citizens ought to decide on what needs to be counted 
as socially recognised necessities and thereby reserved for distribution according to 
intrinsic needs. These are protected by entrenched welfare rights that are directly 
relevant to maintaining the functioning of individuals as full and equal citizens. As 
such, they are different from the concern with public goods. As he says, 
‘(w)elfare…is not simply another public good whose supply should depend entirely 
on how much people actually want to see it provided; rather, welfare rights should 
take their place alongside other rights of citizenship, such as freedom of speech and 
political participation…’ (Miller, 1989, p. 313). Therefore, both the category of basic 
needs and the procedure for substantiating it reflect the ideal of an equal relationship 
among citizens, as citizens are equally entitled to benefit from the ‘entrenched 
welfare rights’ and to deliberate about the specific content of these rights. 
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With regard to distribution according to desert, equal citizenship should impose 
constraints on the extent of differential distributive outcomes permitted in the free 
market for two reasons. First, unjustified, radical, substantive inequalities in material 
terms within a national economy would contribute to the undermining of equal social 
relations, especially each individual’s perception of it. Second, and more importantly, 
‘public welfare can contribute to egalitarian aims only in conjunction with a broader 
policy aimed at reducing inequalities in primary incomes; indeed, in the absence of 
such a policy, even the more limited aim of allocating medical aid and so forth on 
the basis of need is compromised’ (Miller, 1989, p. 315). Therefore, both equal 
citizenship and the security of basic needs could justify the regulation of differential 
distributive outcomes in the free market. State intervention, in regulating substantive 
inequalities in the national economy, takes the form of preserving the fairness of 
background conditions rather than redistributive taxation. The main objective, 
according to Miller, is to curb the free market’s inclination towards exploitation and, 
as such, prevent integral luck from interfering with how each individual fares in the 
market. Although, as Miller argues, luck cannot be altogether eliminated from 
distributive outcomes, ‘(w)hat we can do is try to ensure that the results of luck are 
non-cumulative so that its distributive effects are as far as possible genuinely random’ 
(Miller, 1989, p. 172). Since the systemically condoned exploitation between 
transacting individuals in the labour market represents a paradigm case of 
accumulated luck, and the act of exploitation itself undermines equal social 
relationships, state intervention should directly target the structural roots of the 
problem. 
 
In summary, this section discussed the relational egalitarians’ critiques of 
distributive egalitarianism. First, the relational egalitarians charge that the 
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distributive ones cannot effectively distinguish basic needs satisfaction from 
substantive inequality regulation because the luck-choice distinction in and by itself 
fails to justify the compensation for individuals regardless of their moral 
responsibility below a minimum threshold of basic human needs. Second, the 
relational egalitarians maintain that democratic/social equality is better suited than 
substantive equality to justify different approaches to both the satisfaction of basic 
needs and the regulation of substantive inequality, insofar as the relational ideal is 
concerned with the background conditions that justify any distributional pattern 
within society, including but not limited to substantive equality.    
 
3. The non-Discriminative and the Discriminative Strategy of Rescuing 
Distributive Egalitarianism 
 
The last section demonstrated that the relational egalitarians’ criticisms point to the 
inability of a mechanical application of the luck-choice distinction to justify different 
approaches to responsibility-insensitive basic needs satisfaction and responsibility-
sensitive inequality regulation on the basis of luck-choice distinction alone. This 
section will discuss two strategies that may salvage the centrality of the luck-choice 
distinction in social justice that attempt to deal with both the satisfaction of basic 
needs and the regulation of substantive inequality: (1) the non-discriminative and (2) 
the discriminative strategy. What the discriminative and the non-discriminative 
approach have in common is their claim that the critiques of the relational 
egalitarians do not apply to every strand of distributive egalitarianism; it simply calls 
for a moderated version of the responsibility view. They differ in how much 
operational domain could be afforded to the luck-choice distinction before it 
becomes impossible to avoid morally undesirable consequences. Whereas the non-
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discriminative approach requires the luck-choice distinction to regulate both basic 
needs satisfaction and substantive inequality regulation, the discriminative approach 
restricts the operational domain of the said distinction to substantive inequality 
regulation alone.  
 
Beginning with the non-discriminative approach, Arneson observes that Anderson’s 
criticisms target only an extreme strand of distributive egalitarianism that takes 
substantive equality among human beings as the default distributional position. 
Nevertheless, a moderate version of distributive egalitarianism does not have to 
commit to substantive equality per se; by giving up the ideal, it could retain the force 
of luck-choice distinction at the intrapersonal rather than the interpersonal level. In 
other words, substantive equality in material terms is no longer taken as the default 
position, and thereby interpersonal comparison loses its significance in this new 
formulation. He calls this version of distributive egalitarianism ‘responsibility-
catering prioritarianism’ (Arneson, 2000, p. 2). Responsibility-catering 
prioritarianism takes account of the relational aspect of social justice by adopting 
welfare as the currency of substantive equality, nonetheless considering democratic 
equality merely as instrumentally valuable at the level of implementation. As he 
claims, ‘(p)rioritarianism is egalitarian in tilting in favour of those who are badly off. 
But the priority is assigned to aiding an individual in virtue of how badly his life is 
going, as measured by an objective scale of well-being, not intrinsically by any 
comparisonn between his life and that of others’ (Arneson, 2000, p. 7). 
Responsibility serves to guide the state’s attention to certain groups of individuals 
when several claims of assistance are at stake: ‘the moral value of altering a state of 
affairs in a way that makes someone better off or worse off depends, other things 
being equal, on the degree of responsibility the person bears for her present 
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condition’ (Arneson, 2000, p.8). Therefore, when facing multiple claims of 
assistance with similar scores on the objective well-being scale, it is more morally 
valuable to attend to those who are less responsible for their current dire situation 
vis-à-vis other claimants. Democratic equality fits into this picture as a means for 
realising equality of well-being among individuals, rather than as the fundamental 
ideal that trumps all other considerations. As Arneson explains, ‘(t)he egalitarian 
principle of well-being is concerned with the quality of human relationships that 
people sustain in a society, but these are evaluated by their impact on well-being.’ 
(Arneson, 2000, p. 4). In other words, individual well-being remains the ultimate 
point of concern, whereas the issue of equal relations among individuals is taken into 
account because of its impact on individual well-being. 
 
Responsibility-tracking prioritarianism has across-the-board application covering 
both the satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of substantive inequality 
because it ignores the threshold between the two operational domains, comprising 
the entire spectrum of state intervention. There is simply no need for such an 
arbitrary threshold when the fundamental concern is with the absolute level of well-
being at the intra-personal level. Nevertheless, it strikes me as implausible that the 
luck-choice distinction alone could do the job of justifying state intervention without 
the backdrop of democratic equality. Under the extreme version of distributive 
egalitarianism, the moral urgency of state intervention is based on both the extent of 
deviation from substantive equality in material terms and the involvement of 
voluntary decisions in causing the deviation. It makes sense to have a default 
position in distributive outcomes because the moral judgment about state 
intervention needs a baseline to bring individual cases into relevance.  
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Suppose a distributional pattern (D) in which A is rewarded 1 unit of resources, B is 
rewarded 2 units, and C is rewarded 3 units, the grounds on which the extreme 
distributive egalitarians would call it unfair is that comparing to the baseline pattern 
(B*) in which A, B, and C similarly have 2 units, pattern D represents a deviation 
not yet justified. Arneson has taken the baseline pattern out of the picture, stating 
that moral judgment cannot but rely on some other ideal independent of the view of 
responsibility. For instance, in light of pattern D, what can an egalitarian of well-
being say about its fairness without a baseline to fall back on, assuming that 1 unit of 
resources corresponds to 1 unit of well-being? According to my understanding, 
Arneson’s objective scale of well-being tells us that A enjoys 1 unit of well-being, B 
enjoys 2 units, and C enjoys 3 units. However, it does not tell us why this pattern is 
unfair on any of the moral agents in question. Without having substantive equality as 
pattern B*, there is no sense in comparing across A, B, and C. Because Arneson 
relinquishes substantive equality as the default position of the distributional pattern, 
he faces the difficulty of treating the differential distributive outcome as an 
unjustified deviation from substantive equality in welfare. Moreover, without a 
threshold specifying the minimum level of well-being, there is no way to know 
which of A, B, and C signifies absolutely deprived. The responsibility view cannot 
even begin to exert its moral force here since we first need to determine which one is 
absolutely deprived and then bring the luck-choice distinction into consideration.  
 
Of course, when Arneson mentions an objective scale of well-being, he must have 
what Dworkin terms ‘objective conceptions of welfare’ in mind. ‘This supposes that 
a person’s welfare consists of the resources available to him, broadly conceived, so 
as to include physical and mental competence, education and opportunities as well as 
material resources. Or, in some versions, more narrowly conceived so as to include 
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only those that are in fact, whatever people think most important’ (Dworkin, 1981, p. 
226). Guided by the objective conception of welfare, therefore, Arneson needs to 
specify a bundle of material advantages that corresponds to a minimum level of well-
being. Only with this in place could he bring the luck-choice distinction into 
relevance. Nevertheless, if this were true, a threshold would exist in the spectrum of 
state intervention and only the responsibility view would expressly apply below it. It 
is, therefore, quite surprising that Arneson makes a strong case for Anderson’s 
arbitrary division between the satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of 
substantive inequality. According to him, ‘(d)emocratic equality extends an 
unconditional guarantee that each member of the society shall have access to the 
basic functioning level. But this priority ranking is too stringent’ (Arneson, 2000, p. 
13). A comparison of his argument against the arbitrary division between the 
satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of substantive inequality with what his 
responsibility-tracking prioritarianism has virtually become tells us much about the 
difficulty distributive egalitarians face. Without a commitment to substantive 
equality as the default position, the luck-choice distinction will automatically lose an 
important baseline distributional pattern in order to bring itself into relevance. At 
best, it could obtain below a specified minimum threshold of advantages at an 
individual’s disposal. Nevertheless, Arneson, like many distributive egalitarians, will 
not be content with this restricted operational domain of luck-choice distinction, 
because his design for prioritarianism shows his ambition to unite the satisfaction of 
basic needs and the regulation of substantive inequality with the uniform application 
of a responsibility view. Unfortunately, this cannot be done without an overarching 
ideal that is sufficiently sensitive to the said two components of state intervention. 
For certain, treating substantive equality and equality in terms of a minimum bundle 
of resources—which is what prioritarianism has virtually become—separately 
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cannot fill the bill. In this light, a partial or complete submission to the relational 
ideal of democratic equality seems inevitable. 
 
Recognising the need to at least partially anchor the luck-choice distinction in the 
ideal of an equal relationship among citizens, Brown argues that a ‘moderate luck 
egalitarianism’ requires the luck-choice distinction to regulate any deviation from 
substantive equality in material terms whenever it is not in contradiction with the 
relational ideal of democratic equality. Brown suggests that Anderson’s critiques 
obtain in relation to an extreme strand of luck egalitarianism. More importantly, 
there is an advantage to luck-choice distinction that has to be preserved under a 
moderate version of distributive egalitarianism that recognises the relational aspect 
of social justice. As he argues,  
 
(T)he alleged difficulty with luck egalitarianism is that where misfortunes 
are not the result of brute luck they can never be unjust on this view (no 
matter how unjust they might seem). This charge defeats strict luck 
egalitarianism but not moderate luck egalitarianism. Moderate luck 
egalitarianism concedes the importance of other equality norms, including 
democratic equality (Brown, 2005, p. 329- 30). 
 
At the same time, ‘(l)uck egalitarians…questioned the moral status of brute luck in 
order to push the envelope of egalitarian thinking and raise the profile of a range of 
disadvantages that are not the consequence of any human wrongdoing and, therefore, 
had gone unchampioned’ (Brown,2005, p. 329). Hence, it seems that Brown 
responds to Anderson’s criticism by leaving open the possibility that the luck-choice 
distinction could be overridden by democratic equality when in practice the all-
things-considered judgement tilts the balance between the two towards democratic 
equality. Nevertheless, this logic is quite slippery, in the sense that in order to 
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override the luck-choice distinction in some cases, democratic equality has to have 
the authority to override it in all cases if need be. 
 
Apparently, this is not what Brown has in mind. He explicitly states,  
 
(W)hat I am proposing…is the following pluralistic view of justice as 
equality: a society of equals is one in which we try to mitigate the influence 
on people’s lives of brute luck, attribute the costs of voluntary choices to the 
individuals themselves where possible, but at the same time struggle to 
eliminate extreme poverty, exploitation, oppression and lack of access to 
valued functionings (Brown, 2005, p. 331; my emphasis). 
 
In other words, the luck-choice distinction holds its moral force whenever it does not 
contradict the moral demands of democratic equality. I understand that Brown means 
to partially concede to the sway of democratic equality in justifying state 
intervention by giving the latter equal significance for substantive equality in 
material terms. In other words, democratic equality and substantive equality in 
material terms could both be intrinsically valuable at the fundamental level. In order 
for this to be plausible, substantive equality needs to stand as equal a likelihood as 
democratic equality of overriding democratic equality. However, this is not the case, 
as the passage cited above demonstrates that the luck-choice distinction only holds 
sway whenever it does not undermine equal social relations. Thus, Brown’s partial 
submission to democratic equality cannot be plausible without tacitly presupposing 
the fundamentality of democratic equality when judging the fairness of distributional 
patterns. 
 
The second strategy for rescuing distributive egalitarianism from Anderson’s 
critiques attempts to distinguish the satisfaction of basic needs from the regulation of 
substantive inequality, and only requires the luck-choice distinction to regulate the 
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latter. Tan and Markovits both restrict the operational domain of distributive justice 
to the regulation of substantive inequality and its subject matter to major social 
institutions so as to refute Anderson’s critique of distributive egalitarianism. In this 
way, firstly, the moral concerns of democratic equality and substantive equality in 
material terms could to a large extent align with each other to produce policy 
recommendations regarding state intervention on the basis of the luck-choice 
distinction. As Tan says, ‘the luck-choice principle is meant only to determine the 
distributive entitlements of persons above the threshold of a basic minimum 
(however that minimum is defined), and is irrelevant for the purpose of determining 
whether a person who is floundering due to a lack of basic goods ought to be rescued’ 
(Tan, 2014, p. 100). Markovits agrees,  
 
(D)istributive justice...reflects only one facet of a wider scheme of 
obligations that persons owe to one another, and others of these obligations 
may speak up where distributive justice is silent, or indeed outweigh 
distributive justice in appropriate circumstances…in the case at issue, 
humanitarian considerations…require aiding even the most foolhardy, once 
their state becomes sufficiently bad (Markovits, 2008, p. 281).  
 
Recall Anderson’s argument that the sole reliance on the luck-choice distinction 
contradicts the common moral intuition that individuals should be compensated for 
their conditions regardless of their moral responsibility below a minimum threshold 
of basic human needs. The problem with distributive egalitarianism, therefore, is that 
the luck-choice distinction cannot be suspended in relation to the satisfaction of 
basic needs and then be consistently applied in relation to the regulation of 
substantive inequality. Here, Tan and Markovits’ strategy opens the way for the 
satisfaction of basic needs to be covered by humanitarianism, and in this case, the 
judgment about the regulation of substantive inequality as an ethical concern with 
justice could plausibly apply the luck-choice distinction.  
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Secondly, the proper subject of distributive justice is thought to be more focused 
than former notions of distributive egalitarianism, that is, it is only concerned with 
how major social institutions’ backing of specific distributional patterns can be 
justified to those affected by it. Tan argues,  
 
Luck egalitarianism ought not to be in the business of mitigating all natural 
contingencies (due to luck) that people face. As an aspect of social justice, 
luck egalitarianism is only concerned with how institutions deal with such 
natural contingencies. Its goal is to ensure that institutions are not arranged 
so as to convert a natural trait (a matter of luck) into actual social advantages 
or disadvantages for persons. So, only those natural contingencies that have 
an institutional consequence in this way fall within the scope of luck 
egalitarianism (Tan, 2014, p. 103). 
 
In comparison to the extreme strand of distributive egalitarianism that identifies 
certain personal qualities as dis-/advantageous a priori, Tan’s version is concerned 
with the major social institutions that turn certain personal qualities into dis-
/advantageous social contingencies.  
 
In a similar vein, Markovits calls this extreme distributive egalitarianism ‘maximalist, 
responsibility-tracking elaboration of luck egalitarianism,’ as opposed to his ‘luck 
egalitarianism reconstructed.’ As he explains,  
 
The responsibility tracking focus on eliminating morally arbitrary 
disadvantage to the exclusion of all other disadvantage neglects that people 
are active, self-directed creatures and reduces them, in their distributive 
claims, into passive vessels of fortune…and therefore undermines certain 
features of moral personality that make solidarity appealing and 
subordination wrong to begin with, including for the luck egalitarian 
(Markovits, 2008, p. 290). 
 
Luck egalitarianism reconstructed, on the other hand, rejects the proposal to 
eliminate all involuntary disadvantages in a wholesale manner; it only compensates 
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for those natural disadvantages that are arbitrarily turned into differential distributive 
outcomes by major social institutions.  
 
Therefore, in contrast to the non-discriminative strategy, the discriminative approach 
to preserving the luck-choice distinction transforms distributive egalitarianism by 
narrowing down the operational domain of the responsibility view. More importantly, 
as such, it could retain substantive equality as the default position from which any 
deviation needs to be justified on the basis of the responsibility view. Insofar as the 
more restricted domain and the more focused subject matter of distributive justice 
jointly save distributive egalitarianism from dispensing with the luck-choice 
distinction altogether, the relational alternative to substantive equality, namely 
democratic equality, is proven redundant.  
 
Nevertheless, this approach is not that different from the non-discriminative 
approach in the sense that it does not dispute the validity of democratic equality 
when applied to both the satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of substantive 
inequality. Tan holds that democratic and substantive equality are both valid for 
different reasons; whereas the relational egalitarians require substantive equality to 
be justified on the basis of its contribution to maintaining democratic equality, the 
distributive egalitarians value distributive equality for its own sake. Moreover, he 
also recognises the relational egalitarians’ ability to apply the luck-choice distinction 
to substantive inequality in material terms. As he explains, ‘it does not follow from 
the contrast between democratic equality and luck egalitarianism that democratic 
egalitarians do not make use of the luck/choice distinction at all…The luck-choice 
distinction helps the relational egalitarians to work out exactly how much substantive 
inequality in material terms should be tolerated, and for what reasons, within a 
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designated democratic society’ (Tan, 2014, p. 98). Therefore, it seems that, as in the 
non-discriminative approach, the discriminative approach could be assimilated into 
relational egalitarianism because it has a considerably narrower operational domain 
than relational egalitarianism and cannot decisively refute the validity of democratic 
equality.  
 
Nevertheless, Tan argues that distributive egalitarianism is more attuned to 
cosmopolitanism, since it may motivate human beings to establish global institutions 
to regulate substantive inequality in material terms. As he claims, ‘under democratic 
equality, distributive equality is a political value, since it is confined to members of a 
democratic polity on account of what it means to be an equal member of a 
democratic association; whereas it is a moral value for luck egalitarians, since it is 
taken to apply to all agents antecedently presumed to be moral equals’ (Tan, 2014, p. 
98). In other words, because democratic equality is predicated on the existence of the 
institutions of citizenship, it cannot motivate individuals to care about substantive 
equality among distant foreigners. In contrast, substantive equality is directly based 
on the moral equality of human beings, so its application is not constrained by 
existing territorial boundaries between nation-states. If this difference between 
distributive and relational egalitarianism were the only reason to argue against the 
assimilation of distributive egalitarianism into the latter, then assimilation would not 
be an insurmountable difficulty. This is because the institutions of citizenship have 
been undergoing continuous transformation throughout recent human history, and 
have in some cases expanded to encompass a supranational entity, for instance, the 
European Union. What is more, the cosmopolitan account of distributive justice, as 
will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, presupposes the further institutionalisation of 
global citizenship. Leaving aside the question of the motivational force of 
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substantive equality until Chapter 6, there are multiple normative reasons for 
supporting the institutionalisation of global citizenship, and with the establishment 
of global citizenship will come the need for regulating substantive inequality in 
material terms so as to maintain an equal relationship among citizens at the global 
level. Even though the link between these normative reasons and the regulation of 
substantive inequality is not as direct as the distributive egalitarians would like, it is 
still possible that the relational egalitarians would come to support a cosmopolitan 
account of distributive justice that requires regulation of substantive inequality at the 
global level. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I introduced Miller’s conception of social justice, which consists of 
three main principles based on need, desert and social equality. Strictly speaking, 
only distribution according to need and desert is properly a principle of distributive 
justice, as it principally concerns the relative share each individual receives out of 
the common stock of material resources. On the other hand, social equality is 
concerned with the fairness of the background conditions of distribution and as such 
constrains the shape of the legitimate distributional pattern within society so as to 
maintain equal relations among citizens. Central to Miller’s conception of social 
justice is the priority of social equality over need and desert, which directly 
distinguishes him and other relational egalitarians from the distributive egalitarians.  
 
In section 2, following Anderson, Sheffler and Wolff, I demonstrated that Miller’s 
relational egalitarian position proves to be more suitable than distributive 
egalitarianism in responding to the ethical demands of the satisfaction of basic needs 
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and the regulation of substantive inequality, because social equality serves as the 
relational ideal that justifies different approaches to both the responsibility-
insensitive satisfaction of basic needs and the responsibility-sensitive regulation of 
substantive inequality. In section 3, I challenged Arneson and Brown’s non-
discriminative and Tan and Markovit’s discriminative strategies for salvaging the 
concept of distributive egalitarianism. Non-discriminative strategy accords the luck-
choice distinction across-the-board application, including both the satisfaction of 
basic needs and the regulation of substantive inequality and yet requires it to cohere 
with the ethical demands of democratic/social equality. This, in effect, amounts to 
the assimilation of distributive egalitarianism into relational egalitarianism, because 
the application of the luck-choice distinction is justified on the basis of its 
compatibility with the requirements of the ideal of equal relations among citizens. In 
contrast, the discriminative strategy restricts the application of the luck-choice 
distinction to the regulation of substantive inequality, thereby avoiding the difficulty 
of justifying different approaches to both the satisfaction of basic needs and the 
regulation of substantive inequality. Nevertheless, since this strategy does not reject 
democratic/social equality as having applicability across the board, its only reason 
for precluding distributive egalitarianism from being subsumed into relational 
egalitarianism is the latter’s supposed inability to motivate positive initiatives to 
regulate substantive inequality at the global level. As I suggested in section 3 and 
will further reinforce in Chapter 2, the relational egalitarians such as Miller could 
come to endorse substantive inequality regulation at the global level by recognising 
that in order to persuade cosmopolitans, they require an institutionalised channel of 
public deliberation to adjudicate among different theories of distributive justice at 
the global level. With the establishment of institutions of global citizenship comes 
the ethical demand of regulating substantive inequality among human beings qua 
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citizens. Hence, relational egalitarianism could successfully subsume distributive 
egalitarianism if it endorses the further institutionalisation of global citizenship. 
Given that the statists and the liberal nationalists, who align closely with the 
relational egalitarians, continue to reject any positive proposal for global citizenship, 
it remains to be seen whether such assimilation is possible. I will discuss in the next 
chapter Miller’s three reasons for opposing regulation of substantive inequality at the 
global level and will construct a normative reason for him to support the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship on the basis of the need for public 
deliberation to adjudicate among different global principles of distributive justice. 
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Chapter 2:  
Miller’s Split-level Conception 
of Distributive Justice and Its Critics 
 
Introduction 
 
The 21st century has witnessed the emergence of a wide range of actors other than 
the traditional nation-states, a result, primarily, of globalisation. The changes that 
have taken place in the conventional international system are interpreted differently 
by the cosmopolitans on the one hand and the statists and the liberal nationalists on 
the other. As will be discussed at length in Chapter 6, there are two types of 
cosmopolitans: the humanist and the associativist. The humanist cosmopolitans 
usually take the moral equality of human beings as their starting point and argue that 
substantive equality in material terms is the fairest distributional pattern in the global 
economic order, and any deviation from it should track genuine individual choices 
rather than brute luck. The associativist cosmopolitans accept the statists and liberal 
nationalists’ claim that the regulation of substantive inequality should be grounded in 
the institutions of citizenship, in addition to respect for the moral equality of human 
beings. However, since the ability of the traditional nation-states to protect basic 
human rights has been eroded by ever-increasing transnational factors that cut across 
geographical boundaries, both the humanists and the associativists agree that nation-
states need to be replaced by global institutions of citizenship.  
 
In contrast, Miller’s overall theory of distributive justice aims to provide a normative 
foundation for the current international system based on the traditional nation-state. 
As such, he differs from the cosmopolitans in two respects. First, he endorses what I 
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call a split-level conception of distributive justice (SCDJ) that takes the regulation of 
substantive inequalities to be relevant at the domestic level but irrelevant at the 
global level. In Chapter 1, I introduced Miller’s conception of social justice and his 
claim that the regulation of substantive inequality is grounded in the institutions of 
citizenship. Here, Miller extends this conception to the global level and offers an 
overall theory of distributive justice that treats the global and the domestic sphere as 
two different distributive contexts, because different modes of human relationships 
persist therein. Second, he rejects the need for further institutionalising global 
citizenship. With regard to the first aspect, Miller disagrees with the cosmopolitans 
on the point that the moral equality of human beings can be directly translated into 
substantive equality in material terms at the global level, because of the metric and 
the dynamic problem. Here Miller is mainly challenging the humanist cosmopolitans’ 
position on distributive justice, insofar as the associativist cosmopolitans recognise 
the ethical significance of human association within nation-states. With regard to the 
second aspect, Miller rejects the cosmopolitans’ attempt to further institutionalise 
global citizenship based on democratic procedure on the ground that the mutual trust 
particular to the relations among fellow nationals can only be nurtured within a 
bounded society. Here Miller is engaging with cosmopolitanism as a whole, as both 
the humanist and the associativist cosmopolitans endorse the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship.  
 
In this chapter, I will argue that Miller’s SCDJ obtains because the absence of formal 
institutions of global citizenship distinguishes the global from the domestic level and 
are two different distributive contexts. Nevertheless, his rejection of the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship does not obtain, because he requires public 
deliberation at the global level to adjudicate among different global principles of 
 
 
59 
distributive justice. In section 1, I will discuss the connection between Miller’s 
conceptions of social and global justice in order to introduce SCDJ, as well as his 
position on the further institutionalisation of global citizenship. In section 2, I will 
introduce the three main normative reasons for restricting the regulation of 
substantive inequality to the domestic level: the metric problem, the dynamic 
problem and the lack of global institutions of citizenship. In section 3, I will 
demonstrate that global cultural pluralism makes it very difficult to arrive at a 
common metric of substantive equality in material terms at the global level in the 
short term. However, this problem could be overcome by purposeful communication 
among different cultural communities in the long term and as such, does not pose an 
insurmountable obstacle to realising the humanist cosmopolitans’ vision of global 
justice. In section 4, I will demonstrate that the need for nation-states to take 
responsibility for their past collective decisions does not justify SCDJ, because it has 
to be anchored in a prior theory of distributive justice, as the humanist cosmopolitans 
argue. In section 5, I will demonstrate that Miller will be unable to persuade the 
humanist cosmopolitans to accept SCDJ because the latter fails to ground the ethical 
concern with distributive justice in the institutions of citizenship. Moreover, despite 
the fact that the associativist cosmopolitans recognise the grounding relationship 
between citizenship and distributive justice, Miller cannot persuade them to accept 
SCDJ, because they understand the implications of conditions for distributive justice 
at the global level differently from Miller. In this light, I will suggest that, in order to 
overcome the impasse between cosmopolitanism and his SCDJ, Miller will require a 
further institutionalisation of global citizenship based on deliberative democracy, 
insofar as an institutionalised channel of public deliberation could democratically 
adjudicate among different global principles of distributive justice. This account of 
global citizenship should be based on the notion of ‘cosmopolitan justifiability’, 
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because most global justice theorist appeal to it in validating their distributive 
principles. 
 
1. Miller’s Split-Level Conception of Distributive Justice 
 
In this section, I will introduce Miller’s overall theory of distributive justice and his 
rejection of the need to further institutionalise global citizenship. First and foremost, 
according to Miller, both the satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of 
substantive inequality at the domestic level require only the protection of a limited 
number of basic human needs globally. Due to the difference between his 
conceptions of social and global justice, I will call this overall theory of distributive 
justice a split-level conception of distributive justice (SCDJ). In the previous chapter, 
I introduced the three main principles of social justice: need, desert and social 
equality. The need principle demands that all intrinsic needs within society be 
satisfied. This principle applies to a solidaristic community, wherein the members 
respond to each other’s neediness in a loose reciprocal manner. Secondly, 
distribution according to desert dictates that economic rewards shall be equivalent to 
individual contributions. The desert principle applies to the context of instrumental 
association, wherein individuals relate to each other in a utilitarian manner, that is, 
his/her aims and purposes are best furthered through cooperation with others. The 
third principle of social justice, that of distribution according to social equality, 
stipulates that distribution within a nation-state shall be carried out in such a manner 
as to maintain an equal relationship among citizens.  
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In contrast, Miller’s conception of global justice protects only a ‘global moral 
minimum’ (GMM) defined by a short list of basic human needs1. GMM is similar to 
the needs principle that obtains within nation-states, in the sense that (1) the 
minimum threshold is set up with reference to the notion of ‘intrinsic needs’, and (2) 
it contains both a physical-biological and a social component and (3) it requires the 
duties of justice to meet all needs within a specified operational domain. Firstly, as 
he claims, ‘the needs in question must be what I have elsewhere called “intrinsic” 
needs…a person’s intrinsic needs are those items or conditions it is necessary for a 
person to have if she is to avoid being harmed’ (Miller, 2007, p. 179). Moreover, in 
the sense that the basic human needs protected by GMM are similarly defined by the 
physical-biological and the social component, the specific categories of intrinsic 
needs protected under GMM will be much more modest because of the thinner 
shared a normative understanding of what conditions are necessary for meeting the 
minimal decency condition.  
 
Furthermore, GMM considers that all nation-states bear remedial responsibility at 
the global level to assist a nation-state suffering absolute deprivation, as long as no 
moral agent in the said nation-state is responsible for that nation’s outcome (Miller, 
2007, p. 164). Two distinctions are in order here. The first distinction is between 
outcome and remedial responsibility. According to Miller, ‘[Outcome responsibility] 
                                                        
1 Here it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider the capability approach to human rights 
developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. A clear exposition of their approach can be found 
in The Quality of Life (1993). As an alternative to Miller’s basic-need approach, the capability 
approach aims to formulate a list of core human capabilities that all human beings should have in 
order to pursue activities indispensable for their flourishing. In comparison with the basic-need 
approach, the advantage of the capability approach is that it respects the general need of human 
beings to flourish and at the same time recognizes the different ways in which they utilise resources to 
flourish. On the other hand, the advantage of the basic-need approach is that it does not have to rely 
on a particular conception of human dignity in order to identify the conditions indispensable for 
human to flourish. It will take further study to determine which approach is more suitable for 
developing a list of basic human rights on the basis of their respective advantages. Nevertheless, the 
two approaches do have something in common. Similar to Miller’s basic-need approach, the 
capability approach also relies on the shared normative understanding among people to formulate the 
list of core human capabilities.   
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has to do with agents producing outcomes… [whereas remedial responsibility] has to 
do with agents having a duty or obligation to put a bad situation right’ (Miller, 2007, 
p. 83- 4). ‘A moral agent is outcome responsible for a certain state of affairs when 
the agent has contributed to producing the outcome’ (Miller, 2007, p. 86-97). 
‘Remedial responsibility comes into relevance when no agent can be found directly 
outcome responsible for the state of affairs in question, and there is a moral urgency 
to assign responsibility to improve a certain situation up to a specific minimum 
threshold’ (Miller, 2007, p. 98). Miller also makes a second distinction between 
duties of justice and duties of humanitarianism. The duties of humanitarianism can 
be understood as affording moral agents more supererogation than the duties of 
justice. As Miller says, humanitarian assistances ‘are duties that we have good 
reason to perform, without being required to perform them as we are required to 
perform duties of justice’ (Miller, 2007, p. 248). The duty of justice to remedy a 
breach of GMM is rather modest, because GMM restricts the duty of justice to a 
very specific category of cases. That is to say, when no moral agent within the 
nation-state in need of assistance is outcome responsible for the absolute deprivation 
they are experiencing, any nation-state able to assist them ought to do so out of the 
obligations of justice.  
 
Finally, in conjunction with SCDJ, Miller rejects any positive proposal for further 
institutionalising global citizenship on the ground that the lack of mutual trust 
between human beings from different cultural communities makes it practically 
impossible to motivate such a political transformation. According to Miller, an 
administrative state should be established on the basis of the republican conception 
of citizenship that not only protects citizens’ private liberties but also their equal 
political rights to participate in the public deliberation (Miller, 2000, p. 53). In order 
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to maintain a republican conception of citizenship, citizens must have a sufficient 
level of mutual trust among themselves so that they are motivated to act responsibly 
in the public deliberation. As will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, this mutual trust 
could only be supplied by a nation-building process that develops a common 
national identity and a shared public culture among its citizens. Due to the lack of 
mutual trust at the global level, any proposal for the further institutionalisation of 
global citizenship will remain abstract and unfeasible. As he says, the republican 
conception of citizenship ‘has clear empirical preconditions; it cannot simply be 
conjured up ex nihilo…International peace, international justice and global 
environmental protection are very important objectives, and we must hope that 
republican citizens will choose to promote them externally. But this cannot be 
achieved by inventing in theory cosmopolitan forms of citizenship which undercut 
the basis of citizenship proper’ (Miller, 2000, p. 96).  
 
2.  The Three Reasons for a Split-Level Conception of Distributive Justice 
 
In order to justify SCDJ, Miller offers three normative reasons: the metric problem, 
the dynamic problem and the lack of global institutions of citizenship. First, the 
metric problem is derived from the fact that owing to global cultural diversity; 
common normative understanding is too thin for all human beings to reach the same 
valuation of natural resources and for the content of opportunity sets to be equalised 
globally. Miller examines two categories of the distributive egalitarian proposals: (1) 
the equalisation of the access to natural resources and (2) the equalisation of 
opportunity sets. Firstly, Hillel Steiner’s ‘global fund’ proposes to tax the resource-
rich nation-states according to the aggregate value of their natural resource holdings 
and redistribute the revenue among the resource-poor nation-states. Contra Steiner, 
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Miller argues that there are three factors accounted for entirely by human decisions 
and behaviours rather than nature itself: (1) the set of rules of conditions under 
which the natural sites are held, (2) the abilities and the preferences of the people 
who might use the property and consume what is produced there and (3) the impact 
of the surrounding neighbourhood on the property value of the natural site. That is to 
say, the aggregate value of a particular nation-state’s natural resources depends on 
the human decisions and behaviours that legislate certain sets of rules that regulate 
the uses of natural sites within its jurisdiction. It is also influenced by the local 
culture that shapes consumer preferences and the composition of the labour market 
in certain ways. Equally, the characteristics of the surrounding neighbourhood can 
raise as well as lower the property value of natural sites significantly (Miller, 2007, p. 
60). Even though these factors include various aspects of human decisions and 
behaviours—political decisions, consumer preferences and the development of 
employable skill sets, et cetera—they all depend on a shared normative 
understanding about the value of certain natural resources. Indeed, as Miller argues,  
 
Steiner’s proposal to tax nations according to the aggregated property values 
of the sites they contain…appears arbitrary…Nations contribute to the 
creation of their own aggregate property values in at least the three ways we 
have just traced. So if they are taxed on that basis, they are to a considerable 
extent being taxed according to the values they adhere to collectively and 
the choices they have made (Miller, 2007, p. 60-1). 
 
In other words, in the face of multiple normative understandings about certain 
natural sites within nation-states, it will be very difficult for human beings to come 
to a single, non-arbitrary tax scheme that uniformly extracts revenue from each 
nation-state.  
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Secondly, Moellendorf claims, ‘if equality of opportunity were realised, a child 
growing up in rural Mozambique would be statistically as likely as the child of a 
senior executive at a Swiss bank to reach the position of the latter’s parent’ 
(Moellendorf, 2002, p. 49; cited by Miller, 2007, p. 63). In order to realise this 
distributive egalitarian vision and equalise opportunity sets globally, Miller argues 
that some kind of metric is needed to decide whether two opportunity sets are at least 
equivalent. However, this is where the cosmopolitan principles of global distributive 
justice encounter an obstacle. Since people rely on a common normative 
understanding in order to flesh out the general ideal of equal opportunity in more 
substantive terms—that is, ‘a number of specific types of resource and opportunity 
are singled out as significant, and these are not regarded as substitutable’—at the 
domestic level, greater cultural diversity at the global level renders this type of 
collective decision unattainable (Miller, 2007, p. 66).  
 
Second, the dynamic problem is derived from the idea that the people within nation-
states should take responsibility for their collective decisions in the past which have 
differential distributive outcomes today. Miller illustrates this idea with a 
hypothetical case wherein two societies make different collective decisions to 
employ natural resources in respectively consumerist and conservationist ways, and 
end up with unequal distributive outcomes. In this case, he thinks that extensive 
redistributive measures to restore the substantive equality between these two 
societies would ‘leave very little incentive for states and their citizens to behave in a 
responsible way’ and in extreme cases may even compromise the political self-
determination of these societies (Miller, 2007, p. 70- 4). Third, the lack of global 
institutions of citizenship marks the global level off as a different distributive context 
than the nation-state, insofar as the ethical demands of distributive justice are 
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grounded in the social ideal of equal relations among citizens. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, both basic needs satisfaction and substantive inequality regulation are 
justified on the basis of their contribution to human beings’ equal status under the 
shared political institutions of the administrative state. Therefore, Miller argues that 
a nation-state is a different distributive context to the global sphere, in the sense that 
it consists of four characteristics all at the same time. That is to say; a nation-state 
places individuals under shared legal coercion, gives them involuntary membership, 
enables them to pursue reciprocal cooperation and supplies them with a collective 
identity (Miller, 2013, p. 151- 61). Insofar as human relationships at the global level 
do not bear these four characteristics, at least not to the same extent as within nation-
states, the regulation of substantive inequality is not morally relevant. 
 
3. The Critiques of the Metric Problem 
 
In this section, I will argue that the metric problem obtains insofar as global cultural 
pluralism makes it difficult for human beings to achieve among themselves a 
consensus on the metric of substantive equality in material terms. Nevertheless, this 
problem could be mitigated through institutionalised public deliberation at the global 
level in the long term, as cultural commonalities are social contingencies that could 
be developed through purposeful policies. 
 
First and foremost, Weinstock argues that ‘Miller…clearly overestimates the extent 
to which modern nation-states are characterised by the kind of ‘shared 
understandings’ upon which the foregoing argument depends’ (Weinstock, 2003, p. 
277). He cites the difference between how villagers and urban residents understand 
the meaning of extracting natural resources. As he says,  
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In Canada…entire ‘forms of life’ have emerged out of industries concerned 
with the extraction of various natural resources. For inhabitants of the 
fishing villages of Newfoundland, of the farmlands of the prairies, or of the 
logging villages of British Columbia, the resources that they harvest 
represent more than just fungible goods, the full value of which might be 
fully expressed in monetary terms or traded off against other goods. Rather, 
they are laden with meaning and symbolic value, as befits resources around 
which a community has organised its life. The situation with respect to these 
resources is completely different…for urban dwellers within the same 
country (Weinstock, 2003, p. 277). 
 
This observation falls short of decisively refuting the metric problem in two senses. 
Firstly, it does not tell us whether there is a distinction between the degrees of 
cultural diversity at the global and the domestic levels. Miller’s metric problem 
essentially stresses that the normative understandings about distribution are more 
diverse at the global level than within nation-states. Nevertheless, Weinstock merely 
shows that cultural diversity makes it difficult to reach a common normative 
understanding about distribution at the domestic level as well. If he intends to 
address this comparison, it will make more sense to specify the extent to which the 
cultural diversity within nation-states approximates that at the global level.  
 
Secondly, he fails to grasp the role of deliberative democracy in reaching widely 
acceptable collective decisions alongside cultural diversity within nation-states and 
maintain a reasonable amount of shared normative understanding among citizens. 
The reasonable amount of shared normative understanding at the domestic level is 
not a self-perpetuating phenomenon but a purposely produced result brought about 
through a deliberative democracy. During and through the process of public 
deliberation within nation-states, the normative understanding about distribution 
among citizens could both serve as the necessary normative background for reaching 
collective decisions on various issues including but not limited to the pursuit of 
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distributive justice and become enriched in the long run. Hence, these 
abovementioned two points combined to cast doubt over whether simply pointing to 
the overestimation of the cultural homogeneity within nation-states is going to do the 
job of rejecting the metric problem at the global level. 
 
In reply, Fabre argues that a deliberative democracy does not even deliver 
distributive justice. In other words, ‘the difference between preferences and needs is 
a conceptual one, and as such it does not depend on the views of the democratic 
majority’ (Fabre, 2003, p. 319). She cites a hypothetical example:  
 
Consider a nomadic religious ascetic, who claims that he needs resources to 
print out religious tracts instead of housing, and who happens to live in a 
very secular society which regards housing as much more important than 
printing religious tracts. Miller argues that the ascetic does not have a claim 
to those resources, even though they would not exceed the amount needed to 
provide him with housing, on the grounds that ‘someone’s preferences, no 
matter how strong, cannot ground claims of need’ (Fabre, 2003, p. 319). 
 
In other words, the definition of basic human needs does not depend on the 
perceptions of the democratic majority. Instead, there should be a way of 
determining what should be counted as basic needs within a nation-state 
independently of a deliberative procedure. Moreover, even if we agree that a 
deliberative procedure is needed in order to formulate a definition of basic human 
needs, we can put it in such a way that the definition requires the equalisation of 
material advantages, insofar as the procedure is grounded in a pre-institutional 
concern with the equal respect for human beings and requires the participants to 
behave accordingly in their deliberations about distributive schemes. Fabre claims,  
 
There is…a moral prescription as to how one should act toward others, 
which is not yielded by deliberative procedures but rather underpins citizens’ 
commitment to them. But if that prescription is correct, why not allow that it 
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entails other, more detailed requirements to act toward others in certain 
ways…why not allow, further, that it entails certain requirements to 
distribute resources in certain ways… (Fabre, 2003, p. 320) 
 
In other words, even if a deliberative procedure is needed in order to yield the 
definition of basic human needs, the procedure itself carries specific values and 
norms. Therefore, we could demand that the deliberative procedure realise 
substantive equality in material terms alongside other values and norms.  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that a deliberative procedure would rely on specific values and 
norms does not serve to prove that these are selected arbitrarily. Even though I do 
not wish to take a stance on this matter, it is at least preferable that a democratic 
procedure should be founded on values and norms that are acceptable to the morally 
relevant demos. As Rawls argues in his notion of ‘political liberalism,’ society 
should be regulated by the most reasonable political conception of justice, which is 
endorsed by an overlapping consensus comprised of all the reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines in society (Rawls, 2011, p. 60). A political conception that 
carries specific values and norms is itself developed through a sophisticated process 
of individual moral reasoning based on an examination of all the prevalent 
philosophical doctrines found within the society in question in order for it to be 
acceptable to all morally relevant individuals. Therefore, the regulation of 
substantive inequality cannot be added to the founding values of the deliberative 
procedure, unless it can be proved to be widely acceptable. If it is at least 
manageable at the domestic level to achieve a consensus on a common metric of 
substantive equality, the difficulties will multiply when we move to the global level, 
as we will not be entirely sure of what the moral equality of human beings requires, 
beyond securing a bare physical-biological minimum. As noted in section 1, beyond 
basic human needs defined by the physical-biological minimum, people need to rely 
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on a shared normative understanding about what it means to live a minimally decent 
life within a given social environment. The moral equality of human beings does 
require us to treat each human being equally; nonetheless, it fails to specify exactly 
how to treat them. Hence, we cannot allow the moral equality of human beings to 
continue to specify what justice requires of distribution beyond meeting the basic 
needs defined by the physical-biological minimum, because the moral equality of 
human beings in and by itself does not have specific guidelines for such a process. 
 
This response to Fabre actually applies to all humanist cosmopolitans who take 
substantive equality in material terms to be the fairest distributional pattern of the 
global economic order. Given global cultural diversity, I am not sure if people from 
all cultural backgrounds could indeed agree on the same conception of substantive 
equality in material terms, or even treat substantive equality as an essential part of 
their conceptions of the good. Therefore, the humanist cosmopolitans would need to 
engage in an endless discussion as to why a particular conception of substantive 
equality in material terms ought to be the only interpretation of the moral equality of 
human beings, regardless of the different conceptions of the good. As long as a 
justification for the principles of global justice for all human beings is an integral 
part of our moral reasoning, it is highly doubtful that a particular conception of 
substantive equality can be successfully justified as being an integral part of all 
conceptions of human good without suppressing certain cultural communities.  
 
Of course, the humanist cosmopolitans could still argue that the moral equality of 
human beings at least requires the satisfaction of basic needs, to which even the 
statists and the liberal nationalists cannot reasonably object. On the basis of this 
understanding, they could arrive at the conclusion that the regulation of substantive 
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inequality is warranted at the global level because radical inequality is detrimental to 
the satisfaction of basic needs. Tan records this approach in Justice without Borders 
(2004) as the ‘derivative approach to equality.’ This approach aims to ‘show that so 
long as there are great inequalities between people, the basic rights of the poor (or at 
the very least the worst-off) cannot be fully met for a variety of reasons.’ Therefore, 
‘equality can thus be a normative concern derived from the more basic moral 
concern with ensuring that people are able to meet their basic needs’ (Tan, 2004, p. 
53-4). Moreover, excessive substantive inequalities in material terms not only 
undermine the ability of the global poor to fulfil their basic needs as guaranteed by 
Miller’s GMM, but also produce other detrimental effects at the global level. For 
instance, Ayse Kaya and Andrej Keba identify five types of such detrimental effects: 
(1) increased global conflict, (2) undermined global poverty relief efforts, (3) 
reduced global solidarity, (4) undermined self-respect of individual human beings, 
and (5) undermined procedural fairness in international organisations (Kaya & Keba, 
2011). In a sense, there is a causal link between substantive inequality in material 
terms and its various detrimental effects including, but not limited to, absolute 
deprivation. As Lea Ypi argues, ‘the relief of absolute deprivation is causally related 
to the non-fulfilment of claims for the relief of relative deprivation. Poverty and 
inequality appear closely intertwined’ (Ypi, 2012, p. 118). Ypi believes that, given 
the causal link between the two types of deprivations in practice, it is imperative to 
regulate substantive inequalities in order to tackle the structural roots of poverty 
against the global background conditions. Moreover, addressing the radical 
inequalities in the global background conditions necessitates not only the 
equalisation of material resources but also the prevention of the detrimental effects 
in the form of power asymmetry and unequal opportunities for political participation 
(Ypi, 2012, p.115-20). In light of the causal link between substantive inequalities 
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and poverty, Ypi proposes that we could find a common metric of substantive 
equality by focusing on the global ‘positional good,’ whose absolute value ‘depends 
on the relative standing of their possessors compared to each other’ (Ypi, 2012, p. 
98). Power serves as such a global positional good, in the sense that the pervasive 
power asymmetry between the developed and the developing countries is responsible 
for rendering individuals within some of these countries absolutely worse off than 
others (Ypi, 2012, p. 123). Gilabert agrees with Ypi in terms of the general strategy 
of discovering a common metric of substantive equality in material terms, as he 
strives to define global positional goods along three lines: (1) the opportunities to 
access abstract goods that can be specified in roughly the same ways in different 
cultural contexts, (2) the tokens of some advantages equally accessible to all and (3) 
the equal opportunity to migrate freely (Gilabert, 2012, p. 216).  
 
Miller was able to recognise the validity of global positional goods as a common 
metric of substantive equality since he explicitly acknowledges the detrimental 
effects of substantive inequalities at the global level, despite his narrow focus on 
political domination. According to him, substantive inequalities may give rise to (1) 
inequalities of power, (2) undermined self-determination of the weak nation-states 
and (3) compromised ‘fair terms of cooperation’ (Miller, 2007, p. 75- 6). 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that he rejects the use of redistributive measures even 
for the purpose of reducing the impact of substantive inequalities on absolute 
deprivation, and neglects to elaborate on how exactly to counter these detrimental 
effects through collective efforts at the global level. The reason for this could be that, 
although the category of global positional good is the specification of a common 
metric of substantive equality in material terms, it still remains to be substantiated by 
more particular norms and values which cannot be taken for granted. In light of 
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global cultural pluralism, the substantiation of the idea of the global positional good 
still requires a deliberative procedure to bridge different cultural values and thereby 
reach a normative consensus. This opens up the possibility that a deliberative 
democracy could be extended to the global level so as to reach a consensus on global 
positional goods in the long term in a similar manner to that within nation-states. 
This line of reasoning merits further investigation, insofar as it challenges Miller to 
give a justification for restricting the regulation of substantive inequality to the 
domestic level when a deliberative procedure could be established at the global level 
in order to develop a common metric of substantive equality. I will discuss this in 
detail in section 5. Thus, the metric problem obtains to the extent that global cultural 
pluralism poses a problem for realising substantive equality in material terms in the 
short term, if and only if, establishing deliberative democracy is impossible at the 
global level. 
 
4. The Critique of the Dynamic Problem 
 
In this section, I will focus on examining the validity of the dynamic problem in light 
of the cosmopolitans’ critiques, and demonstrate that it does not serve to justify 
SCDJ, even though nation-states should be the main bearer of the collective 
responsibility for protecting GMM. First and foremost, Caney points out that 
national responsibility cannot be reduced to individual responsibilities in the 
traditional sense. As Caney claims, ‘the very plural and diverse nature of most states 
make it difficult to conceive of states as agents making decisions. Rather, they 
comprise diverse elements, divided by religion, class, interests, pursuits, region, and 
(often) nationality. The policies adopted by a state are thus never the choices of all 
the members of that state’ (Caney, 2003, p. 30). In other words, the policies 
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implemented by each nation-state may not be representative of the values and beliefs 
of all the individual citizens within them, therefore, nation-states cannot be held 
collectively responsible.  
 
However, as discussed in the last section, the cultural diversity within a nation-state 
does not make it impossible to reach a normative consensus among its citizens, as 
long as there is a deliberative procedure in place. Indeed, Miller’s conception of 
global justice based on national responsibility depends on the actual possibility of 
policies representing the shared values and beliefs of the population as a whole 
within each nation-state. As he says, ‘the more open and democratic a political 
community is, the more justified we are in holding its members responsible for the 
decisions they make and the policies they follow. National values will still, to a large 
extent, be inherited in practice, but they will be discussed and debated, alternative 
views will be expressed, and so forth’ (Miller, 2007, p. 130). In other words, a 
deliberative democracy could help citizens reach a normative consensus and as such 
enable the final policy outcomes to reflect the shared cultural values of the entire 
population. 
 
In response, Caney advances a two-fold argument. First, many states with people 
dangling below the global moral minimum are not democratic at all. Therefore, it 
will be morally problematic to hold the population collectively responsible for the 
past policies decided on by a small group of elites. Here, Caney confuses the actual 
possibility of reaching a final decision representing the shared beliefs and values of 
the population with the mechanism that makes the consensus more likely to occur. It 
is surely easier for us as outsiders to accept that the political decisions of some 
foreign nation-states reflect the shared, authentic, values and beliefs of their 
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populations when there is a democratic decision-making procedure in place, 
especially the kind with deliberative elements as Miller intends. However, the 
absence of democratic procedure does not, in and by itself, eliminate the actual 
possibility of arriving at policies representing the shared, authentic, values and 
beliefs of the population. Here I do not want to address the question as to whether 
participation in the democratic decision-making process is fundamental to basic 
human needs. The point is that Caney requires much more evidence to reach the 
definite conclusion that democracy is a necessary condition for a population to 
express their shared, authentic, values and beliefs about distribution.  
 
Second, Caney argues that if we took the traditional view of moral agency seriously, 
we would only assign the responsibility to individuals rather than the nation-state, 
whose policies may not be the result of each individual’s voluntary choices. 
‘Treating states as responsible agents is thus deeply unfair to individuals who are 
disadvantaged because of the state’s decisions. This is especially so in 
nondemocratic states but still applies in democratic states’ (Caney, 2003, p. 302). I 
consider that this line of reasoning makes a fetish out of individualism in the sense 
that it completely rejects the possibility of connecting individual responsibility to 
collective responsibility. As a result, Caney does not appreciate the purpose of 
Miller’s conception of global justice based on national responsibility. Miller attempts 
to assign remedial responsibilities among moral agents in the face of great moral 
urgency, that is, the chief aim is to assign them in a manner that is valid and 
acceptable to all, rather than to supply a theoretically sound view of responsibility 
that may be inapplicable to reality due to the conditions of global politics. This does 
not negate the centrality of arriving at a conceptually persuasive view of 
responsibility with regard to meeting GMM. My argument is that humanist 
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cosmopolitans like Caney make an unnecessarily sharp distinction between moral 
reasoning about political principles and the consideration of feasibility constraints. 
This is diametrically at odds with Miller’s methodological approach to distributive 
justice. He specifically argues that at all levels of moral reasoning, the formulation of 
normative principles needs to consider the technical and political feasibility of 
applying the said principles (Miller, 2014, p. 35-8).  
 
Therefore, Miller’s notion of national responsibility is valid, because it is more 
conducive to effectively assigning remedial responsibility among nation-states when 
the moral urgency of the situation at the global level compels all able moral agents to 
act. In fact, the reason why Caney rejects Miller’s notion of national responsibility is 
that he cannot appreciate the priority of effective responsibility assignment over 
sophisticated responsibility identification in light of great moral urgency. The said 
priority can be justified on the ground that a certain serious breach of GMM creates a 
moral requirement to expand the range of possible moral agents that could discharge 
the responsibility to assist the nation-states in need, especially when it is very 
difficult to locate a responsible moral agent on the basis of the traditional view of 
moral agency. As Miller says,  
 
Identifying responsibility is a matter of looking to see who, if anybody, 
meets the relevant conditions for being responsible. What these conditions 
are will depend on the form of responsibility at issue…assigning 
responsibility, by contrast, involves a decision to attach certain costs or 
benefits to an agent, whether or not the relevant conditions are 
fulfilled…Unlike identification, assignment of responsibility can be justified 
or unjustified, but cannot be correct or incorrect (Miller, 2007, p. 84). 
 
In other words, responsibility identification aims to answer the question as to 
whether the moral agent under consideration fits the conditions of taking 
responsibility for certain outcomes, and whether these conditions are morally 
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relevant in the first place. In contrast, responsibility assignment aims to answer the 
question as to whether the moral agent under consideration is justified in taking 
responsibility, regardless of whether certain relevant conditions are met. Of course, it 
is desirable for responsibility identification and assignment to coincide in practice. 
Nevertheless, finding a conceptually valid connection between moral agents and 
certain outcomes is not the primary objective, that is, the moral agents who do not fit 
certain conditions might still be deemed justified in taking responsibility. Even 
though not all approaches to responsibility identification are based on the traditional 
view of moral agency, the intention to avoid a debate with theorists who hold onto 
such a view possibly motivates Miller to distinguish between the aims of his notion 
of national responsibility and that of other conceptions of moral responsibility. At 
any rate, the traditional view of responsibility is less efficient than Miller’s notion of 
national responsibility, given the aim to assign responsibilities in light of moral 
urgency at the global level. As Margret Moore notes, ‘the problem with the… 
(traditional view of moral agency) as it applies to issues surrounding human-induced 
global climate change is connected both to the individualist focus and the focus on 
direct, rather than indirect outcomes. The harm generated by carbon emissions is not 
directly, or solely, the result of individual action’ (Moore, 2013, p. 131). This 
example shows the deficiency of the traditional view of moral agency in tackling one 
of the most pressing issues today—global warming. In contrast, Miller’s notion of 
national responsibility switches the focus of global justice to assigning justifiable 
responsibility to nation-states and therefore makes it more likely that responsibilities 
could be assigned efficiently. For instance, ‘the three remedial responsibility 
principles—moral, outcome and causal responsibility—are especially helpful in 
cases where past action has had a deleterious effect on the planet, but these effects 
were not known, or not conclusively known, to the people who engaged in the 
 
 
78 
actions’ (Moore, 2013, p. 135). Hence, Miller’s notion of national responsibility 
based on the non-traditional view of moral agency obtains in the face of Caney’s 
challenge, because it focuses on discharging moral obligations in light of the moral 
urgency at the global level. 
 
Nevertheless, defending the validity of national responsibility does not automatically 
bring about the validity of the dynamic problem as a reason for restricting the 
regulation of substantive inequalities to the domestic level. As Caney, Tan, and 
Weinstock point out, the dynamic problem in and by itself does not explain why 
regulating substantive inequalities is not required by distributive justice at the global 
level, because the notion of national responsibility needs to be anchored in a prior 
understanding of distributive justice. According to Caney, Miller’s dynamic problem 
commits a ‘category mistake,’ that is, it confuses the statement about the 
entitlements of each nation-state with statements about their duties. The dynamic 
problem consists of the idea that it is unfair to expect a nation-state which pursues 
sensible state policies to bail out another whose bad policies have led to 
disadvantaged distributive outcomes. In this formulation, however, the dynamic 
problem is not a statement about the entitlements of each nation-state in accordance 
with a prior understanding of distributive justice; rather it is only a statement about 
their duties which derives from a particular understanding of distributive justice. As 
Caney says, ‘the dynamic argument is therefore not a direct challenge to global 
equality per se, and one can substitute “basic rights” or “a global difference principle” 
as its target. If correct, this challenge would have disturbing implications for Miller’s 
argument, since it would undermine his rejection of global equality and his 
affirmation of basic rights’ (Caney, 2003, p. 303). Nevertheless, there is no reason 
for mistaken category objection to undermine Miller’s restriction of the regulation of 
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substantive inequality and the protection of GMM alike, because Miller has a prior 
theory of distributive justice that clearly grounds the ethical demands of distributive 
justice in the institutions of citizenship. Caney’s critique essentially boils down to 
the idea that the notion of national responsibility could only be justified under a valid, 
prior theory of distributive justice. Therefore, the notion in and by itself could not 
demonstrate the validity of a prior theory of distributive justice. I agree with his 
argument but nonetheless will point out that Miller does have a prior theory of 
distributive justice (SCDJ), which is grounded in the ideal of an equal relationship 
among citizens. Therefore, if the notion of national responsibility as a derivative of 
SCDJ could not possibly justify SCDJ, neither could Caney use it to undermine 
SCDJ decisively. Nevertheless, Caney’s argument holds to the extent that the 
dynamic problem based on the notion of national responsibility is not a valid 
justification for SCDJ. 
 
5. The Lack of Global Institutions of Citizenship 
 
The final reason for restricting the regulation of substantive inequality to the 
domestic level lies in the lack of institutions of global citizenship. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, Miller’s SCDJ grounds the ethical concern with substantive equality in 
the equal relationship among citizens of the same nation-state. In direct contrast, the 
humanist cosmopolitans ground the relevance of the regulation of substantive 
inequality directly in the moral equality of human beings. In this section, I will 
demonstrate firstly that the exchange between the humanist cosmopolitans and 
Miller has led to a deadlock, insofar as the humanist cosmopolitans do not accept the 
ideal of the equal relationship among citizens as relevant to the formulation of global 
distributive principles. I will then suggest that, although the associativist 
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cosmopolitans recognise the relevance of the said relational ideal over and above 
respect for the moral equality of human beings, they will not accept Miller’s 
restriction of the regulation of substantive inequality to the domestic level on the 
basis of the difference between human relations at the domestic and the global levels. 
Finally, I will show that Miller could endorse the further institutionalisation of global 
citizenship so as to bridge the difference between cosmopolitanism and liberal 
nationalism because they both require a deliberative procedure in order to arrive at a 
normative consensus on the moral relevance of the regulation of substantive 
inequality at the global level. 
 
First and foremost, Miller’s SCDJ grounds the concern with substantive equality in 
the institutions of citizenship, which implies that the absence of global citizenship 
makes the regulation of substantive inequality morally irrelevant globally. The 
humanist cosmopolitans disagree with this conclusion, in the sense that the 
boundaries between nation-states are considered to be social contingencies which 
should be factored out of the formulation of global distributive principles. As Tan 
argues on the humanist side, ‘in a global institutional view, global institutions that 
assign basic rights and responsibilities ought to be impartial with respect to persons’ 
nationality. The arbitrariness of nationality precludes it from having any influence on 
how the global background order allocates persons’ rights and responsibilities’ (Tan, 
2014, p. 178). Even though the humanists may take account of the impact of the 
human relationships within nation-states on the implementation of global distributive 
principles in specific contexts, they do not allow it to constrain the moral reasoning 
about global justice. Insofar as this difference between the humanist cosmopolitans 
and Miller can be traced back to their different methods of developing distributive 
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principles, it is doubtful that the exchange between them will lead to anything but 
deadlock for the foreseeable future.  
 
In fact, Miller levels a forceful criticism against the humanist cosmopolitans in On 
Nationality (1993), arguing that they are unable to formulate morally plausible 
distributive principles because they cannot allow the ethical significance of the 
human relationships within nation-states to bear on moral reasoning. As such, 
humanist cosmopolitanism ‘draws a sharp line between moral agency and personal 
identity on the one hand, and between moral agency and personal motivation on the 
other’ (Miller, 1995, p. 57). In other words, plausible distributive principles should 
aim to motivate moral agents to comply with their ethical demands by infusing 
principles with the motivational force of the human association with which moral 
agents identify most strongly. Miller calls this methodological commitment a 
‘contextualist approach to political theory,’ which matches specific distributive 
principles to different distributive contexts defined by the prevalent modes of human 
relationship found within them (Miller, 2013, p. 47- 9). As I will suggest in Chapter 
5, the moral reasoning guided by the contextualist approach has to consider two 
phenomena so as to be fact-dependent as Miller requires: common moral intuition 
and political emotions. Common moral intuition refers to the wide range of prevalent 
and unclear moral intuitions found within society that may be utilised to inform our 
moral reasoning about various subjects. Political emotion refers to the range of 
human emotions that could potentially be utilised to preserve cultural commonalities, 
motivate altruism and realise social integration at the political level. I will not pursue 
this further in this section, but in chapter 6, I will defend the superiority of Miller’s 
method of developing political theory in comparison with the humanist 
cosmopolitans. Here, it suffices to highlight the fact that the disagreement between 
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the humanist cosmopolitans and Miller is a deep-seated problem located at the 
methodological level. Nevertheless, as shown in Chapter 1, Miller could actually 
bypass this problem by endorsing the further institutionalisation of global citizenship, 
because his relational egalitarian position stands a better chance than the distributive 
egalitarianism upon which humanist cosmopolitanism is based to justify different 
approaches to the satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of substantive 
inequality. The only precondition is that he has to support global citizenship, insofar 
as distributive egalitarianism differs from relational egalitarianism in terms of their 
attitudes towards the said institutions.   
 
Unlike the humanist cosmopolitans, the associativist cosmopolitans allow the ethical 
significance of the human relationships within nation-states to bear on our moral 
reasoning about global justice, because of their attempts to prove the equivalence 
between the modes of human relationship at the domestic and the global levels. In 
other words, on top of respect for the moral equality of human beings, the 
associativist cosmopolitans agree with the statists and the liberal nationalists that the 
regulation of substantive inequality should be grounded in the institutions of 
citizenship. So far, the associativist cosmopolitans have argued mostly against the 
statists, trying to prove that human relationships at the global level come very close 
to resembling the characteristics of citizenship within nation-states, and thereby 
should warrant the regulation of substantive inequality as well (Valentini, 2011; 
Hassoun, 2014; Armstrong, 2009). As will be discussed in depth in Chapter 6, the 
three main statist accounts of distributive justice are based respectively on the 
coercive relationship between citizens and the administrative state, citizens’ 
involuntary membership within nation-states and the reciprocal cooperation among 
citizens facilitated by the administrative state. As a result of the fierce challenge 
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launched by the associativist cosmopolitans, the statists have not been able to 
conclusively disprove the qualitative inequivalence between human relationships at 
the domestic and the global levels. Miller recognises the force of the associativist 
cosmopolitans’ challenge; nonetheless, he suggests that the statists’ accounts all fail 
because they ground the relevance of the regulation of substantive inequality in only 
one aspect of the institutions of citizenship. A nation-state combines four 
characteristics at the same time, which cannot be broken down into separate aspects 
in the moral reasoning about distributive justice: that is, the three statists’ accounts 
coupled with Miller’s notion of common nationality (Miller, 2013, p. 162). As will 
be discussed in Chapter 3, Miller believes that a nation-state has to develop a 
common national identity and a shared public culture so as to motivate citizens to 
support the functioning of the major social institutions within that state. Without a 
nation-building process, the administrative state will not be able to supply the level 
of mutual trust among its citizens which are necessary for solving problems of 
collective action, pursuing distributive justice and practising deliberative democracy 
(Miller, 1995, p. 90- 8). In other words, common national identity is a source of 
motivation among citizens that enables those institutions of citizenship to exist in the 
first place. Therefore, the concern with substantive equality should be grounded in 
the three characteristics normally emphasised by the statists, as well as the 
motivational force of common national identity among citizens. 
 
However, even if Miller combines all four characteristics in order to ground the 
concern with substantive equality in material terms, I do not think that this could 
persuade the associativist cosmopolitans to accept SCDJ, because the institutions of 
citizenship as a multi-faceted whole still cannot qualitatively distinguish the human 
relationships within nation-states from those at the global level. Despite the fact that 
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the associativist cosmopolitans have not directly engaged with Miller’s SCDJ as 
much as the statist accounts of distributive justice, they do frequently highlight 
global citizenship as being a moral rather than a merely legal concept. Insofar as 
global citizenship does not presently confer the same set of legal rights and 
entitlements upon human beings as within nation-states through their coercive legal 
systems, part of its appeal rests on the moral obligation to further institutionalise 
global citizenship based on democratic values in the future (Dower, 2011, p. 30- 1). 
As Falk memorably remarks, ‘the only kind of visionary citizenship that can be 
taken seriously will have to be grounded in what is occurring on the level of fact, 
norm and values as both trend and potentiality. It must be rooted in the future, the 
not-yet, rather than unconvincingly affirm as ‘real’ such a reconfiguring of political 
allegiance as is so unconvincingly claimed by secular-minded ‘world citizens’ (Falk, 
2011, p. 27). By identifying strongly with the whole human race, those whom Falk 
calls ‘citizen pilgrims’ would be sufficiently motivated to bring about the global 
institutions of citizenship in order to regulate the common affairs of humanity. 
Moreover, this moral concept of world citizens or ‘citizen pilgrims’ reflects the 
multidimensional nature of individual identity in our globalised world, instead of one 
conceived of as a pure pipedream. As Dower observes, human beings now relate to 
each other as world citizens, allowing ‘a wide spectrum of cases from a fully-fledged 
form of self-conscious engagement and active responsibility, especially through 
appropriate institutions (political parties, NGOs and so on), through to cases where 
the category applies hypothetically, in order to cover cases where people have no 
wider ‘causal footprints’ beyond the local and thus have no need for active 
engagement at other levels’ (Dower, 2011, p. 38). As a result, the associativist 
cosmopolitans conclude that ideally, appropriate global distributive principles should 
account for the fact that at least a part of individual identity has come to encompass 
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the global realm and, as such, appears equivalent to the identity usually associated 
with citizenship within a nation-state. 
 
Nevertheless, Miller remains sceptical regarding this line of reasoning, arguing that 
it is unlikely that any supranational identity will seriously challenge human beings’ 
national allegiances in the foreseeable future. As he says, ‘since the EU is currently 
the strongest of the supra-national organisations, its failure to displace inherited 
national allegiances is surely of some significance. If no trans-European national 
identity has yet emerged, the prospects for a North American identity, a pan-Arab 
identity, or an East Asian identity…must remain extremely dim’ (Miller, 1995, p. 
162). He goes on to question the cosmopolitan concept of world citizen: ‘in Falk’s 
usage the pilgrim is a person devoted to a cause which she pursues with like-minded 
others regardless of conventional boundaries… (But) there is no determinate 
community with which she identifies politically, and no one, except perhaps other 
members of her group, with whom she stands in relations of reciprocity’ (Miller, 
2000, p. 96). So, the moral concept of world citizen does not sufficiently resemble 
citizenship within nation-states. Miller’s objection to the associativist cosmopolitans 
would appear to be based on valid reasons, insofar as he adopts a clearly stated 
method of developing distributive principles and advances claims grounded in 
common moral intuitions and political emotions. However, given global cultural 
pluralism—an important factor that Miller constantly refers to—it is not clear why 
his own understanding of common moral intuitions and political emotions that are 
found across the globe is the only valid one. In other words, insofar as the 
associativist cosmopolitans also ground their formulation of distributive principles in 
humanity’s collective identity, which supposedly corresponds to people’s common 
moral intuitions and political emotions, it is very difficult to determine which 
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distributive principles better account for these factors. For instance, Caney argues 
that placing excessive weight on the metric problem in order to justify SCDJ will 
undermine the dynamic problem. Since the metric problem highlights the difficulty 
posed by global cultural diversity for developing a common metric of substantive 
equality in material terms, the same logic could be applied in order to question the 
concept of national responsibility. As Caney argues, ‘Miller…criticises other global 
principles on the grounds that it is not possible to construct a culture-neutral 
conception of them. The same charge can, however, be levelled against Miller’s 
dynamic argument. For someone can quite plausibly argue that the value at its core 
embodies a set of non-neutral values’ (Caney, 2003, p. 302). In other words, if Miller 
takes global cultural pluralism seriously enough to refrain from imposing a common 
metric of substantive equality upon humanity, he surely will be deterred by the same 
problem from holding nation-states responsible for their collective decisions if 
human beings cannot come to a shared understanding of collective responsibilities at 
the global level. Hence, if Miller cannot find a way to prove that SCDJ is the only 
valid derivation on the basis of the common moral intuitions and the political 
emotions found at the global level, his method of moral reasoning would seem 
arbitrary.     
 
In this light, one way out of this dilemma is to endorse the further institutionalisation 
of global citizenship based on a deliberative democracy, because public deliberation 
could help human beings reach a normative consensus on whether their own moral 
intuitions and political emotions will support SCDJ. This is consistent with the role 
Miller assigns to deliberative democracy within nation-states, in the sense that he 
always employs public deliberation to explicate how cultural pluralism could be 
overcome in order to support the ethical demands of social justice. As discussed in 
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section 3, the metric problem does not undermine the concern with substantive 
equality within nation-states as it does at the global level precisely because 
deliberative democracy functions best among citizens who share a common 
nationality. As a matter of fact, the cosmopolitans, the humanists and the 
associativists alike often claim that deliberative democracy could be utilised to 
produce a common metric of substantive equality at the global level. For instance, 
Weinstock argues, ‘prudent institutional design has already been employed in the 
history of democratic nation-states in order to overcome difficulties related to size, 
and there is no reason to think that it could not help to offset the difficulties which 
transnational democratic institutions would have to face’ (Weinstock, 2003, p. 278). 
In other words, if deliberative democracy has been proven effective in dealing with 
cultural pluralism within nation-states, it should also be of use in reaching a 
normative consensus at the global level. Therefore, any disagreement as to the 
ethical demands of global justice could be bridged in the long term by public 
deliberation at the global level.  
 
In order for the global public deliberation to be seen as morally desirable to both 
cosmopolitans and Miller, its philosophical underpinning should be as widely 
acceptable as possible. One such underpinning is what Paul Gilabert calls 
‘cosmopolitan justifiability’. The principle of cosmopolitan justifiability is derived 
from the respect for the moral equality of human beings and requires all principles of 
justice to be justifiable to human beings as free and equal moral agents (Gilabert, 
2012, p. 10). As Gilabert observes, both principles are widely compelling among all 
global justice theorists involved in the debate regardless of their ideological 
persuasions. Therefore, cosmopolitan justifiability is a suitable philosophical 
underpinning for the account of global citizenship which I will advance in Chapter 8. 
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Nevertheless, Miller objects to any positive proposal for further institutionalising 
global citizenship on the ground that the lack of mutual trust among human beings 
makes it practically unfeasible to establish a deliberative procedure at the global 
level. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Miller believes that the proper 
functioning of a deliberative democracy relies on citizens participating in public 
deliberations responsibly. On the one hand, ‘the reasons given in political debate 
should be sincerely held, and not merely adopted as an expedient way of promoting 
sectional interests.’ On the other hand, ‘citizens should be willing to moderate their 
claims in the hope that they can find common ground on which policy decisions can 
be based’ (Miller, 1995, p. 96- 7). Miller calls these two aspects of responsibility ‘a 
weaker sense of impartiality’ (Miller, 2000, p. 55-6). The weaker sense of 
impartiality hangs on the mutual trust among citizens, because ‘to act as a 
responsible citizen, you must have reasonable assurance that a large majority of your 
fellow-citizens are going to do the same’ (Miller, 2000, p. 86). The necessary mutual 
trust could only be supplied by a common national identity within a bounded society. 
Therefore, citizens’ responsible attitude towards public deliberation as motived by 
mutual trust is the watershed between what is practically difficult to achieve and 
what is practically unfeasible. Miller recognises that the reality of public deliberation 
could never quite measure up to the ideal of deliberative democracy. However, 
whenever there is a sufficient level of mutual trust among participants, it is at least 
practically feasible to pursue an approximation of that ideal. Since there is no 
community at the global level that could provide individual human beings with a 
similarly strong sense of mutual trust as that motivated by the common national 
identity within a nation-state, it is unfeasible to even try to realise it. 
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This line of objection to global citizenship obtains to the limited extent that the 
formulation of political theory in general, including distributive justice, has to take 
account of feasibility, as Miller explicitly states in his contextualist approach. 
Nevertheless, he fails to recognise that his own methodological commitment 
espouses a balanced consideration of normative ideals and practical feasibility in the 
process of moral reasoning, rather than taking practical feasibility as a trumping card. 
In other words, when formulating a political theory, one has to consider equally the 
ethical demands of normative ideals and the practical conditions for realising them. 
Moreover, in order to persuade others that one’s own political theory produces the 
most appropriate political principles based on given conditions of the context, one 
needs to rely on a meta-theoretical framework to adjudicate among different political 
theories, rather than simply asserting the validity of one’s theory. In light of the 
cosmopolitans’ challenge, Miller so far has not offered any normative reason for 
rejecting the further institutionalisation of global citizenship, despite his continuous 
effort to stress the practical unfeasibility of establishing a deliberative democracy at 
the global level. This line of objection will not serve to conclusively refute either the 
cosmopolitans’ proposal of a global citizenship or the regulation of substantive 
inequality at the global level, because it does not even satisfy the guidelines of 
Miller’s own methodological commitment to considering equally normative ideals 
and practical feasibility in our moral reasoning.  
 
This calls two points into question. First, as concluded in Chapter 1, Miller’s 
relational egalitarian position could successfully subsume the distributive 
egalitarianism upon which the humanist cosmopolitanism is based, if and only if the 
relational egalitarians could support the further institutionalisation of global 
citizenship in order to regulate substantive inequality in material terms. This is 
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because the distributive egalitarians believe that grounding the ethical demands of 
distributive justice directly in the moral equality of human beings could help 
motivate the further institutionalisation of global citizenship in order to deal with 
humanity’s common problems. If Miller does not come to endorse the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship, distributive egalitarianism will have a 
reason to remain as a separate school of thought, in that it will generate sufficiently 
different ethical demands than Miller’s relational egalitarian position. Second, as 
mentioned above, Miller cannot persuade the associativist cosmopolitans to accept 
the restriction of the regulation of substantive inequality to the domestic level, 
because they derive different distributive principles from the practical conditions at 
the global level. More importantly, the metric problem will even undermine SCDJ 
without the presence of a meta-theoretical framework to adjudicate between Miller’s 
theory of distributive justice and other theories, insofar as global cultural pluralism 
places all hitherto taken-for-granted norms and values under critical reflection. Thus, 
for the sake of validating his political theory in general and SCDJ in particular, 
Miller has to endorse the further institutionalisation of global citizenship as a 
mechanism to adjudicate among different political theories, given the particular 
conditions at the global level.   
 
In summary, in this section I have shown firstly that the exchange between the 
humanist cosmopolitans and Miller can only end in a deadlock, because the former 
do not accept that the concern with the regulation of substantive inequality could be 
grounded in the institutions of citizenship. This deadlock could be overcome by 
Miller, if he were to subsume the humanist cosmopolitan position by endorsing the 
further institutionalisation of global citizenship, as suggested in Chapter 1. However, 
as I have demonstrated, Miller will be unable to persuade the associativist 
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cosmopolitans to accept SCDJ, because they each derive different principles of 
distributive justice from the conditions at the global level. Lastly, Miller could only 
persuade the cosmopolitans—both the humanists and the associativists alike—to 
accept SCDJ if he could endorse the further institutionalisation of global citizenship 
as a meta-theoretical mechanism for adjudicating among different political principles 
on the basis of the common moral intuitions and political emotions found at the 
global level.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I set out to examine the validity of Miller’s split-level conception of distributive 
justice (SCDJ), which prescribes different ethical demands at both the domestic and 
global levels. SCDJ restricts the regulation of substantive inequality to the domestic 
level and places the protection of a limited range of basic human needs at the global 
level. I have examined the three main normative reasons for the difference between 
the ethical demands of SCDJ at the domestic and global levels. In section 3, pace 
Fabre, Weinstock, Tan, Gilabert and Ypi, I demonstrated that the metric problem 
obtains, in that global cultural pluralism impedes the production of a common metric 
of substantive equality in material terms. Nevertheless, in the long term, this could 
be overcome with continuous cultural exchange in an institutionalised public 
deliberation at the global level, because cultural commonalities are social 
contingencies that are to a great extent malleable. In section 4, in response to Caney, 
I have shown that Miller’s notion of national responsibility should be preferred over 
the traditional conception of individual responsibility in the face of moral urgency, 
because a sole focus on identification of responsibility will cause policy-makers to 
lose sight of the more important issue: the relief of severe cases of absolute 
deprivation. Nevertheless, the dynamic problem does not serve to justify SCDJ, 
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insofar as it should be anchored in a prior theory of distributive justice that specifies 
the justifiable reward which each nation-state is allowed to acquire from the global 
economic order. In section 5, I showed that Miller could not successfully persuade 
the humanist cosmopolitans to accept SCDJ because they each have different 
methods of developing global principles of distributive justice. Moreover, despite 
their similar approach to distributive justice, Miller could not justify SCDJ to the 
associativist cosmopolitans, insofar as they each derive different distributive 
principles from the conditions of the global realm.  
 
In this light, I suggested that Miller should endorse the further institutionalisation of 
global citizenship as a mechanism for adjudicating democratically among different 
global principles of distributive justice. Moreover, this account of global citizenship 
should be grounded in the principles of cosmopolitan justifiability that requires all 
principles of justice to be justifiable to all human beings as free and equal moral 
agents. Insofar as Miller’s principles of distributive justice are grounded in the three 
statists’ accounts and the motivational force of a common nationality, I will set this 
proposal out in four separate chapters—3, 4, 5 and 6. These will aim to reconstruct 
Miller’s account of deliberative democracy on the basis of Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action, so as to develop a normative consensus on the principles of 
distributive justice while instilling a sufficient level of mutual trust among human 
beings at the global level. Firstly, in Chapter 3, I will examine the validity of 
Miller’s claim that a nation-state requires a common national identity and a shared 
public culture in order to support the functioning of major social institutions, 
including but not limited to, deliberative democracy. Secondly, in Chapter 4, I will 
investigate whether Miller’s account of a nation-building process could incorporate a 
common national identity and a shared public culture without disadvantaging the 
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cultural minorities within the nation-state. Thirdly, in Chapters 5 and 6, I will discuss 
why Miller’s account of a deliberative democracy needs modification on the basis of 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action in light of the deficiency of his 
contextualist approach to political theory, and whether such remodelling is consistent 
with Habermas’s conception of communicative action. 
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Chapter3:  
Miller’s Theory of Nationality and Its Critics 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the validity of a split-level conception of distributive justice, 
which restricts the scope of the regulation of substantive inequality to the domestic 
level. There, I demonstrated that Miller’s split-level conception of distributive justice 
is justified on the ground that the four characteristics of a nation-state mark it off as a 
different distributive context from the global. However, this claim obtains only as 
long as it is both morally undesirable and practically unfeasible to further 
institutionalise global citizenship. I have already demonstrated that Miller does have 
a normative reason for endorsing the further institutionalisation of global citizenship, 
because he requires an institutionalised channel of public deliberation to bridge the 
impasse between his and the cosmopolitans’ global principles of distributive justice 
by democratically adjudicating among different distributive principles. 
 
In this light, the only obstacle is the unfeasibility of further institutionalising global 
citizenship. As Miller continues to maintain, the lack of a collective identity and 
shared cultural values precludes any attempt to realise a cosmopolitan vision of 
global citizenship. In this chapter and the following chapters 4 and 5, I will focus on 
examining the feasibility of further institutionalising global citizenship through the 
remodelling of Miller’s account of deliberative democracy on the basis of 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action. Insofar as Miller’s objection to 
global citizenship is primarily based on the lack of a common identity and a shared 
public culture, it is diametrically opposed to the objection raised by the statists. As 
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will be discussed in Chapter 6, the statists believe that a democratic decision-making 
procedure serves to realise social integration among citizens of the same nation-state. 
As a corollary, the argument against global citizenship is based on ‘institutional 
conservatism,’ that is, careful consideration of all moral and material costs attached 
to the transformation of the existing institutions of citizenship. In this chapter, I want 
to focus on comparing these two different accounts of social integration in order to 
prove that Miller’s account of this is more plausible than the statists’ account 
because it taps into the motivational force of a common nationality. I will focus on 
Habermas’s account of a legally institutionalised communicative action as an 
example of the statists’ account of social integration. I will argue that even 
Habermas’s constitutional patriotism has to rely on the motivational force of a 
common nationality because the latter does not have an explanation for citizens’ 
motivation to participate such a communicative action. This will pave the way for 
constructing an account of nation-building that could be extended to the global level, 
so as to support the further institutionalisation of global citizenship. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 introduces Miller’s theory of 
nationality, highlighting his claim that a nation-state requires a common national 
identity and a shared public culture to motivate citizens to support the proper 
functioning of major social institutions within society. Section 2 introduces the core 
insights of Habermas’s ‘theory of law as the medium between facticity and validity.’ 
I will draw attention to Habermas’s belief that a legally institutionalised 
communicative action serves to realise social integration among citizens through 
public deliberation about all legal rules within society. In section 3, I will suggest 
that Habermas’s constitutional patriotism does not have a valid explanation as to 
how citizens could be motivated to participate in this type of action in the first place. 
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I will reject three possible accounts of the said motivation: (1) the unavoidable 
presuppositions of communicative action, (2) the coercive power of the legal system 
and (3) the shared political culture among citizens.  
 
In response to the first explanation, I will show that the unavoidable presuppositions 
of a communicative action could only explain the motivation of those participants 
who already participate in a communicative action. Even if such an action could be 
proven to be the universal mode of human communication, in the sense that no one 
could possibly communicate without submitting to the rationale of communicative 
action, it is not the most fundamental reason for cooperating. Before engaging in a 
communication, first and foremost human beings require the intentionality to 
cooperate; otherwise, they would simply refuse to do so and resort instead to threats 
and commands. Second, I will show that the coercive power of the legal system 
cannot be legitimately employed to motivate compliance with the rationale of 
communicative action because there is no way to determine whether a legally 
institutionalised communicative action is established first and then legitimates the 
legal system, or vice versa. Third, I will reject the constitutional patriots’ attempt to 
motivate citizens through a shared political culture that understands the 
establishment of a legally institutionalised communicative action as being the result 
of a gradual historical process. This is because a shared political culture is too thin to 
help citizens understand the difference between the existing political culture and a 
new one that validates a legally institutionalised communicative action. In this light, 
Miller’s notions of common national identity and public culture are called for in 
order to bridge the said difference, insofar as these notions draw on a more widely 
encompassing reservoir of cultural values than the constitutional patriots’ notion of 
political culture and, as such, could interpret the new political culture as reflective of 
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the already existing cultural values in a shared public one. Additionally, since a 
common national identity and a public culture appeal to the pre-political connections 
of a national community, they serve to motivate citizens to support the functioning 
of a legally institutionalised communicative action, even if citizens cannot be 
immediately brought to understand the deliberative procedure at the political level. 
 
1. Miller’s Theory of Nationality 
 
As Miller conceives it, ‘nation’ refers to ‘a community of people with an aspiration 
to be politically self-determining,’ whereas a state is a body of critical political 
institutions that claims effective control over a particular territory (Miller, 1995, p. 
19). Throughout this thesis, I will use ‘national community’ interchangeably with 
‘nation’ and ‘administrative state’ with ‘state’ to avoid misleading implications, as 
different theorists use the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ to mean different things. A 
national community has five characteristics. First, it is constituted by belief: a 
subjective identification with a community and its members. Second, a national 
community embodies historical continuity; it anchors members’ actions within the 
history and the destiny of that community, thereby giving them meaning beyond the 
pursuit of personal interests. Third, a national community collectively decides on 
issues related to its future and acts together to see this realised. Fourth, a national 
community is typically connected to a particular geographical place, and recognises 
intrinsic value in such a connection. And, finally, a national community requires a 
common public culture that, according to my reading, is a body of shared normative 
understandings essential for its members to lead a collective life, including but not 
limited to the political (Miller, 1995, p. 21- 7).  
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According to Miller, the merit of a common nationality consists in its ability to 
answer ‘one of the most pressing needs of the modern world, namely how to 
maintain solidarity among the populations of states that are large and anonymous’ 
(Miller, 2000, p. 31). In other words, a national community should instil a sufficient 
level of mutual trust among its citizens in the face of increasing cultural pluralism. 
With a sufficient level of mutual trust among citizens, a nation-state will be able to 
(1) solve the collective action problem, (2) pursue distributive justice and (3) practise 
deliberative democracy. In the first place, ‘much state activity involves the furthering 
of goals which cannot be achieved without the voluntary cooperation of citizens. For 
this activity to be successful, the citizens must trust the state, and they must trust one 
another in order to comply with what the state demands of them’ (Miller, 1995, p. 
91). Without such trust, even the minimal state function of presiding over the market 
economy, in which the outcomes depend primarily on individuals pursuing personal 
interests, would be illusory, because the ground rules of market transactions require 
a level of mutual trust among participants so as to play fair and be confident that 
others will do the same.  
 
Secondly, ‘trust assumes particular importance if we ask about the conditions under 
which individuals will give their support to schemes of social justice, particularly 
schemes involving redistribution to those not able to provide for their needs through 
market transactions’ (Miller, 1995, p. 93). In Chapter 1, I demonstrated that Miller’s 
relational ideal of social equality justifies differential responses to the satisfaction of 
basic needs and the regulation of substantive inequality. The principle of social 
equality requires that all basic needs within society should be met, and substantive 
inequalities are to be regulated so as to maintain the equal status of citizens. This 
may give the false impression that an administrative state is sufficient for the pursuit 
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of distributive justice within a nation, since it is closely related to the equal status of 
its citizens. Nevertheless, the prima facie desirability for distributive justice needs to 
be qualified by the feasibility of doing so, in the sense that the mutual trust among 
members explains why the pursuit of distributive justice is feasible on top of the 
moral demand of equal citizenship. I will address this need for the balanced 
consideration of the ethical demands of distributive justice and the motivational 
force of political emotions, including the said mutual trust, in Chapters 7 and 8.   
 
And finally, ‘states require citizens to trust one another if they are to function 
effectively as democracies; in particular if they are guided by the ideal of 
deliberative democracy’ (Miller, 1995, p. 96). As discussed in Chapter 2, Miller 
adopts a republican notion of citizenship that takes both the protection of private 
liberties and active participation in political decision-making to be equally important 
for democratic citizenship. Moreover, closely associated with a republican notion of 
citizenship is a deliberative model of democratic decision-making that ‘envisages 
(the resolution of political preferences) through an open and un-coerced discussion 
of the issue at stake with the aim of arriving at an agreed judgment. The process of 
reaching a decision will also be a process whereby initial preferences are 
transformed to take account of the view of others’ (Miller, 2000, p. 9). According to 
Miller, in order to practice deliberative democracy appropriately, citizens need to 
satisfy two conditions of responsibility. First, ‘the reasons given in political debate 
should be sincerely held, and not merely adopted as an expedient way of promoting 
sectional interests.’ Second, ‘citizens should be willing to moderate their claims in 
the hope that they can find common ground on which policy decisions can be based’ 
(Miller, 1995, p. 96, 97). In a deliberative democracy, citizens need to trust each 
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other enough to believe that others will reciprocate, before they are willing to act 
responsibly. 
 
2. Habermas’s Theory of Law as the Medium between Facticity and 
Validity 
 
In section 1, I introduced Miller’s theory of nationality and emphasised the 
importance of mutual trust in explaining the motivational strength of a pre-political 
definition of national community. Mutual trust accounts for citizens’ willingness to 
support the functioning of major social institutions at the expense of their personal 
interests, including the resolution of the problem of collective action, the pursuit of 
distributive justice and the practice of deliberative democracy. Nevertheless, 
Habermas seems to hold the view that a legally institutionalised communicative 
action could realise social integration through public deliberation about all legal 
rules within society. In this section, I will introduce Habermas’s ‘theory of law as the 
medium between facticity and validity.’ 
 
Central to Habermas’s insights is the claim that the enacted law in modern society 
serves as a medium through which a reiterative process is established between its 
legitimacy and its authority. Social integration is achieved through public 
deliberation on the legitimacy of all the legal rules within society. The positively 
enacted law takes its integrating force from a particular idealisation of ordinary 
language use, or ‘communicative action.’ A communicative action occurs when 
‘actors in the roles of speaker and hearer attempt to negotiate interpretations of the 
situation at hand and to harmonise their respective plans with one another through 
the unrestrained pursuit of illocutionary goals.’ The reverse side of this use of 
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language is termed ‘strategic action,’ that is, when ‘language is used only as a 
medium for transmitting information, (and) action coordination proceeds through the 
mutual influence that actors exert on each other in a purposive-rational manner’ 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 18).  
 
According to Habermas, a communicative action is possible because there is a 
rational basis to every reciprocal bond. ‘The engaged speaker normally connects the 
specific sense in which he would like to take up an interpersonal relationship with a 
thematically stressed validity claim, and thereby chooses a specific mode of 
communication’ (Habermas, 1991, p. 63). Regardless of the type of validity claim 
adopted by competent participants, a communicative action ideally leads to the 
mutual recognition of the employed validity claim that represents a ‘transcendent 
moment of unconditionality’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 15). In other words, during the 
process, individuals confronted by another’s validity claims may come to abandon or 
alter their original claims. As a result, they would engage in a more complex 
interpersonal relationship and share with each other an enlarged group of 
background norms.  
 
Applied to the reproduction of a social order, the ‘transcendent moment of 
unconditionality’ acquires the function of coordinating the action plans of different 
actors in order to stabilise the behavioural expectations within society. Accordingly, 
a communicative action is legally institutionalised as the principal law-making 
procedure and has to be regulated by what Habermas calls the ‘principle of 
democracy.’ This ‘principle of democracy’ is derived from a more general moral 
principle known as the ‘discursive principle.’ The discursive principle states, ‘just 
those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as 
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participants in rational discourses’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 107). When applied to law, it 
takes the form of the principle of democracy that regulates the substantiation of 
originally abstract constitutional principles in the law-making process. The principle 
of democracy states, ‘only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with 
the assent...of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been 
legally constituted’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 110). A legally institutionalised 
communicative action has to rely on a wide background consensus called the 
‘lifeworld.’ As Habermas argues, ‘from the very start, communicative acts are 
located within the horizon of shared, unproblematic beliefs; at the same time, they 
are nourished by the resources of the always already familiar’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 
22). The ‘lifeworld’ helps citizens to understand each other’s validity claims, and 
would incorporate new normative understandings after every successful 
communicative action. 
 
3. Examining the Three Accounts of Citizens’ Motivation to Support a 
Legally Institutionalised Communicative Action  
 
In section 2, I introduced Habermas’s theory of law as being the medium between 
facticity and validity, since it consists in the conviction that a legally institutionalised 
communicative action could realise social integration among citizens through a 
public deliberation about the legitimacy of all legal rules within society. As the 
theory stands, social integration among citizens is possible if, and only if, all citizens 
are sufficiently motivated to support the action. So far, Habermas has advanced three 
main explanations for citizens’ motivation to support the said deliberative procedure. 
In the following paragraphs, I will demonstrate that Habermas’s three explanations 
fail to do this adequately, unless he incorporates Miller’s notion of common national 
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identity. The three explanations are, respectively: (1) the presuppositions of 
communicative action, (2) the coercive power of positive law and (3) the shared 
political culture in favour of communicative action.  
 
First and foremost, Habermas believes that the idea of communicative action 
contains certain normative expectations that will effectively regulate the deliberative 
procedure based on validity claims. Derived from the discourse principles, these 
normative expectations are (a) ‘all competent speakers be able to participate in the 
envisaged process of shared deliberation,’ and (b) ‘this right of participation should 
not be abridged by coercion or compulsion’ (McMahon, 2011, p. 204). Citizens 
cannot but presuppose these conditions when they seriously commit to the idea of 
communicative action. As Habermas suggests, ‘anyone who seriously engages in 
argumentation must presuppose that the context of discussion guarantees in principle 
freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness on the part of the 
participants, absence of coercion in adopting positions, and so on’ (Habermas, 2001, 
p. 31; cited by McMahon, 2011, p. 204- 5).   
 
As such, Habermas seems to suggest that the presuppositions of communicative 
action are considered to account sufficiently for not only what conditions cognitively 
competent citizens would agree to but also how they are motivated. On the one hand, 
Habermas makes a clear distinction between the competence and the motivation to 
participate in a communicative action. On the other hand, it is not clear if he actually 
gives a separate account of the motivation, other than that of the competences. With 
regard to the distinction Habermas makes between competence and motivation to 
participate in a communicative action, David Wilson and William Dixon argue,  
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Habermas offers a theory of the human act that centres on the distinction 
between motive and capacity, between the reasons that the actor might give 
to himself or herself for his or her act and the competences that enable the 
act, whatever the reason. When Habermas talks of the human act as both 
teleological (person-to-thing) and communicative (person-to-person) there is 
no inconsistency (and none claimed) because it is recognised that the first is 
essentially about why we want to act – and a reaffirmation that we do have 
to want to act – whereas the second is about how we are able to do it 
(Wilson and Dixon, 2009, p. 89). 
 
In other words, Habermas’s theory rests on a mixed portrayal of human beings as 
both teleological and communicative, that is, prone to both pursuing self-interests 
and reaching a consensus. However, as mentioned above, Habermas has so far been 
ambivalent about an individual’s motivation to participate in a communicative action, 
and at times seems to equivocate between competences and motivation. Wilson and 
Dixon remind us that Habermas’s idea of communicative action is mainly concerned 
with the capacity to realise certain tendencies of human nature, and the distinction he 
makes between communicative and strategic action is co-extensive with the 
distinction between the two types of tendencies of human nature—communicative 
and teleological. Communicative and strategic actions, as Wilson and Dixon 
understand them, are the particular competences of citizens to realise their inner 
communicative and teleological tendencies. It seems that individuals could be 
equally motivated to engage in communicative as in strategic action, which is 
dependent on their motivation rather than their competencies. Therefore, Habermas’s 
ambivalence about the motivation to participate in a communicative action will pose 
a problem for the validation of his theory as a whole.  
 
There are two ways for Habermas to better explain individuals’ motivation on the 
basis of the notion of communicative action alone. Firstly, according to Michael 
James’s reading, Habermas resorts to what he calls ‘moral-cognitive consistency.’ I 
quote his reflections as follows,  
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First, a moral sceptic, as an observer of moral phenomena, must admit that 
individuals are not thoroughly relativistic but in fact demand justifications 
for morally questionable attitudes and actions. Second, the sceptic could not 
consistently argue against the capacity to argue rationally about morals, 
since arguing this point would involve the sceptic in a performative 
contradiction. Finally, the sceptic can deny the capacity to argue about 
morality, while simultaneously avoiding a performative contradiction, only 
by withdrawing from the community of moral arguers. Because 
communicative action depicts intersubjective understanding through the 
possibility of contesting claims to validity, consistency requires the sceptic 
either to accept the validity of moral argument or to cease to belong to a 
community of communicative actors (James, 2003, p. 167- 8). 
 
In other words, Habermas could rely on the conviction that by participating in a 
communicative action, no one could possibly renounce its rules. As James claims, 
Habermas essentially believes that the only way left to those sceptical of 
communicative action is to withdraw from the community of communicative actors 
altogether. In other words, as long as one intends to communicate any meaning at all 
with another interlocutor and expect them to accept his/her claims, he/she has to 
already presuppose the rules of communicative action. However, I agree with James 
that the ‘moral–cognitive consistency motivations pertain only to those actors who 
have already adopted a reflective level of communicative action, without clarifying 
what motivates actors to engage in reflective communicative action…in the first 
place’ (James, 2003, p. 168). The moral-cognitive consistency argument does not 
touch on the scenario wherein individuals refuse to even communicate meaning on 
the basis of validity claims; rather, they resort to command backed by threats and 
violence.  
 
The second way to explain motivation on the basis of communicative action is to 
argue that the rationale of communicative action is universal to all human 
communication, in the sense that even strategic action is a distorted form of 
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communicative action. Leaving the institutional guarantee—the category of law—
aside for the moment, it is apparent that the decision to engage in communicative 
rather than strategic action on the part of citizens is coordinated by voluntary consent 
only. Therefore, ‘Habermas…must provide an account of how consent, operating in 
the medium of language, can coordinate social interaction. And he must do so 
without reducing the force of consensual agreement to either strategic calculation or 
social norms. In this regard, it is not enough to refer to ‘the telos of consent, inherent 
in language itself.’ That will be to assume what needs to be argued’ (Johnson, 1991, 
p. 192). Nevertheless, according to Johnson, thus far Habermas has explained the 
coordinating role of consent exactly on the basis of the telos of consent inherent to 
human communication. As he claims,  
 
Habermas insists that the guarantee that binds parties to communicative 
action can operate only under appropriate conditions. He currently explicates 
those conditions in terms of the theory of argumentation. In argument or 
discourse, participants contest and respond to validity claims. This is the 
explicit, reflexive mode of communicative action through which ‘different 
participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the 
mutuality of rationally motivated conviction,’ pursue a consensual 
understanding of their situation (Johnson, 1991, p. 192). 
 
In other words, Habermas insists on supplying an explanation for the coordinating 
role of consent with the concept of communicative action alone. It amounts to the 
assertion that in human communication, all individuals automatically orient towards 
reaching agreements rather than pursuing personal interests, solely because they are 
cognitively competent for such a task.  
 
However, this attempt to explain individuals’ motivation to participate in a 
communicative action rather than a strategic one is wanting, because it gives too 
little credit to the moral agency of citizens. Human beings are more than machines 
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that react to external conditions in accordance with their programming, that is, their 
actions are directly matched with certain external stimuli in a predictable way. Of 
course, Habermas could respond by asserting that human communication in general 
is predicated on the rationale of communicative action, which leaves individuals 
with no other choice but to participate in a communicative action. As Joseph Heath 
argues, Habermas assigns his discourse principle a weak transcendental status 
insofar as the status ‘explains why principles such as this seem to recur in every 
major human culture and religious tradition.’ In other words, human communication 
in general cannot avoid making the presuppositions of communicative action 
regardless of cultural contexts. I disagree with this explanation for the reason that 
human communication has to be chosen by individuals. There are other ways of 
interaction available to individuals other than communication in general; for instance, 
threats and violence. This suggests that the question as to why individuals are 
motivated to resort to human communication at all remains, even if the rationale of 
communicative action is universal to all human communications. Hence, it seems 
that the presuppositions of communicative action cannot explain citizens’ motivation 
to support a legally institutionalised communicative action, because it is concerned 
with citizens’ cognitive competences rather than their motivation. 
 
I will now proceed to address the second explanation for citizens’ motivation to 
support a legally institutionalised communicative action, and that is the coercive 
power of positive law. As introduced in section 2, Habermas believes that in order to 
effectively protect private liberties, citizens require equal political rights which 
themselves need to be legally institutionalised through a law-making process in the 
first place. Moreover, insofar as the law-making process is based on Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action, the process is regulated by the discourse principle. 
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Therefore, in order to secure such a system of rights and the law-making process that 
produces them, the discourse principle appears as ‘the heart of a system of rights’ 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 122). This in effect amounts to a claim that the discourse 
principle will utilise the coercive power of positive law to regulate the legally 
institutionalised communicative action so as to protect citizens’ private liberties and 
political rights. In this light, self-interested citizens would be motivated by the threat 
of coercive positive law to support a legally institutionalised communicative action 
because of the cost resistance to it would entail.   
 
However, Habermas also argues that positive law has a dual character. He says, ‘In 
the legal mode of validity, the facticity of the enforcement of law is intertwined with 
the legitimacy of a genesis of law that claims to be rational because it guarantees 
liberty’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 28). In other words, the ability of positive law to coerce 
citizens into complying with it is grounded in the possibility that the same citizens 
are able to discuss and repeal the law through a just deliberative procedure. As 
Habermas says, ‘the positivity of law means that a consciously enacted framework of 
norms gives rise to an artificial layer of social reality that exists only so long as it is 
not repealed, since each of its individual components can be changed or rendered 
null and void’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 38). Insofar as the discourse principle lies at the 
heart of the system of rights and, as such, is the normative core of positive law, 
Habermas’s idea of the dual character of law seems to suggest that even the 
discourse principle could be called into question if some citizens find it problematic. 
This apparently does not work to Habermas’s advantage, as Frank Michelman points 
out as follows,  
 
As itself a positive law prescribing the society's set of arrangements for the 
production of (other) positive laws, the constitution sits in a delicate position. 
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Inevitably, many of its provisions are themselves objects of reasonable 
disagreement, and yet these provisions must at any given moment be fixed, 
decided, because in them lies the institutional programme for debating and 
deciding disputed specifications or proposed modifications of any and all 
positive legal prescriptions, including constitutional provisions themselves 
(Michelman, 2001, p. 263- 4). 
 
In other words, the normative core of a positive law, especially the discourse 
principle, cannot be open to revision as are other derivative legal rules, insofar as 
they lay down the institutional framework of the law-making process itself. In this 
sense, to say that a positive law could legitimately coerce citizens to support a 
legally institutionalised communicative action is to invite an infinite regress 
involving the establishment of a society-wide communicative action and the 
validation of the discourse principle. Thus, between the discursively established 
validity of the discourse principle and the legally institutionalised communicative 
action, which comes first? Hence, in order to avoid this type of infinite regress, 
Habermas cannot rely on the category of law to guarantee the reciprocal orientation 
of citizens towards agreements.  
 
Finally, I want to examine the last explanation available to Habermas for citizens’ 
motivation to support a legally institutionalised communicative action: a shared 
political culture. In light of the difficulty of shielding the normative core of positive 
laws legitimately from discussion and even repeal by citizens, Michelman attempts 
to link the validity of a legally institutionalised communicative action within a 
nation-state to the validity of a political collective identity of the citizenry. As he 
says, ‘there will have to be some way in which citizens can perceive even their most 
intractable and divisive disagreements over the application of constitutional norms to 
be directed to something other than the content of the norms’ (Michelman, 2001, p. 
268). In this light, the solution is to redirect potential disagreements over the 
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contents of the normative core of positive laws to a shared collective self-
understanding that would support the normative core. As Michelman claims,  
 
(G)iven disagreements over applications of essential constitutional norms, 
perhaps we as citizens don't have to ascribe the disagreements to ambiguity 
or vagrancy of meaning in the norms themselves. We might rather ascribe 
our applicational disagreements to uncertainty or disagreement about exactly 
who we think we are and aim to be as a politically constituted people, where 
we think we have come from and where we think we are headed 
(Michelman, 2001, p. 268).  
 
Therefore, a political culture supplies the most appropriate context within which 
such an important collective identity is found. As he claims, ‘the answer is…a 
cultural contingency—a cultural contingency, when and where it exists, that the 
corporate identity in question, however contested it may be in other respects, is 
already perceived by all concerned to fall within the class of morally 
conscientious…constitutional identities’ (Michelman, 2001, p. 269). In other words, 
when citizens share a political culture that supports the idea of a legally 
institutionalised communicative action, they will treat their substantive 
disagreements over the normative core of positive law as moral disagreements over 
the definition of who we are as a legal community and thereby leave the stability of 
the legal order intact.  
 
Habermas seems to support this reading. As he explicitly claims, 
 
(I)n complex societies the citizenry as a whole can no longer be held 
together by a substantive consensus on values but only by a consensus on 
the procedure for the legitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate 
exercise of power. Citizens who are politically integrated in this way share 
the rationally based conviction that unrestrained freedom of communication 
in the political public sphere, a democratic process for settling conflicts, and 
the constitutional channelling of power together provide a basis for checking 
illegitimate power and ensuring that administrative power is used in the 
equal interest of all. The universalism of legal principles is reflected in a 
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procedural consensus, which must be embedded in the context of a 
historically specific political culture through a kind of constitutional 
patriotism (Habermas, 1994, p. 135). 
 
From this text, we can gather that the content of a political culture is centred on the 
validity of legally institutionalised communicative action alone and does not have to 
exceed what is needed for citizens to accept the said procedure. Nevertheless, 
Michelman fails to tell us why these political-cultural convictions are valid in the 
first place. Michelman assumes that we can indeed find the existing political culture 
within most liberal societies to be supportive of a legally institutionalised 
communicative action. Under this assumption, the possibility that citizens can 
actually recognise themselves as endorsing certain normative values that would at 
least be consistent with the discourse principle in effect solves the problem of the 
validity of the normative core of positive law. If we nonetheless challenge the 
underlying assumption, asking whether there is actually a shared political culture 
supportive of a communicative action, the grounding of the normative core of 
positive law in an accommodating political culture would seem to collapse.  
 
Drawing on Michelman’s arguments, Alessandro Ferrara tackles this problem by 
describing the formation of a shared political culture as an open-ended political 
project that in time comes to support the normative core of positive law. He claims, 
 
(W)e can conceive of the political identity of the people as something that 
pre-exists the constitution. Constitution framing needs not count, from the 
standpoint of our conceptual strategy for avoiding infinite regress, as an 
originary act or as a kind of legal Big Bang. Rather it can be seen as an act 
that takes place within a broader normative frame of reference to which it 
has to be responsive (Ferrara, 2001, p. 786).  
 
In other words, our democratic law-making process does not begin with the 
establishment of the normative core of positive law. It develops alongside the 
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parallel, gradual development of the shared normative understandings among 
citizens that come to support the democratic regime and its legal order. Therefore, 
Ferrara suggests, ‘the non-paradoxical understanding of the nexus of democracy and 
constitutionalism begins to look like the gradual coming to fruition of a modern 
identity that hinges on the background principle of subjective freedom’ (Ferrara, 
2001, p. 787). Insofar as the development of ‘the background principle’ is an 
incremental process that cannot be described in terms of separate, clearly defined 
stages, it would be difficult for anyone to reject the possibility that there might 
already be a shared political culture among citizens that endorses a legally 
institutionalised communicative action. Even if empirical evidence emerges to reject 
this claim, Habermas could still argue that his idea of a legally institutionalised 
communicative action is a normative claim that requires the development of a shared 
political culture in order to take certain directions. Since there is no reason to believe 
that there would never be a shared political culture supportive of this normative ideal, 
it is logical to accept the conclusion that citizens could come to support a legally 
institutionalised communicative action in the long term if, and only if, a shared 
political culture could be developed to support it.  
 
In the sense that citizens’ motivation to support a legally institutionalised 
communicative action ultimately relies on the gradual coming to fruition of an 
accommodating political culture—rather than on the presuppositions of 
communicative action or the coercive power of positive law—the question now 
becomes whether the political culture as it is can motivate citizens sufficiently to 
transform the existing democratic decision-making process in the direction required 
by Habermas. Putting aside the discussion of the cognitive mechanism at work when 
citizens are faced with the transformative task of establishing a legally 
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institutionalised communicative action, it is apparent that the said deliberative 
procedure has to be at least comprehensible to citizens in order for it to have any 
appeal at all. That is why the passage cited above shows that Habermas includes all 
the necessary normative understandings about communicative action in the shared 
political culture among citizens. In other words, in order for the shared political 
culture to motivate citizens to support a legally institutionalised communicative 
action, it has to help citizens comprehend the desirability of the said deliberative 
procedure. The same could be said about motivating citizens to transform the 
existing democratic decision-making process into a Habermasian deliberative 
procedure; that is, the existing political culture must be able to help citizens 
understand the idea of communicative action. Ferrara’s argument above agrees with 
this understanding of the motivational force of a shared political culture. It is 
because the gradual change of a shared political culture could continue to help 
citizens understand the new political regime as consistent with their collective self-
understanding that citizens would contribute to the establishment of the new regime 
without questioning the validity of the latter’s normative core. Nevertheless, since to 
Habermas a political culture merely consists in the necessary normative 
understandings about the legally institutionalised communicative action, as shown 
by the passage above, there will certainly be a difference between the existing 
political culture and the necessary political-cultural convictions about 
communicative action. Of course, I do not deny that Ferrara’s depiction of the 
transformation of a shared political culture as a gradual process is correct. I merely 
wish to point out that the existing political culture in and by itself cannot enable 
citizens to understand the new deliberative procedure and thereby motivate citizens 
to consent to the transformation of the existing procedure, no matter how small the 
difference between the existing and the new political cultures. There has to be a 
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more comprehensive cultural background shared among citizens to help them see the 
new political culture as something different but somehow reflective of the already 
widely accepted norms and values. 
  
4.          Habermas’s constitutional patriotism has to rely on Miller’s theory of 
nationality 
 
I demonstrated in section 3, Habermas’s three explanations of citizens’ motivation to 
support a legally institutionalised communicative action do not obtain, and therefore 
he requires a notion other than the unavoidable presuppositions of a communicative 
action, the coercive power of a legal system and the shared political culture to 
explicate the said motivation. Miller’s notion of a common nationality could satisfy 
these conditions, insofar as nationality draws on a more comprehensive reservoir of 
pre-political cultural values that could motivate citizens to support the functioning of 
major social institutions in general. Let me begin with the motivational force of a 
common nationality. As introduced in section 1, Miller’s notion of common 
nationality aims to develop a common national identity and a shared public culture 
that supplies a sufficient level of mutual trust among citizens, because a nation-state 
requires the said mutual trust to motivate citizens to consent to collective action 
schemes, support distributive justice and participate in deliberative democracy. 
According to Miller, citizens are more likely to shoulder special obligations towards 
others at their own cost when they share a common national identity and a public 
culture and thereby believe that others will reciprocate likewise in similar situations. 
There are three features of this pre-political tie among citizens sharing a common 
nationality. First, there will not be any conflict between fulfilling my obligations to 
others and pursuing my own life goals. Second, a type of loose reciprocity obtains 
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among citizens so that each will expect to benefit from the reciprocal relationship in 
the long term. Lastly, formal systems of reciprocity such as major social institutions 
could arise from the loose reciprocal relations among citizens (Miller, 1995, p. 66- 7).    
 
Furthermore, Miller’s notion of a nationality as consisting of a common national 
identity and a shared public culture encompasses more cultural values than 
Habermas’s notions of collective self-understanding and political culture. The first 
contrast is between Miller’s notion of national identity and Habermas’s notion of 
collective self-understanding. On the one hand, Miller’s notion of national identity 
has five characteristics. First, it is constituted by belief. Second, it embodies 
historical continuity. Third, it is an active identity. Forth, it connects a group of 
people to a particular geographical territory. And, last, it draws on a common public 
culture (Miller, 1995, p. 21-7). On the other hand, Habermas’s notion of collective 
self-understanding is developed through substantiating the system of rights—
including both private liberties and political rights—and consists in a body of ideas 
related to how it is to lead a common life according to an inter-subjectively agreed 
normative outlook among citizens (Habermas, 1996, p. 160). It seems that Miller’s 
notion of national identity draws on a more comprehensive source of common 
normative understandings than Habermas’s notion of political-cultural self-
understanding, insofar as the former aims to unite citizens as a community that has to 
conduct a collective life at levels including, but not limited to, the political. The 
same could be said about the second contrast between Miller’s and Habermas’s 
notion of public culture. Miller’s notion of public culture encompasses a wide range 
of normative understandings in relation to how co-nationals are to conduct a life 
together as a pre-political national community, and the scope of a public culture 
could only be determined in deliberative democracy rather than ex ante (Miller, 1995, 
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p. 25-7). Habermas’s notion of political culture is a body of normative 
understandings essential for validating a legally institutionalised communicative 
action within a nation-state. It consists precisely in ‘the rationally based conviction 
that unrestrained freedom of communication in the political public sphere, a 
democratic process for settling conflicts, and the constitutional channelling of power 
together provide a basis for checking illegitimate power and ensuring that 
administrative power is used in the equal interest of all’ (Habermas, 1994, p. 135). 
Even though both public and political culture attempt to provide a shared 
background of normative understandings about how to lead a life together within 
nation-states; unlike Habermas’s notion of political culture, Miller’s notion draws on 
both political and pre-political cultural values, insofar as it aims to unite citizens 
even beyond the political realm. 
 
Thus, if Habermas were to incorporate Miller’s notion of common nationality, his 
account of social integration would be able to explain citizens’ motivation to support 
a legally institutionalised communicative action and, therefore, undertake to 
transform the existing democratic decision-making process accordingly for two 
reasons. First, a shared public culture could help citizens understand the political-
cultural convictions about communicative action as reflective of the norms and 
values already embodied in the more comprehensive cultural background, even 
though the said new political culture is quite different from the existing one. Second, 
a common national identity could motivate citizens to undertake the transformation 
of the existing deliberative procedure so as to establish a legally institutionalised 
communicative action, despite the fact that they might not fully comprehend the new 
deliberative procedure as well as the existing one, insofar as seeing the others as co-
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nationals, they are willing to shoulder potential costs in order to give their national 
community the best chance of survival through the new deliberative procedure.  
 
The incorporation of Miller’s notion of common nationality will not result in any 
internal incoherence of Habermas’s theory of law as the medium between facticity 
and validity, for two reasons. Firstly, Miller’s own conception of deliberative 
democracy shares many similarities with Habermas’s conception of communicative 
action. On the one hand, Miller argues that ‘a weak sense of impartiality’ is 
necessary for a well-functioning deliberative democracy: ‘One is that the reasons 
given in political debate should be sincerely held, and not merely adopted as an 
expedient way of promoting sectional interests…The second condition is that 
citizens should be willing to moderate their claims in the hope that they can find 
common ground on which policy decisions can be based’ (Miller, 1995, p. 96-7). On 
the other hand, a communicative action occurs when ‘actors in the roles of speaker 
and hearer attempt to negotiate interpretations of the situation at hand and to 
harmonise their respective plans with one another through the unrestrained pursuit of 
illocutionary goals,’ whereas strategic action occurs when ‘language is used only as 
medium for transmitting information, (and) action coordination proceeds through the 
mutual influence that actors exert on each other in a purposive-rational manner’ 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 18). In the face of this comparison, Miller’s first condition of 
the weak sense of impartiality seems to convey the idea of communicative action, 
insofar as Miller means for the participants in a deliberative democracy to hold their 
political views and not as an expedient way of promoting narrow sectional interests. 
As the second condition shows, a public deliberation is normally expected to lead to 
ethical judgments that all could potentially accept; it ought to strive to reach a 
genuine agreement among citizens holding different interest positions. This is 
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consistent with the discourse principle that governs Habermas’s account of the 
deliberative procedure: ‘Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly 
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses’ (Habermas, 1996, 
p. 107). Therefore, the basic rationale of deliberative democracy is roughly the same 
for Miller and Habermas, which makes it uncontroversial to see the development of 
a common nationality as one among the many tasks of a legally institutionalised 
communicative action.  
 
Secondly, the development of a common nationality through a deliberative 
democracy does not challenge any of the fundamental values of a legally 
institutionalised communicative action. As Miller claims, despite the importance of 
the motivational force of a common nationality, the substance of a common 
nationality is quite flexible and, as such, could only be determined through public 
deliberation, drawing on a shared public culture (Miller, 1995, p.68- 70). The 
development of a common nationality could, therefore, be seen as one of the many 
goals a legally institutionalised communicative action serves to accomplish. In fact, 
Habermas explicitly states that there are three categories of questions to be discussed 
in the deliberative procedure: (1) the pragmatic questions, (2) the ethical-political 
questions and (3) the moral questions. The pragmatic questions focus on finding the 
best solution to common social issues on the basis of shared normative 
understandings; the ethical-political questions focus on clarifying the collective self-
understanding of the society as a whole; the moral questions focus on establishing 
the universal moral principles acceptable to all citizens within a society (Habermas, 
1996, p. 159- 62). It seems that Habermas also intends the legally institutionalised 
communicative action to develop a collective self-understanding among all citizens. 
The development of a collective self-understanding is necessary insofar as citizens 
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require a shared political culture to comprehend, and thereby support, the existing or 
the future deliberative procedure. As discussed, both Michelman and Ferrara resort 
to a shared political culture to explain citizens’ motivation to support the core 
normative values embodied in the existing democratic decision-making process 
without personally choosing those values.  
 
Therefore, Miller’s notion of a common nationality could be seen as a version of 
collective self-understanding, insofar as Habermas has a very ambiguous conception 
of collective self-understanding that does not clearly distinguish political from pre-
political values. As Cronin observes,  
 
At times Habermas draws a strong contrast between the constitution and 
their ‘ethical’ integration into religious and other groups on the basis of 
values and ideals of the good that others cannot be expected to share. Yet at 
other times, as McCarthy points out, he speaks of the unavoidable ‘ethical 
permeation’ of political culture, thereby acknowledging that the legal and 
political cultures of democracies are inevitably shared by particularistic 
values and conceptions of the good and reflect the traditions of their major 
component groups (Cronin, 2003, p. 16). 
 
Faced with this apparent ambivalence in Habermas’s theory, Cronin suggests that it 
is more reasonable to claim that ‘a constitutional political culture and the 
corresponding collective identity should be seen as ‘post-nationalist’ rather than 
‘post-national,’ in the sense that this would reject chauvinistic interpretations of 
national identity while preserving a distinctive national character’ (Cronin, 2003, p. 
16). In other words, Habermas does not make a sharp distinction between political 
and pre-political cultural values; rather, he is more concerned with the ‘chauvinistic’ 
implication of coercive cultural integration at the state level. Insofar as cultural 
pluralism within liberal societies diversifies our value preferences with regard to 
common social issues, forced cultural integration for the sake of social solidarity 
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contradicts the rationale of communicative action. In the sense that Habermas’s 
account of deliberative procedure is designed to give citizens an equal chance of 
discussing the legitimacy of the legal order so as to best protect their own private 
liberties, a forced cultural integration is obviously out of the question.  
 
Nevertheless, as Cronin observes, due to the porous nature of the distinction between 
political and pre-political cultural values, there is an inevitable ‘ethical permeation’ 
of political culture by more comprehensive pre-political cultural values. As 
introduced in section 2, a legally institutionalised communicative action relies on a 
notion of ‘lifeworld’ rather than a political culture alone. The lifeworld is the body of 
shared normative understandings already familiar to all citizens within a nation-state, 
and could both serve as the necessary background against which parties to a 
communicative action understand the validity claims raised by others and be 
enriched by every successful communicative action. Since lifeworld is an integral 
part of a communicative action, and the latter occurs not only at the political level, it 
follows that a lifeworld is more widely encompassing than a political culture. In a 
legally institutionalised communicative action, citizens draw on a shared lifeworld 
that contains both political and pre-political values, therefore the deliberative 
procedure will naturally lead to an increase in the number of political and pre-
political cultural values shared among citizens. This does not contradict Habermas’s 
account of a legally institutionalised communicative action, in the sense that this 
cultural integration results from voluntary communication among citizens on an 
equal footing rather than from coercive state policies.  
 
However, this is not to say that policies backed by state coercion are not necessary 
for a legally institutionalised communicative action to occur. On top of the legal 
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rules that, once validated, require enforcement by all citizens in a deliberative 
procedure, state coercion is required to develop a shared public culture, so as to 
supply a sufficient level of mutual trust among citizens. There are two differences 
between Habermas’s notion of lifeworld and Miller’s notion of public culture. Firstly, 
Habermas’s notion of lifeworld is broader in scope than Miller’s notion of public 
culture. According to Habermas, lifeworld is a body of shared normative 
understandings that forms the already familiar background to every human 
communication in the social world. In contrast, ‘a public culture may be seen as a set 
of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together’ (Miller, 
1995, p. 26). The comparison shows that lifeworld is a concept indicating the 
universal condition of all human communications, whereas a public culture 
represents a group of people living together as a national community. Secondly, 
lifeworld does not require coercive measures on the part of the state apparatus to 
develop. As Habermas says, ‘the lifeworld forms both the horizon for speech 
situations and the source of interpretations, while it in turn reproduces itself only 
through ongoing communicative actions’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 22). In other words, 
the enriching of a lifeworld is not directed towards a specific aim, and therefore 
rejects purposeful state policies to develop a shared body of normative 
understandings among citizens. In contrast, a public culture is treated as an 
impersonal good of the national community which is preserved and enriched by 
purposeful state policies at both the political and the sub-political levels. In terms of 
the nation-building process, Miller argues,  
 
What must happen in general is that existing national identities must be 
stripped of elements that are repugnant to the self-understanding of one or 
more component groups, while members of these groups must themselves be 
willing to embrace an inclusive nationality, and in the process shed elements 
of their values which are at odds with its principles (Miller, 1995, p. 142).  
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Accordingly, rather than developing freely as a result of a legally institutionalised 
communicative action, a public culture has to be reformulated and preserved for the 
sake of a common national identity. This comparison reveals why a public culture is 
required whereas a shared lifeworld is always present in the communicative action. 
The specific need to supply a sufficient level of mutual trust among citizens requires 
a purposeful process of enriching and preserving a body of normative understandings 
shared among citizens, rather than a process that may or may not fulfil this specific 
need. Nonetheless, the said purposeful process does not contradict Habermas’s 
account of legally institutionalised communicative action because, like a collective 
self-understanding and a political culture, a public culture is developed through 
voluntary communication among citizens on an equal footing, and therefore does not 
force cultural integration upon citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter sets out to compare Miller’s account of social integration with the 
statists’ accounts—of which, due to the limited scope of this thesis, I have chosen 
Habermas’s conception of a legally institutionalised communicative action as an 
example, for its lasting influence. Whereas Miller emphasises the need for a 
common national identity and a shared public culture as a precondition for mutual 
trust among citizens, Habermas believes that a deliberative procedure based on equal 
and un-coerced communication could instil sufficient social solidarity among 
citizens. In order to demonstrate the advantage of Miller’s theory of nationality over 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action in accounting for social integration, 
in section 3 I examined three explanations of citizens’ motivation to participate in a 
legally institutionalised communicative action. Insofar as the possibility of social 
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integration rests wholly on citizens’ participation in a legally institutionalised 
communication, citizens’ motivation to comply with the rationale of the said 
procedure cannot be presupposed. 
 
The three explanations are: (1) the unavoidable presuppositions of communicative 
action, (2) the coercive power of the legal system and (3) the shared political culture 
among citizens. I demonstrated that these explanations all fall short of accounting for 
citizens’ motivation to comply with the rationale of communicative action. First, the 
unavoidable presuppositions of communicative action do not obtain, because these 
only explain the motivation of those who are already engaged in human 
communication. Second, the coercive power of the legal system cannot motivate 
citizens to comply, because it will result in an infinite regress at the conceptual level. 
In other words, between the establishment of a legally institutionalised 
communicative action and the legitimacy of the legal system, it is difficult to 
determine which comes first. Third, a shared political culture cannot motivate 
citizens to comply with the rationale of communicative action because Habermas’s 
notion of political culture is too thin to help citizens understand the difference 
between the existing political culture and the new political culture that supports a 
legally institutionalised communicative action.  
 
In this light, Habermas’s conception of a communicative action has to incorporate 
Miller’s notions of common national identity and shared public culture, so as to 
motivate citizens to participate in the deliberative procedure he visualises. Insofar as 
a public culture is a more widely encompassing reservoir of cultural values than a 
political culture, it could help citizens understand the new political culture as 
reflective of the already existing values in the public culture. Moreover, since a 
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national identity appeals to the pre-political communal ties among citizens, it could 
motivate them to transform the existing political regime into an actual legally 
institutionalised communicative action at their own expense, even if they do not yet 
fully understand the validity of the new deliberative procedure. Hence, the statists’ 
account of social integration—of which Habermas’s conception of communicative 
action is an example—also has to rely on Miller’s notions of common national 
identity and shared public culture.  
 
This conclusion implies that a plausible conception of global citizenship should also 
take serious account of human beings’ motivation to support the global democratic 
institutions, if we expect it to be realisable in the long term. Insofar as a common 
identity and a shared public culture among people are indispensable to the 
functioning of institutions of citizenship, global public deliberation should aim to 
develop them alongside the discussion of common global issues and global 
regulative norms. As will be discussed at more length in Chapter 8, this is the third 
guiding principle of the global public deliberation. The other two guiding principle 
will emerge respectively in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
In the next chapter, I will turn the discussion around, arguing that Miller’s theory of 
nationality suffers certain deficiencies when applied to the nation-building process. 
As Miller’s account of deliberative democracy is too vague to explain how it helps 
citizens to voice their different interpretations of a common nationality, facilitates an 
equal communication among them and finally enables them to reach a normative 
consensus, it is necessary to turn to Habermas’s conception of communicative action 
for a remedy.   
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Chapter 4: 
Miller’s Account of the Nation-Building Process 
and Its Liberal Multiculturalist Critics 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Chapter 3 introduced Miller’s theory of nationality and demonstrated how its validity 
obtains despite the challenge from Habermas’s constitutional patriotism. There, I 
demonstrated that Miller’s theory of nationality is more plausible than Habermas’s 
constitutional patriotism, because it taps into the motivational strength of a common 
national identity and a shared public culture. However, I have not considered his 
account of the nation-building process through a deliberative democracy which 
materialises the theory of nationality. Miller develops an account of the nation-
building process that stresses the importance of developing a common national 
identity and a shared public culture while also paying sufficient respect to cultural 
pluralism. However, it comes under criticism from the liberal multiculturalists for its 
inability to satisfactorily balance the demands of nation-building with a respect for 
cultural pluralism at the conceptual level. In this chapter, I want to argue that with 
my reconstruction, Miller’s account of the nation-building process could realise 
nation-building while also paying sufficient respect to cultural pluralism.  
 
In section 1, I will introduce Miller’s account of the nation-building process. 
Essentially, it requires that the need for nation-building should be balanced against 
respect for cultural pluralism within a nation-state. In section 2, I will address four 
aspects of the liberal multiculturalists’ criticisms of Miller’s account. Firstly, 
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McMahan believes that the promotion of a common national identity and a shared 
public culture will supress other non-national aspects of personal identification, such 
as familial, religious, ethnic identities, et cetera. In order to dispute this point, I will 
demonstrate that it is necessary to prioritise the national over the non-national 
aspects of personal identification, because this provides an important motivational 
base among citizens to guarantee the functioning of major social institutions and 
equal respect among citizens. Secondly, Michael Freeman argues that it is unrealistic 
to expect cultural minorities to identify with the actual deeds of the ancestors of the 
cultural majorities, despite this being a part of the nation-building process. In 
response, I will show that the collective fabrication of a national past is driven by the 
need to supply a sufficient level of mutual trust among citizens. As such, rather than 
a strict identification with the actual historical episodes, all it requires is a collective 
ethical understanding of certain historical events which makes it possible for all 
citizens to live as a united people. Thirdly, Sunne Laegaard claims that, in order to 
provide every citizen with a meaningful context of choices, the shared public culture 
has to expand to a greater extent than Miller allows. In response, I will demonstrate 
that the scope of a shared public culture does not depend on its ability to provide a 
meaningful context of choices available to citizens as their only available cultural 
context; rather, it depends on its ability to preserve the national community.  
 
Finally, according to Laegaard and Benner, there is no way to guarantee that the 
shared public culture could be developed and renewed in such a way as to avoid the 
conservative bias in favour of cultural majorities. In response, I will prove that my 
reconstruction of Miller’s account of the nation-building process as two levels of 
public deliberation could help ensure that the conservative bias would be avoided. 
These two levels are, respectively, the pragmatic questions concerning concrete 
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social issues, and the ethical-political questions with respect to the reformulation of a 
common national identity and a shared public culture. As such, the existing common 
national identity and the shared public culture could be the basis upon which the 
debate over concrete social issues are adjudicated at the pragmatic level, whereas 
they could be questioned, thereby becoming the subject matter of the public 
deliberation for its reformulation at the ethical-political level. Since these two 
independent levels of public deliberation both constitute a larger reiterative process, 
my reconstruction could help Miller avoid the conservative bias in favour of cultural 
majorities. Additionally, as suggested in section 3, in order to guarantee the equal 
influence of the cultural majorities and the minorities over the final results of public 
deliberation, the reformulation of a common national identity and a shared public 
culture should be guided by my rendition of Miller’s notion of equal respect to the 
co-deliberators. It states: all citizens should aim to advance their claims in the hope 
that the resultant common national identity and the shared public culture would be 
equally beneficial to all. 
 
Nevertheless, as I will show in section 4, my reconstruction of Miller’s account of 
the nation-building process, though successfully assuaging the multiculturalists’ 
concerns, poses a problem for nation-building as a whole, because Miller’s failure to 
elaborate on the exact parameters of the shared public culture necessary for 
preserving a national community makes it practically impossible for citizens to 
comprehend the extent to which the current national identity and the shared public 
culture could be challenged without threatening the national community as a whole. 
In this light, it calls for a theory that could explain how deliberative democracy could 
help citizens reach a normative consensus on various subjects, including the scope of 
a shared public culture through actual communication. In this light, I will propose 
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that Miller’s account of the nation-building process should incorporate Habermas’s 
notion of communicative action, since the latter is supposed to facilitate an equal and 
un-coerced communication among citizens so as to negotiate between different 
interpretations of the external world on the basis of validity claims. 
 
1. Miller’s Account of the Nation-Building Process  
 
Miller’s account of the nation-building process resides in the idea that a common 
national identity and a shared public culture should be developed on the basis of a 
republican conception of citizenship. Here, citizens aim to find the most acceptable 
balance between a common national identity and all other non-national group 
identities by means of public deliberation. As Miller says, ‘what must happen in 
general is that existing national identities must be stripped of elements that are 
repugnant to the self-understanding of one or more component groups, while 
members of these groups must themselves be willing to embrace an inclusive 
nationality, and in the process to shed elements of their values which are at odds 
with its principles’ (Miller, 1995, p. 142).  
 
In order to achieve this end, a republican conception of citizenship and the need for 
nation-building are placed on par with each other, with the former specifying the 
procedure most consistent with republicanism and the latter preserving the relevance 
of developing a common national identity and a shared public culture. On the one 
hand, the republican conception of citizenship requires that the distinction between 
public and private culture should only emerge as a result of public deliberation 
(Miller, 1995, p. 57). Public culture is a body of normative understandings necessary 
for a group of individuals to live as a national community which includes, but is not 
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limited to, political culture. In contrast, private culture concerns the cultural values 
inherent to individuals’ non-national group identities, which should not be interfered 
with by the state (Miller, 1995, p.25- 7). Citizens participate in deliberative 
democracy to determine the boundary between public and private culture as well as 
the content of the shared public culture, so as to balance the demands of nation-
building and respect for cultural pluralism. 
 
On the other hand, the practical needs of nation-building determine the mode of 
public deliberation in the democratic decision-making process in general. As Miller 
claims, in deliberative democracy, ‘the success of any particular demand will depend 
upon how far it can be expressed in terms that are close to, or distant from, the 
general political ethos of the community. It requires of citizens a willingness to give 
reasons for what they are claiming…’ (Miller, 2000, p. 57) In other words, the 
claims raised and debated in a democratic forum need to be at least intelligible to all 
citizens, and this necessitates the existence of a shared public culture. The success of 
particular claims would depend on their persuasiveness as evaluated on the basis of 
the said common cultural background.  
 
2. Criticisms of Miller’s Account of the Nation-Building Process  
 
In this section, I will consider four lines of the liberal multiculturalist criticisms that 
target Miller’s account of the nation-building process. First and foremost, Jeff 
McMahan charges that the nation-building process supresses other aspects of 
individual identification. By attributing predominance to a common national identity, 
the nation-building process is likely to result in the withering of other aspects of 
individual identification. As McMahan says, ‘acquiescence to a vision of oneself in 
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which nationality overshadows the other variegated dimensions of one’s life, 
character, and relations with others is to suffer a miserable reduction of the richness 
of one’s identity’ (McMahan, 1997, p. 121). I concede that the nation-building 
process has to prioritise certain cultural values over others which may also be 
important to the non-national aspects of individual identification. Nevertheless, if we 
acknowledge that the public sphere cannot but prioritise certain sets of cultural 
values over others, with the backing of the administrative state, the act of 
prioritisation in itself should not be the reason why nation-building is morally 
undesirable.  
 
Moreover, there are two senses in which the prioritisation of the national over the 
non-national aspects of personal identification is necessary within nation-states. 
Firstly, by supplying a sufficient level of mutual trust, a common national identity 
and a shared public culture are crucial for a nation-state to solve the collective action 
problem, pursue social justice and maintain a functioning deliberative democracy 
(Miller, 1995, p. 90- 5). Here, Miller essentially suggests that there is a positive 
correlation between the number of cultural commonalities among citizens and the 
level of mutual trust among them. As he argues,  
 
The arguments here all appeal to the political consequences of solidarity and 
cultural homogeneity. They focus on the important role played by trust in a 
viable political community. Much state activity involves the furthering of 
goals which cannot be achieved without the voluntary co-operation of 
citizens. For this activity to be successful, the citizens must trust the state, 
and they must trust one another to comply with what the state demands of 
them (Miller, 1995, p. 91). 
 
Secondly, a common national identity and a shared public culture are required for 
motivating both cultural majorities and minorities to treat each other as equal 
citizens whose non-national identities are equally important. On the one hand, Miller 
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claims, ‘a common sense of nationality is needed to underpin the claim for equal 
respect: I respect the other person as a fellow-American or fellow-Briton, and this 
means someone who shares an identity and belongs to the same community.’ In the 
absence of a shared national identity, the cultural majorities ‘are being asked to 
extend equal respect and treatment to groups with whom they have nothing in 
common beyond the fact of cohabitation in the same political society’ (Miller, 1995, 
p. 139). On the other hand, the cultural minorities can only become full members of 
the national community if they develop a sense of attachment to it through partaking 
in the re-/formulation of the common national identity and the shared public culture. 
As Miller argues,  
 
The minority groups want to feel at home in the society to which they or 
their forebears have moved…So they need a story that they share with the 
majority, though a story that can be told in different ways and with different 
emphases by different groups. To see themselves only as bearers of a 
specific ethnic identity…would be to lose the chance to join a larger 
community whose traditions and practices have inevitably left their mark on 
the environment they inhabit (Miller, 1995, p. 138). 
 
From the standpoint of the minorities, this appeals to the importance of sharing a 
common national identity and a shared public culture with the majorities so as to 
have any influence at all on the policy outcomes of public deliberation. Hence, Jeff 
McMahan’s charge that the prioritisation of the national over the non-national aspect 
of personal identification is morally undesirable could be mitigated to the extent that 
an acknowledgement of the inevitability of the said prioritisation is called for in the 
two senses mentioned above. Nevertheless, I agree with McMahan’s charge to some 
extent, because the necessity of developing a common national identity and a shared 
public culture also illuminates the vulnerable position of cultural minorities vis-à-vis 
the majorities in public deliberation. Compared with the majorities, the minorities 
are left with little choice but to participate in developing a common national identity 
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and a shared public culture, otherwise their demands will not have any real influence 
over the policy outcomes. In light of the necessity of developing a common national 
identity and a shared public culture, the vulnerable position of the cultural minorities 
vis-à-vis the majorities makes it crucial to ensure that the resultant collective identity 
does not make unjust demands on the minorities, and the process of formulating a 
collective identity is not biased in favour of the cultural majorities. As a response to 
Freeman’s critique, I will touch in the following paragraphs on the former aspect 
when discussing the possibility of developing an ethical understanding of the 
national past as part of a collective identity that could be meaningful to both cultural 
majorities and minorities. Then, as a response to Bener’s critique, I will address the 
latter aspect when discussing the possibility of avoiding the conservative bias 
towards cultural majorities in public deliberation. 
 
I will now address the second line of criticism against Miller’s account of the nation-
building process. Michael Freeman charges that, as a part of the common national 
identity, a shared national past imposes an unrealistic burden on newly arrived 
immigrants, in that it requires them to identify with the actual deeds of the cultural 
majorities’ ancestors. As he argues,  
 
If the memory of forebears is an important part of national identity, then this 
element cannot be purged in order not to exclude immigrant minorities. If 
such memory is an essential part of national identity, then immigrants are 
required to do what is impossible: to share historical memories with the 
descent-majority. This form of historical nationalism is incompatible with a 
pluralist democracy of equal citizenship (Freeman, 1994, p. 84).  
 
In other words, the development of a common national identity seems at odds with 
the idea of equal citizenship, because it necessarily imposes upon immigrants the 
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unrealistic burden of having to identify with the actual deeds of the cultural 
majorities’ ancestors. 
 
In my view, Miller believes that the objective accuracy of the national past, as 
interpreted and shared by the national community together, matters less than the role 
the mythical past plays in enabling the members to understand themselves as a 
united community from an ethical perspective. As Miller says, ‘leaving aside 
questions about the sense in which we can call any historical narrative true or false, 
the historical accuracy of national stories seems to matter less in its own right than 
for the effect it has on the nation’s present self-understanding’ (Miller, 1995, p. 40). 
In particular, an ethical understanding of the national past as part of the common 
national identity helps supply a sufficient level of mutual trust among citizens to 
support the functioning of major social institutions. Hence, the development of a 
common national identity does not necessarily require immigrants to do the 
impossible, that is, identify with the actual deeds of the cultural majorities’ ancestors, 
because there is more than one way to construct a shared national history so as to 
ensure that both the members of the ‘immigrant-minority’ and the ‘descendent-
majority’ understand the roles their individual lives are or will play in preserving the 
national community. For instance, even if the ‘immigrant-minority’ has just joined 
the national community, public deliberation could henceforth capitalise on the 
historical episodes of the hosting society that make the society what it is and what 
attracted the ‘immigrant-minority’ in the first place. Insofar as most immigrant-
minorities are more or less attracted by the liberal ideals of western societies, their 
immigration to the host societies could be understood as a voluntary addition to the 
countless efforts that have made liberal societies what they are today. The same goes 
for the indigenous ethnic groups which are not under Freeman’s consideration. 
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Despite possibly unfair treatment by the ‘descendent-majority’ during the previous 
undemocratic nation-building process, they could join public deliberation now, in the 
hope that the past mistakes of the majority could be recognised as important lessons 
in a shared national past that have led to a more enlightened and tolerant people. 
Their participation in the reformulation of a shared national past with the majority 
could be understood as being an indispensable contribution to the collective revision 
of the past mistakes of the national community as a whole, in terms of the 
mistreatment of cultural minorities. 
 
Now, I will address the third critique of Miller’s account of the nation-building 
process. Sune Laegaard argues that a large-scale nation-building process is at odds 
with the purpose of providing a meaningful context of choices to all members of the 
nation-state, including cultural minorities. As Laegaard claims,  
 
A public culture primarily consists of such elements as political principles, 
social norms about behaviour in the public sphere and a commitment to the 
preservation of the national language…(Nevertheless) for a public culture to 
be a precondition for the meaningfulness of individual choices, it must 
incorporate further cultural elements. But in that case, it gradually ceases to 
be public, and thereby becomes progressively more problematic from a 
liberal point of view as a basis of public policies (Laegaard, 2007, p. 292- 3). 
 
In other words, the need to remain public conflicts with the need to provide a 
sufficient context of choices to each citizen within the nation-state, when attempting 
to develop a shared public culture among all citizens. However, in my view, 
Laegaard’s understanding of public culture is diametrically opposed to Miller’s; that 
is, the need for a shared public culture is not derived from the attempt to provide 
every citizen with a context of meaningful choices. Instead, a shared public culture is 
required at the level of nation-states because it could supply the indispensable level 
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of mutual trust among citizens of the same nation-state, so as to support the 
functioning of the major social institutions.  
 
Even though it is difficult to bridge the abovementioned difference, Laegaard could 
at least recognise the importance of social integration as Miller conceives it. This is 
because it is indispensable to even the promotion of non-national group identities in 
the political arena, in the sense that mutual trust among citizens, especially between 
cultural majorities and minorities, makes it possible to advance the campaign for the 
promotion of minority cultural identities. This means that a one-sided promotion of 
minority cultural identities at the expense of the nation building process would lead 
to the undermining of the overarching national identity, which is what supplies the 
necessary mutual trust among citizens. According to Miller, ‘if a group succeeds in 
winning political recognition, then, on the one hand, it establishes one among many 
possible lines of social cleavage as the relevant line; on the other hand, it is able to 
define publicly what it means to belong to the group’ (Miller, 2000, p. 70- 1). As 
these lines of social cleavage sharpen, public deliberation would tend to be swayed 
by power and numbers alone, that is, in the absence of sufficient nation-building 
efforts to balance out the costs of the promotion of minority cultural identities, 
because the mutual trust among citizens would be undermined. Therefore, it is 
important to maintain an acceptable balance between the demands of nation-building 
and respect for cultural pluralism. As long as the boundary between public and 
private cultures emerges through public deliberation, we may have confidence in the 
acceptability of the balance between the nation-building process and the promotion 
of non-national group identities. Private cultures are determined by the collective 
will of the people and, more importantly, supply an alternative context of choices to 
individuals than a shared public culture offers. Thus, contrary to Laegaard’s 
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prediction, a shared public culture does not have to expand more than the liberal 
multiculturalists would care to accept so as to supply every citizen with a meaningful 
context of choices. 
 
Finally, I will address the fourth line of criticism of Miller’s account of the nation-
building process. Erica Benner observes that there are two components of Miller’s 
accounts of the nation-building process: the constitutive and the constitutional 
dimensions. The constitutional dimension ‘is based on republican values and on 
decision-making procedures that Miller describes under the heading ‘deliberative 
democracy,’’ whereas the constitutive dimension is based on ‘his argument that 
nations are the best available constitutive units of political and international order’ 
(Benner, 2003, p. 209, 210). She then examines two possible approaches which 
Miller could have taken to explain the relationship between the constitutional and the 
constitutive dimensions of deliberative democracy. As she claims, ‘one argument 
can be called the political justice-supporting argument. It says that nationality is 
good because and insofar as it supports principles of political justice, in this case 
those embodied in republican theory and deliberative democracy. The second can be 
called the pre-political justice argument. It says that the value of nationality is 
relatively independent of specific political considerations’ (Benner, 2003, p. 213). 
However, as Benner observes, Miller takes a middle ground between these two 
approaches that balances the demands of nationality with all other principles of 
justice, within the constraints laid down by the republican conception of citizenship. 
Nevertheless, the net result of this balancing act is to give ‘the claims of national 
identity an independent and, indeed, a fundamental moral standing, whether or not 
they are linked to republican values.’ Since, Miller argues, ‘national self-
determination ‘creates the conditions under which people can live together on terms 
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of justice’—but in deciding what ‘terms of justice’ are, reference must be made first 
of all to national identity and ‘public culture,’’ it makes it easier ‘for nationalists to 
make very strong demands based on the pre-political justice argument, while 
seriously weakening the arguments that could be used against them’ (Benner, 2003, 
p. 215).  
 
According to Benner’s understanding of Miller’s account of the nation-building 
process, the status of a shared public culture is quite ambivalent and is open to the 
possibility that nationalist sentiment could run amok without the proper check of a 
republican conception of citizenship. In other words, she is concerned with putting 
the practical needs of nation-building on a par with the republican conception of 
citizenship. In my view, Miller indeed faces the difficulty of reconciling the need of 
nation-building with the republican conception of citizenship, especially given that 
he does not have an explicit explanation for how a common national identity and a 
shared public culture could both be the basis and the subject matter of public 
deliberation. On the one hand, the practical needs of nation-building require that in 
deliberative democracy, ‘the success of any particular demand will depend upon how 
far it can be expressed in terms that are close to, or distant from, the general political 
ethos of the community. It requires of citizens a willingness to give reasons for what 
they are claiming…’ (Miller, 2000, p. 57). Here, the shared public culture is the basis 
of public deliberation, because a common cultural background among citizens is 
required to motivate a genuine deliberation, rather than a negotiation based on power 
and deceit, and to make the reaching of a common ground possible. Insofar as the 
shared public culture is settled and unquestioned, it could serve as the basis on which 
all claims raised in deliberative democracy are judged, rejected, altered or accepted. 
On the other hand, the republican conception of citizenship lays down the 
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fundamental ground rules for a political regime based on deliberative democracy. 
With respect to the development of a common national identity and a shared public 
culture, it requires that the private-public division in general and the boundary 
between public and private cultures in particular should emerge from public 
deliberation, so as to maintain an acceptable balance between the demands of nation-
building and the respect for cultural pluralism. Here, the shared public culture serves 
as the subject matter of public deliberation, so as to avoid the conservative bias in 
favour of cultural majorities. Insofar as some aspects of the existing shared public 
culture will become outdated or morally problematic, it needs to be reformulated 
over time through public deliberation. Nevertheless, on the surface, this seems 
paradoxical: how could public deliberation be consistent with the existing shared 
public culture when the latter has to be continually reformulated through public 
deliberation itself? Miller has no explanation for this apparent paradox, and this is 
where Benner criticises him on the ground of the seemingly unaccountable shared 
public culture. 
 
As Benner correctly interprets, Miller’s account of the nation-building process 
attributes equal moral weight to both the need for nation-building and the republican 
conception of citizenship, which, in the current context, implies that the need for a 
shared public culture to serve as the basis of public deliberation should cohere with 
the need for it to be the subject matter of public deliberation. From my perspective, 
the only way to assuage Benner would be to elaborate in more detail what types of 
public deliberation are implied when a shared public culture serves as the basis and 
the subject matter respectively. I argue that when the shared public culture serves as 
the basis for public deliberation, it implies a public deliberation with respect to 
concrete social issues. In Market, State and Community (1989), Miller developed the 
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idea that one of the roles of deliberative democracy is to keep the distributive 
practices within a solidaristic community and an instrumental association 
democratically accountable to citizens. Accordingly, public deliberation consists in 
(1) ‘identification of interests common to all members of the collectivity in question, 
and specification of the best means of realising those interests,’ and (2) ‘the 
adjudication of competing claims to resources in terms of shared standards of justice’ 
(Miller, 1989, p. 265). It is these two types of activities that I referred to as the 
debate over concrete social issues. Since these activities concern the distribution of 
material advantages within society and Miller believes that distributive justice in a 
particular society depends on the shared public culture among citizens (Miller, 1999, 
p. 18), the public deliberation over concrete social issues relies on the shared public 
culture being settled and unquestionable. 
 
When the shared public culture itself is questioned, it becomes the subject matter of 
public deliberation. Such a public deliberation focuses on reformulating the existing 
shared public culture, in the hope of updating or correcting the morally problematic 
aspects. Regarding the malleability of nationality, Miller has this to say, ‘the flexible 
content of national identity allows parties of different colours to present their 
programmes as the true continuation of the national tradition and the true reflection 
of national character’ (Miller, 2000, p. 33). Moreover, ‘one thing we may be doing in 
the course of redefining what it means to be British, French, etc. is to purge these 
identities of elements that necessarily entail the exclusion of minority groups’ 
(Miller, 2000, p. 35). In my view, since the main objective of nation-building is to 
maintain social solidarity, and the measures for tackling this task will change with 
social circumstances, the boundary between public and private cultures needs to be 
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constantly adjusted so as to keep an acceptable balance between the needs of nation-
building and respect for cultural pluralism.  
 
Hence, in order for the roles of shared public culture as the basis of public 
deliberation and its subject matter to cohere with each other, the shared public 
culture must serve as the common cultural background when concrete social issues 
are at stake, whereas it must be questioned and reformulated whenever outdated or 
morally problematic aspects are detected. We could conceive the roles of the shared 
public culture and the corresponding modes of public deliberation as being mutually 
independent and, at the same time, part of a larger reiterative process, rather than as 
conflicting requirements for a single linear process. In other words, instead of 
requiring the shared public culture to be both the basis and the subject matter of a 
public deliberation that does not distinguish clearly between different types of issue 
at hand, we could regard the two modes of public deliberation as occurring at two 
different levels. The shared public culture will only serve as the basis of public 
deliberation about concrete social issues at the level of the pragmatic questions, 
whilst it will serve only as the subject matter of public deliberation to reformulate 
the common national identity at the level of the ethical-political questions.  
 
These two levels of public deliberation are part of a larger reiterative process in the 
sense that, whereas the existing shared public culture determines the success of the 
claims raised at the level of the pragmatic questions, the unresolved conflicts with 
regard to concrete social issues will lead to the questioning and the reformulation of 
the shared public culture itself. In other words, the conflicts over the concrete issues 
at the level of the pragmatic questions serve to detect the unclear or problematic 
aspects of a shared public culture, and could only hope to be resolved through the re-
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clarification or the reformulation of a shared public culture at the level of the ethical-
political questions. This is consistent with Miller’s own understanding of how a 
common national identity and a shared public culture could be continuously 
reformulated alongside concrete social issues. Miller’s conception of national 
community suggests that the national identity is active, that is, the identity and the 
corresponding public culture need to be formulated and renewed continuously, 
alongside the debate over concrete social issues. As he says, ‘the nation becomes 
what it is by the decisions that it takes’ (Miller, 1995, p. 24). This must mean that the 
discussion about what the common national identity and the shared public culture 
should be is not normally insulated from the concrete social issues regarding 
immigration, parole violation, abortion, racial segregation, et cetera, which take 
place in specific contexts. Once the reformulation of the common national identity 
and the shared public culture is complete at the level of the ethical-political questions, 
it once again becomes settled and unquestionable, serving as the basis of public 
deliberation about concrete social issues at the level of the pragmatic questions. Thus, 
a feedback loop is established between the two roles of public culture as being the 
basis and the subject matter. Understood in this way, the requirements of the need 
for nation-building will not commit the debate over concrete social issues to an 
unchangeable ‘general political ethos of the community.’ Thus, I have resolved the 
problem of reconciling the two roles of public culture as both the basis and the 
subject matter of public deliberation, and assuaged Benner’s concern with the 
seemingly unaccountable nature of shared public culture.  
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3. Non-National Group Identities and the Equal Respect to Co-Deliberators 
 
I have discussed the four aspects of the liberal multiculturalist critiques of Miller’s 
account of the nation-building process through deliberative democracy and proposed 
a reconstruction of the account as a two-level public deliberation. In this section, I 
will show that this reconstruction falls short of guaranteeing the equal influence of 
cultural majorities and minorities over the results of public deliberation, unless it is 
guided by my rendition of Miller’s notion of giving equal respect to the co-
deliberators. This is because Miller fails to recognise the contribution of non-
national group identities to the reformulation of a common national identity and a 
shared public culture, given that his original account of the nation-building process 
does not distinguish pragmatic questions from ethical-political questions sufficiently 
clearly.  
 
On the one hand, Miller does not have a well worked-out method of determining the 
scope of a shared public culture that is needed in order to inspire a sufficient level of 
mutual trust within a group of individuals so as to count as a national community; it 
all depends on the boundary between public and private cultures as decided by 
citizens through public deliberation. As such, the formulation of a common national 
identity and a shared public culture requires contributions from all sections of 
society on an equal footing (Miller, 1995, p. 40), which has to be free of the 
constraints of the existing national identity and shared public culture. To refrain from 
referring to the existing national identity and public culture amounts to falling back 
on some non-national aspects of personal identification that have hitherto been 
restricted to the private sphere. Since individuals cannot develop any meaningful 
identification—even conceive of one—in the absence of the broader cultural 
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community, refraining from referring to national identity leaves the non-national 
group identities as the only option. 
 
At the same time, Miller considers it imperative to keep non-national identities out 
of the public deliberation, in order to prevent them from undermining the nation-
building efforts. He starts by recounting the three stages of the political recognition 
of cultural minorities within contemporary multicultural societies. As he says, ‘the 
first demand of minority groups has been to be left alone by the state, to be given the 
space to develop their own social and cultural institutions…The second stage can be 
characterised as the quest for inclusion…the claim that one is entitled to be treated as 
an equal citizen regardless of group differences. Admission to the public realm 
should not depend on the particular characteristics, culture or beliefs one has as a 
member of group C’ (Miller, 2000, p. 66- 7). The third stage focuses on what the 
liberal multiculturalists commonly call the ‘politics of identity,’ in which cultural 
minorities aim to acquire political expression for their respective cultural values. 
According to Miller, there are two approaches to the politics of identity: 
 
(On the one hand) the public realm was biased against them because it 
embodied norms with which it was harder for members of these groups to 
comply. The bias may have been less overt by comparison with earlier 
conceptions of citizenship, but it existed none the less… (On the other) the 
public recognition of group identities becomes important to groups when 
these identities themselves become insecure and threaten to dissolve for 
reasons having nothing directly to do with the political exclusion of the 
groups in question (Miller, 2000, p. 70). 
 
In other words, whereas cultural minorities face the unjust imposition of the cultural 
values of the majority in the form of a shared public culture in the first approach to 
the politics of identity, minorities aim to reassert their cultural values even though 
the shared public culture does not unjustly impose any cultural values upon them. 
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Between these two approaches to the politics of identity, Miller takes issue with the 
second approach, in that the minorities’ efforts to assert their cultural values have 
nothing to do with the fairness of the shared public culture. Following the second 
approach, he understands the politics of identity as being a political aspiration to 
select possible lines of social cleavage among different cultural groups and clarify 
the definition of membership of each cultural group. As he claims,  
 
If a group succeeds in winning political recognition, then, on the one hand, it 
establishes one among many possible lines of social cleavage as the relevant 
line; on the other hand, it is able to define publicly what it means to belong 
to the group…this, I am suggesting, provides the impetus behind the politics 
of recognition that we are seeking to understand (Miller, 2000, p. 70- 1).  
 
He goes on to argue that the politics of identity commits a conceptual fallacy when it 
attempts to undermine the very nation-building process which made it possible in the 
first place. He charges that the politics of identity could not persuasively answer the 
two important questions: ‘under what circumstances will people come to sufficient 
agreement about principles of social justice for these principles to guide them in 
reaching collective decisions? And under what circumstances will people be 
motivated to deal with one another’s demands on the basis of principles of justice, 
rather than on the basis of interest-bargaining (or indeed some more violent method 
of conflict resolution)?’ According to Miller, the answers can only be supplied by a 
nation ‘with a shared way of life which serves both as a source of ethical standards 
and as a framework within which people will want to justify their decisions to one 
another by reference to criteria of justice’ (Miller, 2000, p. 78). In other words, I 
believe Miller prefers the second stage of political recognition for cultural minorities 
to the politics of identity, because at that stage,  
(W)e have groups who bear two identities—a particular group identity, and a 
national identity that they share with others—which they want to express in 
different ways.’ Accordingly, at the second stage, ‘in their dealings with 
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fellow-members… (the individuals) want their group identity to be 
recognised and respected…In other contexts—public contexts, especially—
they want their group identity to be treated as irrelevant, and their 
overarching identity as fellow-nationals to be respected’ (Miller, 2000, p. 
68).  
 
Hence, in order to preserve the national community within which every cultural 
community may be treated as equal in politics, Miller decides to keep non-national 
group identities apart from public deliberation. 
 
I agree with Miller that a national community provides the basic foundation upon 
which citizens could be sufficiently motivated and cognitively conditioned to reach a 
common ground in a deliberative democracy. Nevertheless, I depart from his verdict 
on the politics of identity on the point where he completely excludes non-national 
group identities from public deliberation. As I noted above, the formulation and the 
continuous renewal of a common national identity and a shared public culture 
require the members of all sections of society to compete on an equal footing in 
order to imprint their particular image onto the common national identity. According 
to Miller, individuals cannot make meaningful choices without reference to the 
broader cultural community. Since the competition to imprint particular images onto 
the common national identity requires meaningful choices, and these choices cannot 
come from a ‘self’ detached from particular cultural communities, it has to resort to 
either the national identity as it is or the non-national group identities. Moreover, it 
would be paradoxical to renew a common national identity and a shared public 
culture by referring to the existing common national identity alone. This would 
amount to reforming one’s own personality without a plurality of cultural resources, 
which is impossible, to say the least. 
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Possibly, the reason why Miller has such a difficult time accommodating the politics 
of identity within public deliberation lies in the fact that he does not explicitly make 
a clear distinction between the two levels of public deliberation. As discussed in 
section 2, it becomes clear that national identity could reform itself with only the 
existing public culture in its service. In interpreting the essence of the politics of 
identity, Miller conflates the debate over concrete social issues at the pragmatic level 
with the formulation of a common national identity and a shared public culture at the 
ethical-political level. He understands the politics of identity as a political aspiration 
to collectively select possible lines of social cleavage and clearly define the terms of 
membership for each cultural community. However, unless the politics of identity 
requires individuals to merely pursue their narrow sectional interests in debating 
concrete social issues at the ethical-political level, it would not necessarily lead to 
the undermining of nation-building efforts. Indeed, as Miller himself admits, the 
politics of identity ‘becomes important to groups when these identities themselves 
become insecure and threaten to dissolve for reasons having nothing directly to do 
with the political exclusion of the groups in question’ (Miller, 2000, p. 70). It seems 
that what is at stake here is non-national group identities rather than sectional 
interests under threat within a nation-state. Granted that heightened non-national 
group identities might give rise to more distinctly defined sectional interests, 
nonetheless, the individuals maintaining distinct non-national group identities would 
be more willing to frame these sectional interests in terms of the common interests of 
all citizens and the substantive standards of social justice if, as Miller argues, they 
submit to a common national identity and a shared public culture. However, under 
my reconstruction of Miller’s account of the nation-building process as a two-level 
public deliberation, the framing of sectional interests in terms of the common 
interests of citizens and the substantive standards of social justice belongs to the 
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debate over concrete social issues on the basis of a common nationality at the level 
of the pragmatic questions. In contrast, the formulation of a common national 
identity and a shared public culture occurs at the level of the ethical-political 
questions. Insofar as the non-national group identities only contribute to the debate 
on the ethical-political questions, they would not undermine the ability of the 
common national identity to serve as the basis for the debate over concrete social 
issues at the level of the pragmatic questions.  
 
Therefore, whether the politics of identity could be accommodated by Miller 
depends on which level of public deliberation is at stake. As far as the ethical-
political level is concerned, it not only could but must include the politics of identity, 
that is, if we understand it as a political aspiration to preserve the non-national group 
identities under threat through imprinting some aspects of them onto the common 
national identity. Conversely, Miller is correct in his statement that a common 
national identity is needed to sufficiently motivate citizens and cognitively prepare 
them to frame their sectional interests in terms of the common interests of all citizens 
and the substantive standards of social justice. Hence, a distinction between the 
pragmatic and the ethical-political level helps us to understand Miller’s rejection of 
the politics of identity in a new light; it could and should be accommodated at the 
ethical-political level where the political aspiration to preserve the threatened non-
national group identities takes the form of competing to imprint part of them onto the 
common national identity. 
 
Nevertheless, Miller has not proposed any substantive guideline for how to 
formulate a common national identity and a shared public culture through all social 
sections competing for influence over the common national identity. As discussed in 
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section 2, a common national identity and a shared public culture should be 
developed so as to motivate citizens to act responsibly in public deliberation. 
According to Miller, there are two criteria for acting responsibly through which we 
could grasp his general guidelines for public deliberation. Firstly, ‘the reasons given 
in political debate should be sincerely held, and not merely adopted as an expedient 
way of promoting sectional interests.’ Secondly, ‘citizens should be willing to 
moderate their claims in the hope that they can find common ground on which 
policy decisions can be based’ (Miller, 1995, p. 96, 97; my emphasis). What does it 
mean to moderate one’s claim in the hope of reaching a common ground in the 
context of formulating a common national identity and a shared public culture? 
Miller only says in general,  
 
My proposal…is that we should understand deliberation not as requiring that 
we restrict ourselves to offering reasons and arguments that must commend 
themselves to all members of the deliberating body, but as requiring only 
that we should seek agreement on terms that respect our fellow-deliberators 
and their convictions. This requirement…will itself serve as a filter that 
eliminates certain arguments in the course of the debate without 
disqualifying them a priori (Miller, 2000, p. 152; my emphasis). 
 
This resorts to the notion of respect to co-deliberators and their convictions in order 
to improve on the rather vague idea of moderating one’s claim in deliberative 
democracy. In short, said respect could filter out those claims less conducive to 
reaching a common ground through public deliberation. The idea of respect, 
nonetheless begs further questions with respect to what it amounts to in practice. 
According to Miller, there are three ways in which the deliberative procedure could 
help filter out the initial policy preferences of the deliberators and in the end produce 
widely accepted decisions. Firstly, ‘the most straightforward case is that of 
preference orders that are irrational because they are based on false empirical beliefs.’ 
Secondly, there are ‘preferences that are so repugnant to the moral beliefs of the 
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society within which the decisions are being made that no one is willing to advance 
them in a public context.’ Finally, ‘the most important way in which deliberation 
may alter initial preferences, however, is that…preferences…(which) are not so 
much immoral as narrowly self-regarding will tend to be eliminated by the process 
of public debate’ (Miller, 2000, p. 15- 6). It seems that the notion of respect to co-
deliberators is required more in the third way than in the first two, because in the 
first two ways empirical evidence and widely shared public culture could serve to 
determine the success of each claim raised in public deliberation, and these are less 
dependent on different citizens’ own normative understanding. I believe that this is 
what often happens at the pragmatic level, where the debate on concrete social issues 
in relation to the common interests of all citizens and the substantive standards of 
social justice could be decided on the basis of their consistency with the shared 
public culture and, additionally, the empirical evidence that ensures the theoretical 
soundness of the final policy outcomes. In comparison, the idea of respect is more of 
a necessity in the third way, in which citizens lack an unquestionable public culture 
and scientifically proven empirical evidence to rely on in order to evaluate the claims 
raised in public deliberation. Insofar as empirical evidence cannot serve to illuminate 
ethical questions—at least, not decisively—and the shared public culture is itself 
under the review of the citizens, the deliberators enter an uncertain area of discussion, 
which could only depend on the idea of equal respect to the co-deliberators and their 
ethical convictions. Here, the third way filters out those claims that are ‘narrowly 
self-regarding,’ since they go against the ideal of respect for co-deliberators and their 
ethical convictions. 
 
Unfortunately, the expression, ‘narrowly self-regarding,’ like the notion of respect, 
leaves the reader none the wiser, because Miller does not offer a clear set of criteria 
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for either of them but, instead, uses examples to tease out their possible implications, 
which are open to different interpretations. Therefore, given the lack of explicit 
guidelines for formulating a common national identity and a shared public culture 
and, as such, the wide range of possible interpretations of the notions of respect and 
narrow self-regard, it suffices to propose an interpretation most congenial to Miller’s 
understanding of the functions of a common national identity and a shared public 
culture. Since Miller believes a common national identity to constitute an important 
aspect of personal identification, to situate personal lives within the historical 
continuity of the community as a whole and to provide an individual with a 
meaningful context of choices, the notion of respect consists in a particular way of 
framing the claims with regard to the renewal of a common national identity and a 
shared public culture; that is, every citizen holding a different non-national group 
identity should frame their claims in the hope that they may enjoy the benefits of a 
common national identity and a shared public culture, at least as far as the national 
aspect of personal identification is concerned. More specifically, each claim should 
be framed in the hope that the resultant common national identity and the shared 
public culture could constitute an aspect of personal identification which is equally 
acceptable to all citizens, interpret a national past which equally makes sense to all 
citizens and supply a context of choices which is meaningful to all citizens. Hence, it 
seems that the notion of equal respect for co-deliberators and their ethical 
convictions calls for a process in which all citizens bearing different non-national  
group identities aim to detect the problematic aspects of the existing national identity 
and the shared public culture through the unresolved conflict over concrete social 
issues at the pragmatic level, and then frame their claims at the ethical-political level 
in the hope that the problematic aspects of the existing national identity and the 
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shared public culture may be reformulated so as to benefit all citizens equally in the 
abovementioned ways.  
 
4. Supplementing Miller’s Account of Nation-Building with Habermas’s 
Idea of a Legally Institutionalised Communicative Action 
  
In section 2, in order to assuage the multiculturalists’ concern with a shared public 
culture on the ground of its conservative bias in favour of cultural majorities, I 
proposed a reconstruction of Miller’s account of nation-building as two levels of 
public deliberation; those of pragmatic questions and of ethical-political questions. 
Nevertheless, as a direct corollary of this reconstruction, the existing common 
national identity has to be under continuous scrutiny and be reformulated through 
public deliberation, if outdated or morally problematic aspects of them are 
discovered. As such, a two-level public deliberation seems to lean heavily on the 
possibility that the scope of a shared public culture sufficient for preserving the 
national community could be determined ex ante. This is because citizens need an 
estimate of the said scope in order to comprehend the extent to which they could 
challenge the existing shared public culture at the level of the ethical-political 
questions without risking the erosion of the mutual trust among themselves. In this 
sense, the practical need to clarify the scope of the shared public culture sits 
awkwardly with Miller’s claim that the republican conception of citizenship requires 
a public-private division to emerge through public deliberation, rather than ex ante.  
 
This would remain a stumbling block for Miller unless he could develop a theory 
explaining how the process of public deliberation could help citizens reach a 
consensus on a common national identity and a shared public culture that are deemed 
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sufficient to preserve their national community. In this proposed formulation, social 
integration in general no longer depends on the cultural similarities produced 
through deliberation alone; to a large extent it depends on the process of public 
deliberation in the hope of converging on the scope of the shared public culture 
necessary to supply a sufficient level of mutual trust. Note that in this formulation, 
citizens may not always converge on a definition of common nationality that could 
supply the sufficient level of mutual trust among them in practice; public 
deliberation merely makes it more likely that a sufficient level of mutual trust would 
emerge in the long term.  
 
In this light, I want to suggest that Habermas’s conception of a legally 
institutionalised communicative action could be of service. According to Habermas, 
social integration could be achieved through a legally institutionalised 
communicative action within nation-states. A communicative action occurs when 
‘actors in the roles of speaker and hearer attempt to negotiate interpretations of the 
situation at hand and to harmonise their respective plans with one another through 
the unrestrained pursuit of illocutionary goals’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 18). A 
communicative action is possible because, according to Habermas, there is a rational 
base to every reciprocal bond; that is, individuals confronted with various different 
validity claims raised by others may come to abandon or alter their original validity 
claims. As a result, they together engage in a more complex interpersonal 
relationship and come to share an enlarged group of background norms. When 
applied to the reproduction of a social order, a communicative action is legally 
institutionalised so as to infuse the universally applicable constitutional principles 
with the collective will of the citizens, so that the citizens could come to see the 
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resultant policy outcomes as their own and the co-deliberators as part of their ever-
increasing interpersonal relationships.  
 
The idea of a legally institutionalised communicative action serves to help Miller 
escape this circular argumentation because it switches the burden of asserting the 
normative truth away from the political theorist as an external observer partial to a 
collective learning process involving all relevant moral agents as active participants. 
At any rate, this is more consistent with Miller’s belief that the formulation of 
political principles should take account of the common people’s moral intuitions and 
political emotions. In other words, Miller considers it undesirable to specify what 
justice is independently of particular contexts and, then, require the common people 
to comply with them (Miller, 2013, Chap. 1). Nevertheless, Miller fails to live up to 
his standards for formulating normative principles, in the sense that his account of 
nation-building relies heavily on specifying the scope of the shared public culture 
necessary for preserving a national community ex ante. This amounts to 
contradicting his own standard, because it bypasses the contribution of the common 
people’s moral intuitions and political emotions in a specific context. 
 
Habermas’s notion of a communicative action is formulated in the face of the 
difficulty of asserting the normative truth within increasingly culturally fragmented 
societies. After the ‘linguistic turn,’ ‘thoughts and facts can no longer be located 
immediately in the world of perceived or imagined objects; they are accessible only 
as linguistically ‘represented’ (dargestellt), that is, as states of affairs expressed in 
sentences’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 11). In a sense, the relation between the proposition 
of truth and the objective world is broken by the introduction of language as the 
medium through which a representation of the world is achieved. Since the 
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representation of the external world has to be achieved by means of communication 
between the speakers and the hearers, the linguistic medium alone conditions how 
the said representation is comprehended and negotiated among the interlocutors. 
Therefore, the transcendental proposition of truth is replaced by a search for the 
transcendental conditions under which the representation of the external world is 
possible through communication.  
 
Accordingly, the only way to salvage a sense of truth from the linguistic turn is to 
rely on a collective learning process through ‘transcendent moments of 
unconditionality’ among interlocutors of the same communicative action. This is to 
say, the relation between the truth proposition and the external world could only be 
established through continuous justification based on validity claims amongst 
interlocutors. ‘Transcendent moments of unconditionality’ represent the collective 
recognition of certain validity claims following successful communicative actions. 
The normative understanding that all deliberators converge upon and thereby 
incorporate into the always already familiar lifeworld is only an approximation of 
the truth, in the sense that it merely satisfies our own particular standards of 
correctness for deliberation in particular contexts (Habermas, 1996, p. 12- 7). As 
Habermas explains, ‘the cautionary use of the truth predicate…can be understood as 
the grammatical expression of a fallibility that we often experience ourselves while 
arguing, and observe in others when looking back at the course of past arguments in 
history’ (Habermas, 2003, p 38). The point here is that the fallibility of every validity 
claim is unavoidable, and therefore the truth proposition justified against all 
refutations in particular contexts should be treated as settled for that moment, until 
new validity claims arise to challenge it.  
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In this light, the formulation of a common national identity and a shared public 
culture at the level of the ethical-political questions could be understood as a 
collective effort to converge on an approximation of the truth which elaborates on 
the positive relation between the number of cultural similarities among a group of 
individuals and the level of collective will to remain as a united people. There are 
practical difficulties with quantifying the positive correlation from an external 
observer’s standpoint which attempts to assert a context-independent idea of the 
truth. Nevertheless, such difficulty is only a manifestation of the linguistic turn 
which breaks the direct correspondence between the truth and the objective world 
with the mediation of language use. It could be similarly tackled with the 
introduction of Habermas’s notion of a legally institutionalised communicative 
action within nation-states. On the basis of a legally institutionalised communicative 
action, the reformulation of a common national identity and a shared public culture 
could be seen, from an active participant’s standpoint, as a collective attempt to 
converge on the scope of the shared public culture necessary for preserving the 
national community through raising, justifying and recognising validity claims. 
Through the ‘transcendent moments of unconditionality,’ a context-dependent 
approximation of the truth is reached among citizens of the same nation-state that 
recognises a certain formulation of a common national identity and a shared public 
culture as necessary for preserving the national community. The resultant common 
national identity and shared public culture, nonetheless, are merely ephemeral, in the 
sense that they, as a result of communicative action, are only steps in the collective 
learning process of all citizens. In other words, due to the continuous exchange 
between the co-deliberators on the one hand and between the deliberators and the 
external world on the other, the approximation of the truth is sure to be altered in the 
long term. It should be noted here that Habermas’s idea of a communicative 
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approach to normative truth could be applied to the justification of all norms and 
conventions governing social interaction. I merely suggest that it should be applied 
more specifically to the task of reformulating a common national identity and a 
shared public culture. Therefore, the approximation of a sufficient level of mutual 
trust among citizens does not exhaust all that a legally institutionalised 
communicative action could achieve.  
 
Moreover, on top of producing a common national identity and a shared public 
culture that approximates to an idea of the truth within the particular context of a 
nation-state, public deliberation per se would serve to enlarge the extent of shared 
normative understanding among the co-deliberators and increase the complexity of 
their interpersonal relationships at the same time, if it were based on Habermas’s 
notion of a legally institutionalised communicative action. Therefore, insofar as 
public deliberation thus structured could realise social integration alongside an 
increased extent of shared normative understanding independently of the resultant 
common nationality, to a certain extent, it could explain why a national community 
would not collapse, even though citizens might not always converge on a common 
nationality that proves to be sufficient for preserving their national community.  
 
Hence, should Miller’s account of the nation-building process incorporate 
Habermas’s idea of a legally institutionalised communicative action, it would 
provide an remedy for his failure to elaborate on the exact parameters of a shared 
public culture along the line of the arguments I outlined earlier in this section. That 
is to say, the problem caused by Miller’s failure to quantify the positive correlation 
between the number of cultural similarities and the level of collective will to remain 
as a united people could be resolved in two senses. Firstly, any idea of the truth, 
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including the said positive correlation, has to be communicatively approximated 
through a legally institutionalised communicative action within the nation-state. 
Secondly, the process of public deliberation per se also serves to realise social 
integration to some extent. In other words, this manoeuvre, as I argued a satisfactory 
theory should do, switches the burden of proof decisively from the external observer 
alone—that is, Miller—to an infusion of an external observer’s standpoint and an 
active participant’s standpoint. 
 
Nevertheless, a main difference between Miller and Habermas lies in the fact that the 
latter believes public deliberation per se to be sufficient for realising social 
integration within nation-states, whereas Miller seems to consider it merely a means 
to an end—that is, the resultant common national identity and shared public culture. 
This is most saliently reflected in Miller’s insistence that in some cases the scope 
and the types of cultural similarities make it practically impossible to establish a 
sovereign nation-state. For instance, a case of rival nationalities excludes quite 
decisively the possibility of a successful nation-building process, insofar as groups 
with mutually exclusive national identities would each seek to control all or part of 
the state’s territory (Miller, 2000, p. 128). In comparison, Habermas insists that 
social solidarity could be achieved through participating in a legally institutionalised 
communicative action on the basis of universal constitutional principles, regardless 
of the differences among the cultural values held by the citizens.  
 
All in all, I do not think that by incorporating Habermas’s notion of a legally 
institutionalised communicative action, Miller’s account of the nation-building 
process would be rendered inconsistent. This is because recognising the role of 
public deliberation in reaching a consensus on a definition of a common national 
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identity and a shared public culture will not weaken Miller’s original position. In 
other words, Miller’s claim that public deliberation should aim to produce a common 
national identity and a shared public culture necessary for supplying a sufficient 
level of mutual trust is not weakened by the recognition that public deliberation 
should be structured on the basis of a legally institutionalised communicative action. 
Moreover, in the absence of a quantifiable, positive correlation between the number 
of cultural similarities and the level of the collective will to remain as a united 
people, a communicative action is the only available approach to approximating the 
idea of the truth in terms of how many cultural commonalities are necessary for 
preserving a national community. Furthermore, the reformulation of a common 
national identity and a shared public culture based on a legally institutionalised 
communicative action could be seen as a collective learning process that strives to 
improve the said approximation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced Miller’s account of nation-building as requiring a 
balance between nation-building and respect for cultural pluralism, and considered 
four lines of the liberal multiculturalists’ criticisms of them. In section 1, I 
introduced Miller’s account of the nation-building process, which depends equally 
on both the republican conception of citizenship and the importance of nation-
building. Miller aims to affirm the importance of nation-building while employing 
the republican conception of citizenship to regulate the procedure through which the 
former is carried out so that cultural pluralism is sufficiently respected. 
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In section 2, I examined four lines of liberal multiculturalist criticisms of Miller’s 
account of the nation-building process. McMahan, Freeman and Laegaard question 
the desirability of nation-building, given the importance of respecting non-national 
group identities. McMahan charges that the prioritisation of national identity will 
suppress other aspects of personal identity. Freeman complains that a common 
national identity will impose an unjust burden on immigrants, requiring them to 
identify with the actual deeds of the cultural majority’s ancestors. Laegaard claims 
that a shared public culture will have to expand more than liberal multiculturalists 
could allow, in order to provide each citizen with a meaningful context of choices. 
These three lines of multiculturalist criticisms could be mitigated, however, because 
as I demonstrated, they fail to understand that the nation-building process is 
necessary for the functioning of major social institutions and even the protection of 
non-national cultural communities (be they indigenous ethic groups or immigrants).   
 
Nevertheless, Benner advances a valid critique in that by attributing equal moral 
weight to nation-building efforts and the republican conception of citizenship, 
Miller’s account is likely to display a conservative bias in favour of the cultural 
majority. This poses a serious problem for Miller, in the sense that he does not have 
an explanation for how a shared public culture could be both the basis and the 
subject matter of public deliberation. In this light, I proposed to reconstruct his 
account of nation-building as two independent levels of public deliberation. By 
splitting Miller’s general idea of public deliberation into two levels—the pragmatic 
questions and the ethical-political questions—the existing shared public culture 
could serve as the basis of the public deliberation with regard to the concrete social 
issues, whilst it could also be the subject matter of public deliberation in relation to 
the reformulation of the existing common national identity and the shared public 
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culture. In this way, Miller’s account of the nation-building process could avoid the 
conservative bias in favour of the cultural majority. During the process of 
reformulating a common national identity and a public deliberation at the ethical-
political level, the public deliberation should be guided by my rendition of Miller’s 
notion of equal respect to the co-deliberators. As set out in section 3, the guiding 
principle states that all citizens should aim to advance claims in the hope that the 
resultant common national identity and shared public culture will be equally 
beneficial to all. 
 
This reconstruction is in line with Miller’s aim to balance the need of nation-building 
with the respect for cultural pluralism. It has the advantage of preventing the public 
deliberation from favouring the cultural majorities by continuously renewing the 
exiting national identity alongside concrete social issues. At the global level, because 
of the power asymmetry among nation-states, the formulation of global regulative 
norms and values has been dominated by the Western cultural values. In this light, if 
we expect the global institutions of citizenship to be based on cosmopolitan 
justifiability, all human beings or their representatives should be able to exert equal 
influence over the final policy outcomes of the global public deliberation. Insofar as 
all principles of justice should be justifiable to all human beings, as free and equal 
moral agents, the global public deliberation should not favour any section of the 
world population by default. This is the second guiding principle of the global public 
deliberation. 
 
Nevertheless, this reconstruction does very little to bring all citizens to an 
understanding of the extent to which the existing collective identity could be 
challenged before it threatens the national community as a whole, because Miller 
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explains the necessary mutual trust among citizens on the sole basis of a common 
national identity and a shared public culture. In this case, if social integration were 
solely based on the resultant common national identity and shared public culture, it 
would make it necessary for Miller to explain, from an external observer’s 
standpoint, the extent to which the citizens could challenge the current collective 
identity without damaging the mutual trust among citizens. In this light, I proposed 
in section 4 that Miller’s account of the nation-building process should incorporate 
Habermas’s notion of a legally institutionalised communicative action, because the 
latter champions the idea that social integration can be achieved through a societal-
level communicative action on the basis of validity claims. Even though the level of 
social solidarity produced by the public deliberation per se may not necessarily be 
enough for supplying sufficient mutual trust among citizens, this proposal could 
understand public deliberation as a never-ending collective learning process for 
approximating a sufficient level of mutual trust among citizens in the long term. In 
other words, this proposal partially switches the burden of proof from the external 
observer—that is Miller—alone to the active participants in the deliberative 
democracy, since it is the co-deliberators that directly express their collective will in 
converging on a scope of the shared public culture that is supposedly sufficient for 
preserving national community. Hence, Miller could only overcome the deficiency 
of his account of the nation-building process by incorporating Habermas’s 
conception of a communicative action. In the next chapter, I will further advance this 
line of argument by showing that Miller’s methodological commitment to 
incorporating common moral intuitions and political emotions in the moral reasoning 
about political principles also implies an institutionalised deliberative procedure 
based on Habermas’s conception of communicative action. 
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Chapter 5: 
Miller’s Approach to Political Theory and  
the Role of Common Moral Intuitions and Political Emotions 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I discussed Miller’s split-level conception of distributive justice 
that restricts the scope of the regulation of substantive inequality to the domestic 
sphere, and in Chapters 3 and 4, examined Miller’s theory of nationality. In these 
previous chapters, my main focus was on examining the principles of distributive 
justice and the theory of nationality, thereby leaving Miller’s approach to political 
theory as a whole unquestioned. In this chapter, I will address the main critiques of 
Miller’s approach to political theory that allows common moral intuitions and 
political emotions to bear on his moral reasoning about political principles and social 
institutions. In this thesis, common moral intuitions refer to the range of widely held 
and yet unclarified intuitions about morality in general within society. Political 
emotions refer to the range of human emotions that could be potentially utilised to 
realise social integration, motivate altruism and preserve shared cultural values 
within society. 
 
First and foremost, in section 1, I will introduce Miller’s approach to political theory 
as I understand it, on the basis of his major works, including On Nationality (1993), 
Principles of Social Justice (1998), Citizenship and National Identity (2000) and 
Justice for Earthlings (2013). According to my interpretation, Miller’s approach 
aims to allow common moral intuitions and political emotions to bear on our moral 
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reasoning about political principles and social institutions. Section 2 examines the 
main critiques of Miller and argues that the problem with his approach boils down to 
his failure to set forth a clear set of guidelines for selecting and assigning moral 
weight to common moral intuitions and political emotions in regard to different 
issues at hand. By extension, in section 3, I will demonstrate that this difficulty at the 
methodological level will translate into a similar problem for citizens in Miller’s 
account of deliberative democracy at the institutional level, in the sense that citizens 
will arrive at different political principles, for they select different common moral 
intuitions and political emotions and assign different moral weights to them in the 
absence of clear, shared guidelines. Here, as Miller himself recognises, Rawls’s 
‘reflective equilibrium’ is not sufficient to help him solve this problem, despite the 
fact that Miller’s approach is based on that notion. This is because reflective 
equilibrium is a device for individual moral reasoning used in isolation from all 
others and, as such, citizens cannot possibly know others’ approaches to selecting 
common moral intuitions and political emotions and assigning moral weight to them. 
In this light, Habermas’s conception of communicative action is better suited to fill 
the gap in Miller’s account of deliberative democracy, since it is an institutional 
mechanism for citizens to lay bare their different approaches to common moral 
intuitions and political emotions and transform them in order to arrive at a shared 
approach among all citizens through communication based on validity claims. This 
will reinforce my conclusion in Chapter 4 that Miller has to incorporate Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action into his account of deliberative democracy, 
insofar as he fails to specify the scope of a shared public culture that would be 
sufficient for preserving the national community as a whole. 
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1. Miller’s Approach to Political Theory 
 
Miller’s methodological stance on the formulation of political theory is laid out in 
Justice for Earthlings (2013), where he summarises his hitherto underdeveloped 
methodological commitments in clearer and more systematic form. He first rejects 
GA Cohen’s approach to political theory, labelling it ‘fact-insensitive,’ insofar as it 
opines, ‘where a political principle is said to be fact-dependent, there must be a 
further, fact-independent, principle that explains how the facts in question support 
the first principle’ (Miller, 2013, p. 20). In contrast, Miller proposes a version of 
what he calls a ‘fact-dependent’ way of formulating political theory. According to 
him, political principles should be developed in such a way that ‘citizens can act 
upon, not in the sense that they can fully implement them here and now, but in the 
sense that their present actions can be guided by the longer-term goal of realising the 
principles in question’—an invocation of Rawls’s notion of ‘realist utopia,’ as Miller 
explicitly admits (Miller, 2013, p. 34).  
 
As to what constitutes the ‘fact’ in fact-dependent political theory, he hints that it 
should fall somewhere between ‘political feasibility’ and ‘technical feasibility.’ On 
the one hand, political feasibility concerns whether certain proposals could command 
sufficient political support to be adopted on the basis of a range of conflicting 
interests in the political arena. This feasibility constraint is more ephemeral in the 
sense that the reception of certain proposals depends on the easily malleable and 
quickly changing interests within society. On the other hand, technical feasibility 
concerns ‘whether a proposal contradicts physical laws or rock-bottom social or 
psychological laws,’ which is not as easily modifiable as political interests (Miller, 
2013, p. 36-7). However, this leaves the reader none the wiser, since it does not 
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clearly state which facts ought to be considered when formulating a political theory. 
Based on my reading of Miller’s discussion of distributive justice and nationality, he 
seems to allow two types of facts to bear on his moral reasoning: common moral 
intuitions and political emotions.  
 
Common moral intuitions here refer to the range of widely held and yet unclarified 
intuitions about morality in general within a society. Miller allowed common moral 
intuitions to bear on his theorisation of distributive justice in Principles of Social 
Justice (1999). As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, he calls his own principles of 
distributive justice contextualist, because different distributive principles are 
matched with different distributive contexts defined in terms of the prevalent mode 
of human relationship within them. Accordingly, the principles of need, desert and 
social equality are matched with solidaristic community, instrumental association 
and the formal institutions of citizenship (Miller, 1999, p. 25-6). The contextualism 
of distributive justice aims to ‘discover the practical principles that guide those 
(intuitive) beliefs,’ rather than trying to find abstract principles that claim to 
‘underlie and inform people’s intuitive judgments’ (Miller, 1999, p. 22-4). As I 
understand it, this means that people’s common moral intuitions are not passive 
factors to be explained by some abstract principle; they should actively contribute to 
the process of developing distributive principles.  
 
A large body of literature on the topic of political emotions has accumulated over the 
years, including prominent figures such as Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, Rawls and 
Martha Nussbaum. These political theorists all focus on the question of how 
emotions could support shared political principles and social institutions within 
liberal societies. For instance, Rousseau bases the stability of a society on a ‘civil 
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religion’ consisting of ‘sentiments of sociability,’ so as to motivate sacrifices on the 
part of the citizens (Rousseau, [1762] 1987). In a similar vein, Mill talks of the 
importance of a ‘religion of humanity’ to be taught within society in order to 
motivate altruism (Mill, [1874] 1998), while Rawls endorses the idea of ‘sympathy’ 
initially nurtured within the familial environment to motivate citizens’ support of just 
social institutions (Rawls, [1971] 1999, p. 64). Miller bases his theory of nationality 
on a specific type of political emotion—nationalist sentiment—in On Nationality 
(1995), Citizenship and National Identity (2000) and Global Justice and National 
Responsibility (2007). Miller uses a broadly encompassing notion, ‘sentiment,’ in 
discussing the reason for leaving nationalist sentiments as they are when formulating 
political theories in regard to nationality and distributive justice. I do not see the 
usefulness of this notion of ‘sentiments,’ since it is hardly enlightening as to which 
category of emotions are most relevant to the formulation of political theories. 
Having said that, Miller is not mistaken in his use of the general term when 
discussing his fundamental methodological stance on the formulation of political 
theories, which is Humean in nature. As he clearly says, ‘by (Humean approach) I 
mean a philosophy which, rather than dismissing ordinary beliefs and sentiments out 
of hand unless they can be shown to have a rational foundation, leaves them in place 
until strong arguments are produced for rejecting them’ (Miller, 2000, p. 25). Insofar 
as Hume treats the whole range of broadly defined human sentiments as important 
factors to consider in his political philosophy, Miller is not wrong in using the notion 
of ‘sentiments’ in affirmation of his methodological stance. However, I think Miller 
is more concerned with the category of human sentiment that is most relevant to 
realising social integration, motivating special obligations and preserving shared 
cultural values within society. Therefore, in this thesis I will not examine the 
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literature on political emotions specifically but will refer to it when it becomes 
relevant to my discussion.   
 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, ethical particularism suggests that an 
administrative state should aim to develop a common national identity and a shared 
public culture so as to motivate citizens’ support for major social institutions within 
society (Miller, 1995, p. 90-7). As Miller argues, ‘nationality answers one of the 
most pressing needs of the modern world, namely how to maintain solidarity among 
the populations of states that are large and anonymous such that their citizens cannot 
possibly enjoy the kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face 
interaction’ (Miller, 2000, p. 31-2). Moreover, nationality could ground the special 
obligations among co-nationals because the obligations arise from and are integral to 
an intrinsically valuable human relationship within the national community (Miller, 
2007, p. 35). In the sense that nationalist sentiments should be allowed to bear on our 
moral reasoning about the possible political arrangements in a globalising world, in 
Miller’s theoretical framework people’s attachment to their national communities 
should constrain the possibility of developing supranational organisations, 
subnational organisations and even global governance transcending national 
territories. That is to say, since nationalist sentiments supply an important sense of 
solidarity and motivate the discharge of special obligations among citizens, a new 
political arrangement that ignores nationalist sentiments would not be fact-dependent. 
 
2. Critiques of Miller’s Approach to Political Theory  
 
Many theorists take issue with the precise way in which Miller allows common 
moral intuitions and political emotions to bear on his formulation of political theory. 
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I will firstly examine the two contrasting views of Swift and Mason. Mason believes 
that Miller allows common moral intuitions and political emotions to directly 
constitute the normative contents of his political theory, whereas Swift believes that 
Miller only allows them to widen the range of perspectives for him to consider 
before arriving at his own normative understanding. I will agree with Swift, insofar 
as common moral intuitions and political emotions do not directly ground Miller’s 
political theory as normative premises in a strict logical chain of reasoning. Secondly, 
I will examine Swift’s view that Miller allows common moral intuitions and political 
emotions to influence his moral reasoning as feasibility constraints. Based on Stears, 
Bader, Brock and Wenar’s arguments, I will demonstrate that Miller’s treatment of 
common moral intuitions and political emotions as feasibility constraints tends to 
display a conservative bias in the face of globalisation, insofar as he fails to clarify 
the exact way in which he selects and attributes moral weight to them in his moral 
reasoning about distributive justice and nationality. Lastly, I will consider Swift’s 
observation that Miller allows common moral intuitions and political emotions to 
enter his moral reasoning in such a way that people affected by the political 
principles produced therein would be able to accept them. This interpretation brings 
to the fore the implications of Miller’s failure to clarify his approach to common 
moral intuitions and political emotions for his account of deliberative democracy, in 
the sense that without any clear guideline, citizens of the same nation-state could not 
arrive at the very set of political principles which is to regulate their major social 
institutions.  
 
First and foremost, according to Swift, Miller’s stance treats facts as ‘food for 
thought,’ because, in Miller’s moral reasoning, facts do not directly constitute the 
normative content of political theory, despite the fact that they supply different 
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perspectives on the issues at hand for Miller to consider. Nevertheless, considering 
that theorists are expected to consider as many perspectives as possible within 
society so as to arrive at their own normative understanding, the treatment of facts as 
‘food for thought’ does not distinguish Miller’s methodological commitments from 
all others (Swift, 2003, p. 15-17). In stark contrast, Andrew Mason seems to think 
that Miller’s principles of distributive justice and theory of nationality support the 
idea of common moral intuitions and political emotions as the absolute trumping 
cards in moral reasoning. As he argues, 
 
(D)oes he take it to imply that there is always a reason for believing that 
widely shared views are true or justifiably held, perhaps because a view’s 
being widely shared is evidence of its truth or of its being justifiably held? 
This does seem to be Miller’s position; for instance, he maintains that ‘a 
theory of justice needs to be grounded in evidence about how ordinary 
people understand distributive justice’ (Mason, 2003, p. 60-1). 
 
As I read Miller’s remarks on the grounding of relations between facts and principles, 
he certainly does not mean to suggest that all common moral intuitions and political 
emotions should be taken at face value without proper reflection. Miller argues that 
there are three grounding relations between facts and principles: (1) entailment, (2) 
evidential grounding and (3) pre-suppositional grounding. First, grounding as 
entailment means that facts directly enter moral reasoning as the normative premises 
which will lead to specific principles in a strict logical chain. Second, evidential 
grounding means that ‘a fact supports a conclusion, not by entailing it, but just by 
providing evidence that makes it likely to hold.’ Third, pre-suppositional grounding 
means that certain facts are the necessary conditions for the principles to obtain. For 
instance, some principles are tailored to a very specific group of people or a 
particular context and cannot as such be applied beyond the specified scope (Miller, 
2013, p. 21- 2). Mason seems to believe that facts can only enter moral reasoning 
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directly as normative premises, otherwise it is quite difficult to see how the above 
citation of Miller will necessarily mean that facts constitute normative principles. 
The citation is ambiguous and general at most. Once we acknowledge that there are 
evidential and prepositional groundings other than grounding as entailment, Mason’s 
critique collapses. Therefore, Miller’s methodological stance on the formulation of 
political theory does not link common moral intuitions and political emotions as 
normative premises directly to political principles in a strict logical chain; rather, as 
Swift observes, his method coheres more with the idea that common moral intuitions 
and political emotions serve to broaden the range of perspectives on certain issues 
for theorists to consider. Nevertheless, this understanding does not capture the 
uniqueness of Miller’s approach to political theory. 
 
Secondly, Miller also invokes common moral intuitions as feasibility constraints on 
moral reasoning and seems to consider this invocation to be a distinguishing feature 
of his method. However, according to Swift, Miller has not explained how common 
moral intuitions determine which normative theory is feasible within a specific 
context (Swift, 2003, p. 18-19). As Swift argues, Miller’s use of common moral 
intuitions and political emotions has not yet shone any light on how they constrain 
our moral reasoning about justifiable political principles. Indeed, although Miller’s 
theories strive to meet the critical standard of Rawls’s ‘realistic utopia,’ his overly 
general statement attracts criticism for its arbitrariness. As Miller says, ‘Rawls’s idea 
(of realistic utopia), I believe, is that by extending the limits of political possibility—
exploring different ways in which societies might be reordered in the name of greater 
justice—we shall also come to a better understanding of the limits of the reshaping, 
and therefore become reconciled to those aspects of our condition that cannot be 
changed’ (Miller, 2013, p. 31). Insofar as he places greater emphasis on the facts in 
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reality being a constraint on the formulation of the utopian ideals, Marc Stears 
disputes this emphasis, arguing,  
 
Miller has gone too far in restricting the political theorists’ scope for 
manoeuvre. For although he is absolutely right to highlight the need for 
theorists to appreciate both the structural and attitudinal preconditions for 
social justice, the particular account of those preconditions offered and the 
prescriptive guidelines for what theorists should do if those preconditions 
are not met are both unduly pessimistic (Stears, 2003, p. 30). 
 
According to Stears, Miller’s conservative bias manifests most notably in his choice 
of the three grounding presuppositions of distributive justice that serve to justify 
nation-states’ continuous existence. These three grounding presuppositions are: (1) a 
theory of social justice should be formulated within a bounded society with a 
determinate membership, (2) there exists ‘an identifiable set of institutions whose 
impact on the life chances of different individuals can be traced,’ (3) ‘there is some 
agency capable of changing the institutional structure in more or less the way our 
favoured theory demands.’ On the basis of these three presuppositions, he argues 
that Miller’s theory of distributive justice is closely bound up with the ethical 
significance of the nation-state (Stears, 2003, p. 31-2). Since so far only sovereign 
nation-states with a common national identity could simultaneously meet the three 
presuppositions, Miller’s theory of distributive justice attributes a greater weight to 
the world as it is than to the world as it should be. However, Stears demonstrates 
with the example of ‘the new nationalists’ that Miller’s prioritisation of the structural 
and the attitudinal preconditions for the development of the utopian ideal of justice 
does not fit with the historical struggle of the new nationalists. In the sense that the 
new nationalists in America who strove for more social justice did not have a pre-
existing suitable structural and attitudinal context to support their attempts, the 
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malleable institutions and public opinions were gradually changed in favour of their 
reform proposals (Stears, 2003, p. 35-42).  
 
In similar vein, many political theorists have voiced their concern with Miller’s 
reluctance to recognise the impact of globalisation on our moral reasoning about the 
traditional nation-state. The idea is that the traditional nation-states are under 
increasing pressure from globalisation to move beyond national borders, so as to 
better fulfil their administrative functions in the following areas of issues: (1) the 
security of the rule of law and the effectiveness of the administrative state, (2) the 
sovereignty of the territorial state, (3) the collective identity, and (4) the democratic 
legitimacy of the nation-state (Habermas, 2001, p. 68-80). As a result, globalisation 
necessitates a reconfiguration of the political regime, if indeed such a thing exists, at 
the global level, in order to accommodate increasing supranational and even 
transnational interconnectedness. Nevertheless, Miller continues to be very much 
focused on a world order that consists primarily of separate sovereign nation-states 
based on socially integrated national communities, and has gone so far as to reject 
any positive proposal for the further institutionalisation of global citizenship.  
 
In this light, Veit Bader is quite right to point out,  
 
Miller’s focus on the ‘nation-state’ and (traditional state) ‘citizenship’ does 
not explore the opportunities of multi-level polities and multi-level and 
multi-layered citizenship, of trans-national polities such as the EU and trans-
national citizenship in particular, which provide promising opportunities to 
accommodate transnational and global shifts in affiliations, loyalties, 
identities and obligations (Bader, 2013, p. 175).  
 
This, essentially, calls into question Miller’s reliance on the traditional nation-state 
by reinstating a more dynamic picture of the ideal convergence between 
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administrative states and national communities. In other words, given that political 
emotions such as nationalist sentiment constrain the range of possible political 
arrangements, surely it is still possible to envisage a readjustment of the scope and 
authority of the administrative state in the face of the changing landscape of human 
association at the global level? Why can’t nation-states adjust to the supranational 
and transnational interconnectedness created by immigration, the resurgence of 
religion, international commerce and so forth? In some contexts, it is natural for an 
individual to identify more with their religious group, enclave of fellow-immigrants 
and business partners than with their co-nationals. As might be expected, a Muslim 
would condemn the US’s backing of Israel’s aggression against the Palestinians 
(recall Trump’s recent explicit recognition of Israeli occupation of the disputed 
territory against the will of the Palestinians); a Chinese immigrant will inevitably 
complain about the BBC’s biased portrayal of the P. R. China that does nothing to 
correct prejudiced Western perceptions of a distant, newly emerging power; the CEO 
of a multinational corporation will defend his own and his foreign partners’ business 
interests by lobbying against a rise in the corporate tax in the US. In certain contexts, 
all these shifts in allegiances and loyalties will continue to quicken, widen and 
deepen over time and will finally reach a tipping point whereby the administrative 
state is no longer able to bear the pressure.  
 
Miller is likely to respond, either, (1) that transnational/supranational solidarities are 
not strong enough to threaten national communities either now or in the long term, or, 
(2) that it is morally undesirable to change the status quo of the world order. I will 
quickly dispense with the second response, since it is diametrically at odds with 
Miller’s own methodological stance. As introduced in section 1, Miller’s 
methodological commitment to taking serious account of common moral intuitions 
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and political emotions enables him to justify the ethical particularism of nationality 
on the ground that most people have an emotional attachment to their national 
communities. In light of the claim that globalisation has undermined traditional 
national communities, Miller suggests, ‘the issue…is not so much one of a 
quantitative weakening of nationality as of growing uncertainty about the cultural 
values and political principles that distinguish one nation from the next’ (Miller, 
1995, p. 182). Therefore, the development of the democratic decision-making 
procedure at the supranational level will not lead to the erosion of the supremacy of 
nationality. As he argues, 
 
Perhaps what we are witnessing is the slow emergence of new nationalities, 
such as European nationality, so that national identities will coexist at 
different levels…This would mean the passing of nationality as a simple, 
all-embracing source of political identity, but not of nationality as a 
differentiating factor which binds together a given set of people and makes 
them a community to the exclusion of outsiders (Miller, 1995, p. 159- 60). 
 
It would seem from the above that Miller is quick to acknowledge the possibility that 
globalisation may alter the status quo of the world order. Moreover, he does not 
advance a strong normative claim that the world should be returned to the way it was. 
He simply doubts that supranational/ transnational solidarities will ever pose a threat 
to the supremacy of nationality. Nevertheless, it also suggests that there is a 
momentum embedded in his theory of nationality that cannot be limited to the 
pessimistic prediction that a supranational solidarity among EU citizens will not 
replace nationality as a distinctive feature of a certain group of people. I agree with 
Miller that nationality will not be eroded easily by the emergence of 
supranational/transnational interconnectedness, insofar as in general at all levels of 
human interaction, people require a common object of emotional identification in 
order to be motivated to shoulder all sorts of political obligations. Even if 
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supranational organisations such as the EU cause citizens’ allegiances to shift 
gradually towards a political regime beyond that of the traditional nation-states, it 
will still not bypass the need for a common object of identification such as a shared 
European identity among EU citizens. However, this argument hardly serves to 
justify Miller’s reluctance to support the positive proposal of a global citizenship 
based on deliberative democracy, because the development of newer democratic 
institutions, in conjunction with the diversification of people’s allegiances and 
loyalties at all levels of human interaction, is exactly the dynamic picture Bader 
envisions. 
 
In effect, Miller responds to the proposal for a global citizenship in the first way 
mentioned above, that is, (1) the political emotions of the people are such that there 
will not be a strong enough motivational base among them to support the 
institutionalisation of a supranational democracy and, (2) the structural conditions at 
the supranational level are such that democracy will not work in practice. Firstly, as 
he conclusively argues,  
 
(W)hen asked about some practical question that requires them to choose 
between displaying national loyalty and displaying a European loyalty, large 
majorities of people across Europe will choose their nation…This pattern of 
response corresponds to a view of Europe as an association of states for 
mutual support rather than as a genuine community each of whose members 
acknowledges a responsibility for the welfare of the rest…It seems at 
present established national identities are more likely to be challenged from 
below…than eroded from above by people coming to identify themselves 
with large heterogeneous entities like Europe (Miller, 1995, p. 160, 161, 
163). 
 
In other words, the newer patterns of loyalties have not yet grown strong enough to 
challenge the supremacy of the established ones, usually at the sub- and/or the 
national levels. As such, at the supranational/transnational level, the people ‘are not 
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involved in relations of reciprocity, whereby I may agree to promote your interest on 
this occasion on the understanding that you will support mine sometime in the future. 
Nor are they held together by communal ties or relationships of mutual trust’ (Miller, 
2000, p. 95). As a result, people cannot act responsibly as required by Miller’s 
republican conception of citizenship. In the absence of a strong common identity, 
they cannot be expected to (1) advance claims based on sincerely held beliefs rather 
than as an expedient way of furthering personal interests and (2) be willing to 
moderate their claims in the hope of finding a common ground among them (Miller, 
1995, p. 96-7). Therefore, supranational democratic institutions cannot be developed 
without a level of solidarity among people from different nation-states. 
 
Secondly, Miller rejects the cosmopolitan democrats’ proposal for a global 
citizenship on the ground that the structural conditions at the supranational level 
prefer the current world order based on the traditional nation-state. First and 
foremost, with regard to cosmopolitan democratic law, he argues, ‘whatever the 
chances are that we create a more effective piece of machinery for conflict resolution, 
this still has to do with relations between states and nothing directly to do with 
citizenship…(And) where domestic protection of citizens’ rights is 
feasible…citizenship is better served by constitutional reform within those states’ 
(Miller, 2000, p. 92, 93). Then, with regard to the multi-level democratic decision-
making procedure, he considers it almost impossible to define the relevant 
constituency for every common issue at the supranational level as these arise. Finally, 
with regard to global civil society, he claims that people from different nation-states 
cannot be seen as citizens proper at the supranational level, because they in no way 
belong to a determinate community. In other words, unlike citizens, people sharing a 
common conception of the good, such as the Greenpeace campaigners, do not 
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identify politically with a community but stand in a relation of reciprocity with other 
like-minded people (Miller, 2000, p. 94- 6). 
 
I do not intend to address here these empirical claims, for they have already been 
extensively discussed by others and are not relevant to the point I am trying to make. 
Even if one accepts these claims at face value, it is still a far cry from accepting 
Miller’s claim that a further institutionalisation of global citizenship is unfeasible, 
since he does not tell us the extent to which these feasibility constraints weigh on the 
decision to institutionalise global citizenship and how he selects the relevant facts as 
the said constraints. In fact, as Bader observes,  
 
Miller does not live up to his own demand and recommendations to provide 
‘full reference to the circumstances of each society’ but sticks to what could 
be called a kind of half-way contextualism. On the one hand, the book is 
crowded with the traditional philosophers’ examples (‘imagine’, ‘suppose’, 
‘assume’) meant to illuminate the theory instead of using the theory to 
analyse real world cases. On the other hand, many small or bigger real world 
cases are mentioned in passing, but none is really dealt with in any detail in 
the respective circumstances (Bader, 2013, p. 174). 
 
This ambiguity of his methodological stance has a most noticeable implication for 
the ethical particularism of nationality and the contextualism of distributive justice. 
As discussed above, Miller is reluctant to support any positive proposal for global 
citizenship, despite his acknowledgment of the increasing pressure of globalisation 
and the diversification of solidarities at different levels of human interactions. In the 
absence of any formal institution of citizenship at the supranational/transnational 
level, Miller considers the global level a different distributive context from the 
domestic, in the sense that different distributive principles obtain at the domestic and 
the global levels. As noted in Chapter 2, according to Miller, social justice requires 
both the satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of substantive inequality, 
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whereas global justice merely requires the former. Therefore, in a sense, Miller’s 
insistence on ethical particularism combined with his bias towards the traditional 
nation-state determines the split-level conception of distributive justice. Even though 
it is difficult to refute here Miller’s restriction of the regulation of substantive 
inequality to the domestic level on the basis of contextualism, it is still fair to 
question the list of basic human rights Miller settles on. He argues that a concept of 
basic human rights as the moral minimum of global justice should be arrived at 
through determining what counts as basic human needs. As he claims, 
 
Basic needs…are to be understood by reference to this idea of a decent 
human life. They are the conditions that must be met for a person to have a 
decent life given the environmental conditions he faces. The list of such 
needs will include (but is not exhausted by): food and water, clothing and 
shelter, physical security, health care, education, work and leisure, freedom 
of movement, conscience, and expression (Miller, 2007, p. 184). 
 
I agree with Miller that it is wise to keep the list of basic human rights open for the 
time being, given the possibility that it might grow in the future due to the 
continuing dialogue among different cultural communities. However, one can see 
that this list of basic human rights is shorter than what many human rights theorists 
would care to accept, insofar as it excludes civil and economic rights for instance. 
Miller recognises this and explicates it on the ground that cultural diversities at the 
global level make it hardly feasible to expect all nation-states to arrive at the same 
list of basic human rights. As the conception of basic human needs is defined by 
both the ‘physical-cum-biological conceptions of harm’ and the social norms, and 
the latter varies greatly from one society to another, ‘although we should generally 
expect societies to recognise these needs, and to incorporate them into their fuller 
conceptions of societal needs, this may not always be the case’ (Miller, 2007, p. 184-
5). This line of argument is sound to the extent that cultural differences do make it 
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practically unfeasible to arrive at a common conception of basic human needs in the 
short term. However, agreeing on a list of basic human needs defined primarily by 
the ‘physical-cum-biological conditions’ and keeping it open for further convergence 
of different social norms carries with it a momentum that is hard for Miller to 
contain. Insofar as what restricts the length of the list of basic human rights is the 
lack of common social norms among different nation-states, continuing cultural 
exchange could solve this problem in the long term. Even if we put aside this 
possibility for the moment, it is curious how Miller can determine the length of the 
list without any discussion of the empirical evidence that shows precisely what a 
human being requires to live a minimally decent life in the physical-biological sense 
and what the shared normative consensus on the standard of decency is at the global 
level. 
 
For instance, Gillian Brock points out the conceptual link between the existence of 
democratic institutions and the nation-states’ abilities to take collective responsibility 
for their decisions. According to her, Miller has not realised the importance of 
human rights to political participation, in the sense that the citizens’ entitlement to 
participate in collective decisions directly determines the possibility of their taking 
collective responsibility as a nation-state. As she observes,  
 
Quite noticeably absent from Miller’s list of basic rights is a basic right to 
equal participation in politics…but how, we might wonder, are those in poor 
countries to be able to take more responsibility for their own development or 
actions and policies adopted by their governments if (1) they have no ability 
to influence who gets to represent them or makes decisions on their behalf, 
(2) the governments may conduct their affairs in any way they wish…(3) 
when there is no expectation concerning the flow of information, let alone 
accountability, to the people they govern, and so forth? (Brock, 2013, p. 68) 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, Miller’s conception of global justice relies on the idea 
that all nation-states should take responsibility for their decisions that have 
distributive implications. Here, Brock essentially questions Miller’s own rationale of 
developing a list of basic human rights. Insofar as national responsibility operates 
under the assumption that the global moral minimum protects the basic conditions 
for individual human beings to live a minimally decent life, the fact that nation-states 
are held responsible for those of their decisions that have distributive implications 
suggests that all conditions are met for individuals to take responsibility for their 
nation-states’ collective decisions. Nevertheless, according to Brock, in the absence 
of any resemblance of a democratic decision-making procedure in place, people in 
the developing countries cannot be held responsible for Miller’s notion of national 
responsibility. The empirical evidence shows, ‘if we want and expect people in 
developing countries to take responsibility for their own prosperity, we have to help 
them put in place the architecture that makes this possible, especially when they ask 
for our help in trying to do so’ (Brock, 2013, p. 68). Therefore, in order to maintain 
internal consistency, more items related to equal participation in politics should be 
added to Miller’s list of basic human rights. Of course, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
Miller could dispute this claim on the ground that national responsibility is based on 
nation-states being both communities of like-minded people and collective 
cooperative schemes. This is to say that individuals could be held collectively 
responsible for their nation-states’ decisions even if there are no democratic 
institution in place, because they are a community of like-minded people sharing a 
public culture. However, Brock’s emphasis on the link between democratic 
institutions and the people’s ability to take collective responsibility for their nation-
states’ prosperity still holds. Until Miller finds a way to clarify how he selects 
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relevant facts for his moral reasoning and how the chosen facts bear on his 
conclusion, his political theory will continue to be open to critiques like this. 
 
Perhaps, as Leif Wenar points out, more damaging to Miller’s theories is the fact that 
without any explication of the specific way in which the duty to protect a limited list 
of human rights is grounded in respect for the moral equality of human beings, the 
duty to regulate substantive inequality could logically be brought back into the 
picture. As he says, ‘theorists (like Miller) lean heavily on the equal dignity and 
importance of each human life, especially when they are opposing human rights 
sceptics…These theorists then find it difficult to contain the momentum of their own 
arguments, which pull them toward a positive commitment to substantive equality 
among individuals’ (Wenar, 2013, p. 32). Recall that Miller uses the metric problem 
to oppose the cosmopolitans’ proposal for the regulation of substantive inequality at 
the global level, arguing that there are not enough shared cultural values to formulate 
a common conception of substantive equality in material terms. Therefore, the lack 
of shared cultural values at the global level grounds both the objection to the 
regulation of substantive inequality at the global level and the short list of basic 
human rights. Miller’s failure to clarify the exact way in which common moral 
intuitions and political emotions bear on the formulation of distributive principles 
will bring the relevance of the regulation of substantive inequality back into 
relevance. 
 
The discussion above shows that Miller’s methodological commitment to capturing 
common moral intuitions and political emotions does not treat the facts of our 
current world order as the direct normative premises for moral reasoning about what 
it should be. Its fault seems to lie in Miller’s failure to clarify the way in which the 
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morally relevant facts are selected and thereby bear on the process of moral 
reasoning. This ambiguity contributes to (1) the contradiction between Miller’s 
acknowledgement of the increasing pressure of globalisation and his reluctance to 
support any positive proposal for global citizenship and (2) the seemingly arbitrary 
formulation of the human rights regime at the global level. Above all, as the 
criticisms of Miller demonstrate, the said ambiguity also leads to the difficulty of 
initiating a fruitful communication between Miller and his critics, in the sense that 
there is no particularly clear vantage point from which to criticize Miller’s theory of 
distributive justice and nationality without firstly grasping the technical aspect of his 
approach to the facts of the world as it is.  
 
In light of the ambiguity of how Miller assigns moral weight to common moral 
intuitions and political emotions in moral reasoning, Swift’s discussion is very 
enlightening with regard to the last way in which Miller’s methodology is fact-
dependent. This approach does not test the validity of political principles directly 
against common moral intuitions and political emotions; rather it requires political 
theorists to conduct moral reasoning in the hope that the political principles thus 
produced could be justified to the common people under appropriate conditions. As 
Miller explicitly says, 
 
A political philosophy that presents itself to any given society as realistically 
utopian must contain principles that members of that society could be 
brought to accept by reasoned discussion, which means that the principles 
cannot have implications that those citizens would find abhorrent. This 
doesn’t mean that the principles must be accepted immediately they are laid 
out…political philosophy should be in the business of changing political 
attitudes, of showing people what their convictions mean when applied 
consistently to political questions (Miller, 2013, p. 37). 
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In other words, the validity of political principles does not rest on its immediate 
acceptance by the people and thereby on their strict adherence to common moral 
intuitions and political emotions, as long as they could be somehow justifiable to the 
people.  
 
In a sense, the third way essentially reveals at least a part of Miller’s intention for 
political theorists to act as mediator between the laymen’s common moral intuitions 
and political emotions and the justifiable political principles that are supposed to be 
legally institutionalised by the administrative state. If this reading of Miller is correct, 
then there arises a concern with the role of the political theorists vis-à-vis the laymen 
in (1) conducting moral reasoning at the individual level and (2) deliberating about 
political principles that should regulate major social institutions at the societal level. 
With regard to the political theorists’ role in conducting moral reasoning at the 
individual level, Miller envisions an equal relation between political theorists and the 
laymen who similarly aim to translate common moral intuitions and political 
emotions into appropriate political principles that are justifiable to all citizens. As 
Swift observes, Miller finds it unacceptable to defend the absolute authority of 
professional philosophers over laymen in a contemporary world defined by 
increasing cultural pluralism. I quote the enlightening passage in full:  
 
As Miller says: “the notion that philosophers can discover truth by means 
not available to lay persons is even more difficult to defend today than it was 
in Plato’s time.” But that notion has not been defended. The means available 
to philosophers are also “available” to laypersons. If there is a difference, it 
is that philosophers have the time and interest to learn and apply them 
systematically (Swift, 2003, p. 26).  
 
In other words, political theorists and laymen are on an equal footing when 
conducting moral reasoning about political principles on the basis of Miller’s method.  
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Since to Miller an individual’s moral reasoning about political principles is 
conducted in isolation from all others, it is likely that their political principles will be 
drastically different from each other. In this light, how do individuals, political 
theorists and laymen alike, arrive at a set of political principles that could be 
justifiable to all and, as such, should be legally institutionalised to regulate their 
major social institutions within the nation-state? I wish to clarify that to pose this 
question is not to confuse the discussion of the validity of political principles within 
academia with the public deliberation about political principles that should govern 
major social institutions within a nation-state. I do realise that there are two different 
lines of discussion with the justifiability of the political principles as the subject 
matter, and they each have different standards of justifiability. The review of the 
critiques of Miller has so far focused on the discussion within academia. As I 
concluded in relation to Swift’s discussion of Miller’s approach to common moral 
intuitions as feasibility constraints, it exposes Miller’s failure to clarify the way in 
which facts bear on his moral reasoning about political principles. However, Miller’s 
failure to clarify his methodological stance adds certain nuance to his account of 
public deliberation within a nation-state. If Miller’s methodological stance is a 
mechanical process with a set of guidelines clearly laid out for selecting the morally 
relevant facts and weighing their moral significance in relation to all political issues, 
it would be logical for him to argue that all citizens ought to follow this process and 
arrive at the one and only set of political principles to be legally institutionalised at 
societal level. However, this is not the case. Miller’s own failure to clarify his 
method owes to a great extent to the fact that individuals will naturally choose 
different facts as morally relevant and allows them to bear on their moral reasoning 
differently in relation to different issues. 
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I believe this is partly why Miller’s account of deliberative democracy requires all 
citizens to participate in public deliberation on an equal footing, insofar as the 
differences in the selection of facts and the attribution of their moral weights in 
relation to different issues make it virtually impossible to justify a set of political 
principles to citizens without there being actual communication among them. In 
other words, there is no way to know which political principles would be justifiable 
to all citizens ex ante because no one can predict others’ approaches to common 
moral intuitions and political emotions without engaging in direct communication 
with them. Recall the two conditions of deliberative democracy: (1) the advancing of 
sincerely held claims and (2) the willingness to moderate one’s own claim. In 
Citizenship and National Identity (2000), Miller restates the first condition 
differently than he does in On nationality (1993), which is more to the point here. As 
he claims, ‘all that is necessary in order to embark on political dialogue is a 
willingness to find reasons that can persuade those who initially disagree with us, 
and one cannot say a priori how abstract those reasons will have to be’ (Miller, 2000, 
p. 55). By agreeing to find the reasons for my argument, I already recognise my co-
deliberators as being my equal, in the sense that I believe in their ability to arrive at a 
set of political principles worthy of my consideration. Moreover, the abstractness of 
my argument varies in the face of different political issues and different co-
deliberators. The reason for this must be that I cannot know for sure what counter-
arguments my co-deliberators would advance in response to mine on the basis of 
their own approaches to common moral intuitions and political emotions. In order to 
show my respect for the co-deliberators as equals, I have to engage in actual 
communication to find out how they choose the facts and allow them to bear on their 
moral reasoning. 
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3. The Need for Miller’s Account of a Deliberative Democracy to 
Incorporate Habermas’s Conception of a Communicative Action 
 
In light of the discussion at the end of the previous section, I want to focus here on 
expanding on the implications of Miller’s methodological stance on individual moral 
reasoning for his account of public deliberation within nation-states, since this is 
closely related to my argument in Chapter 4 that Miller’s account of the nation-
building process through deliberative democracy should incorporate Habermas’s 
notion of communicative action. In the following, therefore, I will demonstrate that 
Miller’s difficulty in clarifying how one selects the relevant facts and assigns moral 
weight to them necessitates a deliberative process which would allow citizens to 
clearly lay out their different approaches to common moral intuitions and political 
emotions in society and, on the basis of these different approaches, debate the most 
appropriate political principles regulating major social institutions. In a sense, the 
said difficulty for Miller at the methodological level is coextensive with the 
difficulty of specifying the scope of a shared public culture that would be sufficient 
for preserving a national community at the level of principle, because the 
formulation of a theory of nationality also faces the same problem with specifying ex 
ante the way of selecting the common moral intuitions and political emotions 
relevant to the moral reasoning about nationality and assigning moral weight to them.  
 
Before arguing for the abovementioned deliberative process, it is imperative to 
understand the contrasting relationships between Miller and John Rawls on the one 
hand, and Rawls and Habermas on the other. Regarding the first, Miller often 
professes to have inherited from Rawls the method of individual moral reasoning—
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the ‘reflective equilibrium.’ Miller argues that one has to rely on reflective 
equilibrium in order to ground his/her normative ideals in reality, in the sense that 
‘the aim is to achieve an equilibrium whereby the theory of justice appears no longer 
as an external imposition conjured up by the philosopher, but as a clearer and more 
systematic statement of the principles that people already hold’ (Miller, 1999, p. 51). 
Secondly, the reason for discussing the relationship between Habermas and Rawls is 
that the two of them are contrasting figures in the academic response to the impact of 
increasing cultural pluralism on the possibility of asserting normative truth within 
liberal society. As Habermas observes in his famous debate with Rawls, both he and 
Rawls are responding to the contemporary conditions of cultural pluralism within 
liberal society: 
 
The required consensus on issues of political justice can no longer be based 
on a settled traditional ethos that encompasses the whole of society. Yet 
members of modern societies still share the expectation that they can live 
together under conditions of fair and peaceful cooperation. In spite of the 
lack of a substantive consensus on values rooted in a socially accepted 
worldview, they continue to appeal to moral convictions and norms that each 
of them thinks everyone else should accept (Habermas, 2011, p. 95). 
 
In the face of these ‘modern conditions’ defined by the difficulty of asserting 
normative truth when there is no longer any unquestionable consensus on the norms 
among citizens, Rawls opts for a convergence among citizens based on a shared 
political conception of justice grounded in different normative reasons, whereas 
Habermas attempts to revitalise a deliberative process that will discover the political 
principles on the basis of shared normative reasons. Through the discussion of these 
two relations, I want to show that Miller’s methodological stance should somehow 
move closer to Habermas, in order to add to his account of public deliberation with 
the latter’s detailed design of a deliberative process that could enable citizens to 
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reach a consensus based on clearly laid-out normative reasons, despite Miller’s 
reliance on Rawls’s method of individual moral reasoning. 
 
Let me start with the relationship between Miller and Rawls. Here, Miller inherits 
most of the latter’s method of reflective equilibrium while criticising its insensitivity 
to other people’s opinions. As Miller understands reflective equilibrium, we start 
with a ‘considered judgment’ that we hold sincerely and independently of our self-
interests, and gradually transform it by comparing it with the prevalent philosophical 
debates within our society. When, after due consideration, we are convinced that our 
own considered judgments are coherent with each other and with the prevalent 
philosophical debates, a reflective equilibrium has been reached. Nevertheless, 
reflective equilibrium is a thought process conducted exclusively at the individual 
level. As Miller argues, ‘the ‘considered judgments’ that form the starting point for 
this process are the judgments of one particular person; it immediately follows that 
the reflective equilibrium that emerges is also an equilibrium only for the person 
who has engaged in the thought-process Rawls describes’ (Miller, 1999, p. 55). 
According to Miller, reflective equilibrium alone as a method for individual moral 
reasoning is unsatisfactory, because ‘looking at what other people believe about 
justice, and in particular trying to understand when people disagree and what the 
grounds of their disagreement are, are integral to the process of deciding which of 
my own beliefs deserve to be taken as ‘the fixed points of my considered judgment’’ 
(Miller, 1999, p. 56). 
 
In response to the supposed insensitivity of reflective equilibrium to other people’s 
moral intuitions and political emotions, Miller develops his own methodological 
stance on political theory, which explicitly requires individuals to take serious 
 
 
189 
account of common moral intuitions and political emotions within a nation-state. I 
do not see how this method alone could remedy Rawls’s method of reflective 
equilibrium, insofar as the differences between each citizen’s approach to selecting 
relevant common moral intuitions and political emotions and assigning moral 
weights to them make it practically impossible for each to know where their 
disagreements lie and whether they would arrive at the same set of political 
principles in the end. Miller’s own selection of the relevant common moral intuitions 
and political emotions, for instance, relies on reviewing the social scientific works 
on public opinion on certain political issues, as exemplified in Principles of Social 
Justice (Miller, 1999, Chap. 4). Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that 
citizens might rely on different scientific researches, derive different meanings from 
the same piece of research, and allow the inferences drawn from the scientific 
researches to bear on their conclusions differently. As suggested earlier, the only 
solution is to resort to a deliberative process that will allow each citizen to clearly lay 
out his/her approach to common moral intuitions and political emotions, and 
transform each of these in light of all the others. Through public deliberation, each 
citizen could not only develop his/her own perception of others’ common moral 
intuitions and political emotions—which might be distorted by lack of sufficient 
information as well as personal biases—but also take note of others’ actual common 
moral intuitions and political emotions. 
 
The contrast between Rawls’s and Habermas’s methods of formulating political 
principles in the face of increasing cultural pluralism suggests that Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action is a better account of the mechanism through 
which citizens could clarify and, thereby, debate their approaches to common moral 
intuitions and political emotions in order to reach a common ground among them. In 
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comparison with Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium—which focuses 
exclusively on individual moral reasoning in isolation from all others—Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action requires at the most fundamental level an un-
coerced and equal communication among interlocutors oriented towards agreement. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a communicative action occurs when ‘actors in the roles 
of speakers and hearers attempt to negotiate interpretations of the situation at hand 
and to harmonise their respective plans with one another through the unrestrained 
pursuit of illocutionary goals’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 18). As I understand it, there are 
three interrelated normative claims supporting a communicative action: (1) we 
should presume that there is an objective world outside of our mind, (2) the only way 
to understand the objective world is through repeated discursive practices and, (3) no 
one has absolute authority to advance a truth claim in isolation from others. Firstly, 
interlocutors have to assume the existence of an external world of objects in order to 
refer to them according to different linguistic descriptions. As Habermas claims,  
 
On the one hand, linguistic practice itself must make it possible to refer to 
language-independent objects about which we assert something. On the 
other hand, the pragmatic presupposition of an objective world must be a 
formal anticipation if it is to ensure that any subject whatever—rather than 
just a given community of speakers at a given time—be able to refer to a 
common system of possible referents and to identify independently existing 
objects in space and time (Habermas, 2003, p. 33). 
 
The phrase, ‘formal anticipation,’ in the quote seems to refer to the idea that the 
world of objects exists in our constant reference to and evolving understanding of it 
through communication based on improved empirical knowledge. Secondly, based 
on the presupposition of an objective world in formal anticipation, any claim on the 
normative truths could only be redeemed through repeated discursive practices. As 
Habermas argues, ‘argumentation remains the only available medium of ascertaining 
truth since truth claims that have been problematised cannot be tested in any other 
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way’ (Habermas, 2003, p. 38). Therefore, any assertion of truth carries with it the 
possibility that it can and will be challenged and falsified in the future by our 
continuous experiences of the external world. Finally, the third normative claim is 
that no one has privileged access to truth. In Habermas’s words, ‘because no one has 
direct access to un-interpreted conditions of validity, ‘validity’ (Gultigkeit) must be 
understood in epistemic terms as ‘validity (Geltung) proven for us.’ A justified truth 
claim should be able to gain the rationally motivated agreement of the interpretation 
community as a whole’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 14). As such, interlocutors have to be 
prepared to give reasons for the normative truth they assert in a communicative 
action and be open to others’ challenge and refutation. 
 
In this light, Habermas’s conception of communicative action is more suitable than 
Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium for remedying Miller’s failure to clarify the 
way in which citizens are able to present their different approaches to common moral 
intuitions and political emotions. The reason is three-fold. Firstly, given that a 
communicative action has to rely on the presupposition of the existence of an 
objective world, Miller’s notions of nationality and distributive contexts could be 
recognised through the process of a communicative action as the normative truth 
asserted on the basis of the experiences of the external world. Secondly, nationality 
and distributive contexts as the normative truth could only be accessed through 
discursive practices on the basis of citizens’ different interpretations of them. Lastly, 
no one is privileged over others in the deliberative process, since each citizen 
assumes the obligation to justify their interpretations of the common nationality and 
the distributive contexts to others. This is consistent with Miller’s account of 
deliberative democracy in general because his account requires all citizens to have 
equal entitlements to participate in public deliberation (Miller, 2000, p.53). Hence, a 
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communicative action could help Miller better explain the deliberative process, 
which would allow all citizens to clarify their particular approaches to selecting 
relevant common moral intuitions and political emotions and assigning moral 
weights to them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I set out to examine the validity of Miller’s contextualist approach to 
political theory. Insofar as the discussions in the previous chapters all presuppose 
that Miller’s methodological commitment is sound, this chapter serves to test this 
assumption in the face of Miller’s critics. As I interpreted it in section 1, Miller’s 
approach to political theory aims to take serious account of common moral intuitions 
and political emotions at all levels of moral reasoning. As the critiques of Miller in 
section 2 show, however, he is unable to clarify the way in which common moral 
intuitions and political emotions are selected and weighted in his moral reasoning 
about distributive justice and nationality. This will impact adversely on the validity 
of his substantive principles, in the sense that he will neither supply a vantage point 
allowing other political theorists to engage in fruitful dialogue with him, nor invite 
criticism of his theories as being downright arbitrary. More importantly, as shown in 
section 3, at the institutional level, his account of deliberative democracy will 
encounter a similar problem, because it is practically implausible for citizens to 
arrive at a shared set of political principles in the absence of an institutional 
mechanism whereby they may give an account of their different approaches to 
common moral intuitions and political emotions.  
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In this light, Miller needs to incorporate Habermas’s conception of communicative 
action, since the latter provides a detailed account of the mechanism through which 
interlocutors transform their originally subjective interpretations of the external 
world and arrive at a shared normative understanding. This essentially reinforces my 
conclusion in Chapter 4 that Miller’s failure to specify the scope of the shared public 
culture sufficient for preserving a national community makes it necessary for his 
account of deliberative democracy to incorporate Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action. Here the argument goes a step further, as it proves the same 
point at the methodological level. By incorporating Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action, Miller’s account of deliberative democracy will place great 
emphasis on people’s equal rights to participate in public deliberation to hold 
regulative norms and values accountable to themselves. As shown in section 3, this 
belief is already in agreement between Miller and Habermas. This implies that a 
plausible account of global citizenship should also secure all human beings’ equal 
rights to participate in the global public deliberation, if we expect the global 
regulative norms and values to be justifiable to all human beings, as free and equal 
moral agents. This is the first guiding principle of the global public deliberation. In 
the next chapter, I will show the consistency between Miler’s account of deliberative 
democracy and Habermas’s conception of communicative action. 
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Chapter 6: 
Habermas’s Conception of Communicative Action  
and the Role of Common Moral Intuitions and Political Emotions 
 
Introduction 
 
I demonstrated in the last chapter that Miller’s account of deliberative democracy 
needs to move closer to Habermas’s conception of communicative action in order to 
explain how citizens could arrive at shared principles of justice on the basis of 
different approaches to selecting and assigning moral weights to common moral 
intuitions and political emotions. This conclusion brings to the fore the question as to 
whether Habermas’s conception of communicative action could agree with Miller’s 
account of deliberative democracy at the conceptual level. In other words, could 
Habermas take serious account of common moral intuitions and political emotions? 
The conception of communicative action aims to salvage a sense of normative truth 
from the difficulty posed by increasing cultural pluralism. It consists in the 
conviction that no one has privileged access to truth, and normative truth can only be 
approximated through discursive practices on the basis of justifiable validity claims. 
It is clear in this sense that Habermas’s entire project is oriented towards a procedure 
for laying bare all the interlocutors’ relevant common moral intuitions, and 
transforming these so that a shared normative truth may emerge in the end. However, 
at first glance, the same cannot be said about political emotions since throughout his 
works, Habermas has relatively little to say about them. Therefore, in this chapter, I 
wish to focus exclusively on political emotions and take it as a given that 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action is in accord with Miller’s 
methodological commitment to capturing common moral intuitions at all levels of 
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moral reasoning. In this thesis, emotional expression refers to the three modes of 
human communication identified by Young as the alternatives to rational 
argumentation: greetings, rhetoric and narrative. In contrast to rational 
argumentation, I call them emotional expression because Young seems to consider 
them as being the opposite of the ‘dispassionate’ arguments that tend to ‘denigrate 
emotions’ (Young, 2000, p. 39, 63). 
 
I will demonstrate in this chapter that Habermas’s conception of communicative 
action could allow political emotions to bear on our moral reasoning about political 
principles and social institutions. In section 1, contra many constitutional patriots, 
including Lacroix, Markell and Shabani, I will demonstrate that Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action could allow political emotions to bear on our 
moral reasoning about political principles and social institutions because the stability 
of a shared lifeworld requires an affective identification among citizens. In section 2, 
contra liberal multiculturalists such as Young, I will demonstrate that 
communicative action could allow political emotions to bear on our moral reasoning. 
In response to Young’s claim that the conception of communicative action prioritises 
rational argumentation and excludes emotional expression by making an arbitrary 
distinction between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary aspects of language use, 
I will show that in his later career, Habermas dealt with this problem in two ways. 
First, he downplayed the importance of the distinction between the perlocutionary 
and the illocutionary aspects of language use. Second, he came to define the 
difference between communicative and strategic action on the basis of interlocutors’ 
intention to reach agreements.  
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1. Examining the Constitutional Patriots’ Interpretation of Communicative 
Action  
  
Many, but not all, constitutional patriots believe that political emotions should not be 
allowed to bear on our moral reasoning about political principles and social 
institutions; otherwise it might run the risk of compromising the internal coherence 
of Habermas’s theory. Of these, Justine Lacroix argues forcefully that Habermas’s 
recent writings in regard to a set of shared European values have strayed from his 
earlier conception of communicative action that serves more as a self-critical process 
of integration regardless of particular values. As she observes,  
 
Habermas’s concept of constitutional patriotism could initially be 
understood not so much as a static definition – i.e. the adhesion to some 
universal political principles – but rather as a process of continuous 
integration of the values shared by a specific community through the prism 
of a small set of universal norms…However, if we examine Habermas’s 
recent analysis of the future development of Europe, there are hardly any 
traces of this initial dimension…The emphasis put on ‘European values’ 
is…governed by some form of political necessity since Habermas considers 
that there is no risk that this way of gearing identity to historically evolved 
collective identities might be understood substantively. For him, the danger 
is rather that European commonalities might have too little substance 
(Lacroix, 2009, p. 144, 145, 146). 
 
Therefore, focusing on the dynamic momentum embedded in Habermas’s initial 
conception of communicative action as a self-critical process, Lacroix endorses a 
different prognosis for the European Union, which she calls ‘European post-
nationalism.’ As she explains,  
 
European ‘post-nationalism’ does not imply the emergence of a larger scale 
identification process, which might deprive the European project of its 
uniqueness and specificity as a new political entity founded on a deliberation 
and confrontation process among distinct peoples and distinct political 
identities…In that sense, one is ‘European’ not because one adheres to a set 
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of ‘common values’ but simply because one is not discriminated against 
when one is in another member state (Lacroix, 2009, p. 153, 154). 
 
In other words, constitutional patriots like Lacroix consider their ‘post-nationalism’ 
to be a more logical extension of Habermas’s conception of communicative action 
for the European Union than the latter’s own prognosis. Essentially, they both 
maintain that communicative action could effectively decouple individuals from 
their identification with a particular group.  
 
In similar vein, Patchen Markell argues that Habermas’s strategy to redirect citizens’ 
identification with their particular associations toward a set of universal 
constitutional principles still relies on people having an affective identification. A 
logical extension of his conception of communicative action would be to resist 
affective identification altogether. He begins with Habermas’s ‘redirection strategy,’ 
claiming in the broadest terms that Habermas strives to close the gap between post-
national identities associated with universal principles and affective group identities 
by developing a type of new identification through communicative action based on 
particular normative values. This strategy will work insofar as it is founded in a set 
of universal principles rather than a concrete historical community and, as such, will 
not by default be conducive to irrational, anti-democratic hostility towards all those 
labelled as outsiders. Markell points out that this strategy has to rely on a shared 
normative understanding—especially a shared political culture—which is pre-
political insofar as, 
 
The content of the constitution and the particular interpretations that 
constitution has been given over a long history of adjudication the political 
history of the  country; the symbols, songs, events, dates, and people who 
capture our political imagination; the patterns and structures of civil society; 
the vocabularies of political analysis and polemic; the ‘national fantasies’ 
that ‘circulate through personal/collective consciousness’—all these and 
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more constitute a cultural inheritance that the demos did not choose (Markell, 
2000, p. 52).  
 
As a result, the new post-national identity will become similar to the traditional one, 
in the sense that it will also contribute to irrational exclusion on the basis of the 
endorsement of a particular political culture, et cetera, and hostility towards 
perceived outsiders. In contrast, more consistent with the rationale of communicative 
action as Habermas conceived it in his earlier career is the depiction of an open-
ended deliberative procedure that resists the very identification upon which it is 
based (Markell, 2000, p. 40). In agreement with Markell, Omid Shabani endorses a 
similar interpretation of a communicative action that rejects affective identification. 
As he claims,  
 
The traditional sense of belonging constitutes a fixed concept of identity that 
is centred on a national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious feature as the 
common denominator of political association, while the very point of 
continuous deliberation is to revise and renew the political bond of unity. 
From this perspective, therefore, constitutional patriotism need not be seen 
as what replaces conventional identity with post-conventional identity, but 
what, in fact, in continuity with the diversity and pluralism of our time, 
resists creating a fixed identity altogether (Shabani, 2002, p. 441). 
 
Lacroix, Markell and Shabani share the conviction that, once legally institutionalised, 
communicative action could without fail develop a sense of solidarity among citizens 
at any level. Lacroix is most explicit about this belief when she argues that the point 
of a deliberative process at the European level is to arrive at a common 
understanding, regardless of the differences between EU citizens. Markell and 
Shabani are more modest in this respect, as they merely place more priority on the 
continuing resistance against a fixed identification over the confirmation of the 
shared normative understandings. In this light, Habermas seems to hold a different 
view to Lacroix, Markell and Shabani because he believes that the stability of the 
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democratic institutions at the European level hangs on the discovery and 
preservation of shared European values among people from different member states. 
In a sense, Habermas considers it important to respect the affective identification 
among citizens of the same nation-state and aims to merely expand this particular 
identification at the EU level through developing sufficient cultural commonalities. 
Pace Lacroix, Markell and Shabani, I will show that there is no inconsistency 
between Habermas’s conception of communicative action and his prescription for 
the European Union, because the stability of a shared lifeworld among the EU 
citizens requires an affective identification among these citizens that could only be 
provided by sufficient cultural commonalities.  
 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action facilitates ‘a self-controlled 
learning process’ enabling citizens to negotiate different interpretations of the 
external world on the basis of validity claims through the ‘unforced agreement of all 
those involved’ as free and equal moral agents (Habermas, 1991, p. 186). This self-
controlled learning process will in the long term resemble what Habermas calls a 
‘social evolution’ that advances our understanding of the external world through the 
fallible approximation of truth within specific contexts. According to Klaus Eder’s 
understanding of communicative action, Habermas develops this conception in order 
to transform separate individual learning processes into a collective learning process 
involving the society as a whole through a particular use of language (Eder, 2007, p. 
401). During the collective learning process, communicative action has to rely on a 
shared normative background, which Habermas calls a ‘lifeworld.’ As I discussed at 
length in Chapter 3, lifeworld serves as the shared normative background among 
interlocutors against which all validity claims can be evaluated. Through every 
successful communicative action, new normative understandings about the external 
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world would be incorporated into the lifeworld, and interlocutors would form a more 
complex interpersonal relationship. In a way, the expansion of interpersonal 
relationships is closely related to the enriched lifeworld. In Habermas’s words, 
‘language itself supplies the primary source of social integration’ (Habermas, 1996, 
p. 18). This means that the normative understanding about the external world is 
particular to the group of interlocutors who actually participate in a communicative 
action in order to negotiate their different interpretations. Hence, when a societal-
level communicative action is at stake, it is easy to picture a clash between different 
groups of citizens who hold different lifeworlds and nonetheless presume that their 
own lifeworlds are already shared among all the citizens, insofar as the scale of this 
communicative action is extremely large.  
 
The inevitable clash between different lifeworlds in the process of transforming 
individual learning processes to collective ones at the societal level implies that the 
lifeworld shared by a certain group of interlocutors has to open itself to contestation 
and then, equally importantly, close for stability. It needs to open to contestation 
because, starting from the individual level, a lifeworld has to be continually enriched 
in order to be shared collectively among the whole society, thereby cementing the 
interpersonal relationships among citizens. On the other hand, it has to close again 
once the scale of communicative action has reached the societal level in order to 
have any validity at all among all citizens. As Habermas explains,  
 
What lends (lifeworld) its peculiar stability and first immunises it against the 
pressure of contingency-generating experiences is its unique levelling out of 
the tension between facticity and validity: the counterfactual moment of 
idealisation, which always overshoots the given and first makes a 
disappointing confrontation with reality possible, is extinguished in the 
dimension of validity itself. At the same time, the validity dimension, from 
which implicit knowledge acquires the intuitive force of convictions, 
remains intact as such (Habermas, 1996, p. 23). 
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In Habermas’s theory, facticity refers to the authoritative status of norms and values 
that it expects citizens within society to obey, whereas validity refers to the 
legitimacy of norms and values that could only be established through 
communicative action. As a shared normative background, lifeworld has to have 
authoritative status in order to serve as a settled and unquestionable source of 
knowledge for interlocutors. At the same time, as a normative construct it has to be 
open to contestation. The seemingly paradoxical character of a shared lifeworld 
makes sense if we accept Habermas’s claim that the facticity aspect of a lifeworld 
would remain intact until some problematic aspects of its validity are thematised and 
contested by interlocutors. What is more important, the lifeworld will return to its 
originally authoritative status once the contestation is resolved. Therefore, 
contestation and stability are both significant halves of the nature of a lifeworld and 
neither could exist independently of the other.  
 
Therefore, Habermas’s prescription for the European Union is consistent with the 
abovementioned fact that a communicative action needs to open to contestation and 
close for stability. In The Crisis of the European Union (2012), Habermas suggests 
that the European Union is currently in crisis because of the member states’ 
reluctance to further institutionalise democracy and reinforce a supranational legal 
system at the EU level. As he argues,  
 
Given the unprecedented gravity of the problems, one would expect the 
politicians to lay the European cards on the table without further delay and 
to take the initiative in explaining to the public the relation between the 
short-term costs and the true benefits, and hence the historical importance of 
the European project. In order to do so, they would have to overcome their 
fear of shifting public moods as measured by opinion polls and rely on the 
persuasive power of good arguments (Habermas, 2012, p. 6). 
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In order to persuade those sceptical of the European project, he rests its viability on 
two pillars: (1) the civilising power of the law and (2) the mutual trust supplied by 
common European values. First, in response to the objection that there is no 
European demos supporting the further institutionalisation of democracy, Habermas 
suggests that domestically ‘juridification develops not only a rationalising but also a 
civilizing force insofar as it divests state violence of its authoritarian character and 
thereby transforms the character of the political as such’ (Habermas, 2012, p. 8). 
Internationally, ‘by curbing the anarchic competition for power and promoting 
international cooperation, this pacification also makes it possible to establish new 
supranational procedures and institutions for political negotiation and decision-
making’ (Habermas, 2012, p. 10). Second, Habermas also claims in The 
Postnational Constellation (2001) that, in order to cement a sense of solidarity, the 
European Union has to rely on common values among different peoples. This sense 
of solidarity is indispensable to the integration of the institutions in their economic, 
political aspects, et cetera. As Habermas says, 
 
If Europe is to be able to act on the basis of an integrated, multilevel policy, 
then European citizens, who are initially characterised as such only by their 
common passports, will have to learn to mutually recognise one another as 
members of a common political existence beyond national borders. They 
must not ‘suspect members of other European nations of ‘unreasonable’ 
harm to ‘our’ interests,’ whether measured ‘by intention or result’ 
(Habermas, 2001, p. 99). 
 
In order to instil a sense of solidarity among the citizens of Europe, Habermas relies 
on a collective learning process at the EU level in order to create a new locus of 
identification beyond member states through discussing the legitimacy of common 
European issues in the formal and the informal public spheres. During this process, 
the lifeworlds of the different peoples need to open to contestation so as to 
incorporate new normative understandings about supranational institutions and, 
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equally importantly, close again for the stability of a shared normative background 
among citizens. This newly expanded lifeworld shared among European people will 
‘encompass a series of specifically European experiences,’ and consist primarily in 
‘an egalitarian universalism that can ease the transition to post-national democracy’s 
demanding contexts of mutual recognition for all of us—we, the sons, daughters, and 
grandchildren of a barbaric nationalism’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 103).  
 
Hence, it seems that the need for a shared lifeworld to open to contestation will 
naturally end in the necessity of closing it again for stability. As I suggested above, 
the stability of the legally institutionalised communicative action cannot be taken for 
granted, for it can only be supplied by a sufficient number of cultural commonalities 
among interlocutors. Insofar as the closure of a shared lifeworld is necessary for it to 
serve as a settled and unquestionable normative background, the possibility of 
contestation over the contents of a shared lifeworld is also based on its closure. 
Lacroix, Markel and Shabani essentially see a conflict between the two pillars of 
Habermas’s European project; that is, between the civilising power of the EU legal 
system and the common EU values. As previously discussed, they err in presuming 
that a legally institutionalised communicative action could in and by itself instil a 
sense of solidarity among the EU citizens. Nevertheless, to even begin to start the 
deliberative process, EU citizens require a sufficient number of cultural 
commonalities so as to mutually trust each other enough to submit to a set of 
common EU democratic institutions. At the initial stage, citizens should aim to 
discover whatever cultural commonalities are contained in their shared lifeworld, 
drawing on ‘a series of specifically European experiences.’ Even if there is a well-
supported deliberative democracy in place at the EU level, the public deliberation 
cannot perpetually expose the shared lifeworld to contestation without closing it for 
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stability when there is no longer any valid claim raised against it. In a word, contra 
Lacroix et al., I have demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action and his proposal of discovering 
common European values for the European Union. 
 
Since Habermas does not risk causing his theory of communicative action to become 
internally inconsistent by endorsing the purposeful discovery of common European 
values, he must viably hold a different view of political emotions than Lacroix et al. 
In contrast to the latter, he allows the affective identification among citizens within 
the same nation-state to bear on his moral reasoning about the possibility of further 
institutionalising the democratic decision-making process at the EU level, because 
there will be no need to purposefully discover already existing common European 
values if political emotions are so malleable that they can be easily transformed from 
nationalist sentiments into supranational solidarities. Habermas recognises that the 
democratic institutions at the EU level rely on a shared lifeworld among the EU 
citizens to help them comprehend each other’s validity claims in the deliberative 
process, and at the same time cement a sense of solidarity among them. Moreover, 
the shared lifeworld requires a sufficient number of cultural commonalities among 
the EU citizens so as to be stabilised in the face of potential contestation. Therefore, 
once institutionalised at the EU level, a communicative action cannot be constantly 
open to contestation without at the same time purposefully discovering and 
preserving the cultural commonalities among the EU citizens. In a sense, Habermas 
considers it important to respect the nationalist sentiments within nation-states and 
proposes to employ a similar mechanism to generate a sense of solidarity at the EU 
level; that is, by developing shared European cultural values. 
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2. Examining the Liberal Multiculturalist Interpretations of 
Communicative Action 
 
In this section, I will examine liberal multiculturalist interpretations of 
communicative action that prioritise rational argumentation over emotional 
expression. I will firstly introduce Young’s critique of Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action in terms of its inability to accommodate different social 
perspectives concerning common social issues because communicative action is a 
type of language use a cultural majority imposes upon the whole society, thereby 
silencing other language uses. Then, I will demonstrate that the problem boils down 
to the equivocation of the illocution/rational argumentation with the communicative 
action on the one hand and the equivocation of the perlocution/emotional expression 
with the strategic action on the other. Pace the liberal multiculturalists like Young, I 
will show that in his later works, Habermas continuously downplays the importance 
of the illocutionary and the perlocutionary aspects of language use and believes 
communicative action to be the universal mode of human communication. These two 
concomitant moves nullify Young’s equivocation of illocution with communicative 
action and perlocution with strategic action, which means that communicative action 
could accommodate both rational argumentation and emotional expression. 
 
To begin with the critique of Habermas’s conception of communicative action in 
terms of its inability to tolerate different views of social issues, Iris Marion Young 
charges that communicative action privileges rational argumentation over other more 
emotionally charged modes of communication and, as a result, commits an act of 
injustice against the social minorities who are unable to share their life experiences 
through rational argumentation. She argues that there are three reasons why it is not 
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desirable for theorists to privilege rational argumentation over emotional expression. 
First, ‘given the heterogeneity of human life and the complexity of social structures 
and interaction…the effort to shape arguments according to shared premises within 
shared discursive frameworks sometimes excludes the expression of some needs, 
interests, and suffering of injustice, because these cannot be voiced with the 
operative premises and frameworks’ (Young, 2000, p. 37). Second, even if there are 
shared premises among the deliberators, arguments will privilege ‘the modes of 
expression more typical of highly educated people.’ For instance,  
 
Spoken expression that follows the structure of well-formed written speech 
is privileged over other modes. Speech or writing framed as straightforward 
assertion is privileged over more circuitous, hesitant, or questioning 
expression. The norms of deliberation also often privilege speech that is 
formal and general. They value expression that proceeds from premises to 
conclusion in an orderly fashion, formulating general principles and 
applying them to particular cases (Young, 2000, p. 38). 
 
Third, insofar as the ‘emotional and figurative expressions are important tools of 
reasonable persuasion and judgement,’ public deliberation that makes a clear 
distinction between rational arguments and emotional expression is not satisfactory 
(Young, 2000, p. 39).  
 
Prioritising rational argumentation over emotional expression commits an act of 
injustice towards social minorities in the form of an ‘internal exclusion,’ insofar as 
‘they concern ways that people lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking 
of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-making’ 
(Young, 2000, p. 55). Young seems to think that there is a close affinity between 
Lyotard’s notion of a differénd and her notion of an internal exclusion, in the sense 
that they both denote a situation in which a unitary language is imposed upon the 
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whole society and is biased towards a certain section of the population. She cites 
Lyotard in explaining the term:  
 
(The differénd is) the case where the plaintiff is divested of the means to 
argue and becomes for that reason a victim. If the addressor, and addressee, 
and the sense of the testimony are neutralised, everything takes place as if 
there were no damages. A case of differénd between two parties takes place 
where the ‘regulation’ of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom 
of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in 
that idiom (Lyotard, 1988, p. 9; cited by Young, 2000, p. 37). 
 
In this light, Habermas proposes the imposition of a unitary language—that is, 
communicative action—upon the whole society and, in effect, silences all other 
modes of language use. Habermas distinguishes rational argumentation from 
emotional expression by making a distinction between the illocutionary and the 
perlocutionary aspects of language use. As Young explains, ‘the illocutionary 
component of a speech act…is the performative force with which the locution is 
uttered...The perlocution aspect of a proposition is its effect on the hearer.’ The 
illocution is associated with communicative action oriented towards reaching 
agreement, whereas the perlocution aims to further personal interests. By making 
this ‘arbitrary’ distinction between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary aspects 
of language use, illocution based on rational argumentation is correlated with the 
unitary language—communicative action—that is to be imposed on the whole 
society. In contrast, the perlocution is correlated with strategic action that is to be 
discouraged and, as such, it eliminates emotional expression as a different mode of 
communication than rational argumentation in public deliberation. Hence, Habermas 
commits an act of injustice in the form of internal exclusion, insofar as he deprives 
social minorities of an alternative way of using rational argumentation to influence 
public deliberation (Young, 2000, p. 63- 4).  
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In agreement with Young, Roger Foster argues that, by prioritising rational 
argumentation, Habermas’s conception of communicative action tends to neglect the 
possibility of a differénd. First and foremost, Foster makes a contrast between 
Habermas’s notion of communicative action and Lyotard’s conception of differénd. 
According to him, ‘In contrast to Habermas, who conceives justice as speaking the 
language of communicative speech, for Lyotard, justice is the site of a judgement 
outside of the rules of any particular form of discourse, a judgement which separates 
spheres of competence’ (Foster, 1999, p. 93). Foster’s reading, then, depicts Lyotard 
as aiming to expose the unjust situation in which the heterogeneous language 
discourses are forced to speak a common mode of language. As he explains, 
‘Forcing a form of discourse to speak the language of a form of discourse 
incommensurable with it constitutes, for Lyotard, a primary case of injustice. Thus 
the issue is whether a unity can be forged that does not result in the silencing of the 
heterogeneous’ (Foster, 1999, p. 92). Furthermore, in order to achieve this end, 
‘Lyotard lays out the task of the philosopher as reflective judge by means of the 
metaphor of the archipelago, conceived as a representation of the heterogeneous 
forms of discourse’ (Foster, 1999, p. 92). Essentially, the idea is that philosophers, as 
impartial and reflective judges, observe different genres of discourse and try to 
determine how to match the common subject matters of discourse with the 
appropriate genres of language. Therefore, Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action cannot accommodate the uncertain moment when a particular 
mode of language use to approach the subject matter is chosen, because he insists on 
a unified conception of language use on the basis of validity claims. Foster argues,  
 
Lyotard’s critique points to the way in which argumentation, as the scene of 
the discursive redemption of validity claims, separates truth from any 
relation to donation—the free giving of what is other than thought, and 
which opens the very possibility of thought. There occurs what Lyotard 
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refers to as the conceptualisation of space-time because the rules of 
argumentation determine in advance how the given is to be incorporated 
(Foster, 1999, p. 98). 
 
Hence, to Foster, Lyotard’s conception of differénd serves as a critique of 
Habermas’s notion of communicative action, in the sense that the latter aims to 
impose a unified mode of language use upon all the interlocutors without proper 
attention to the heterogeneous genres of discourses that should be matched with 
different subject matters in specific contexts. This is similar to Young’s discussion, 
insofar as they both believe that Habermas’s notion of communicative action as a 
particular theory of language eliminates the possibility of finding various different 
approaches to discourses. Nevertheless, Young and Foster’s arguments only obtain if, 
and only if, Habermas’s conception of communicative action actually imposes a 
unitary language use that ignores the multiple genres of discourses particular to 
specific cultural communities. In the following, I will show that communicative 
action is founded on a set of liberal values that cannot be expected to win the 
acceptance of all cultural communities within society because they hold different 
standards of rationality. In this sense, communicative action does impose a unitary 
language use upon the whole society, and so potentially causes an internal exclusion 
of social minorities. 
 
Habermas’s conception of legally institutionalised communicative action aims to 
legitimate the legal order through the justification of validity claims among all 
citizens on an equal footing. The central principle supporting such a conception is 
what Habermas calls ‘the principle of democracy,’ which says, ‘only those statutes 
may claim legitimacy (legitime Geltung) that can meet with the assent of all citizens 
in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted’ 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 121). Since a legally institutionalised communicative action is 
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the direct application of communicative action in general to the political arena, the 
principle of democracy ‘derives from the interpenetration of the principle of 
discourse and the legal form’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 122- 3). This more general 
principle of discourse derives directly from the presuppositions of a language use 
oriented towards reaching agreements and is operative in all types of practical 
discourses. As James Finlayson and Gabian Freyenhagen explain, the principle of 
discourse ‘spells out a necessary condition of the validity of action-norms in 
general—that is, political, legal and moral norms. It is supposed to be ‘neutral’ or 
‘initially indifferent vis-à-vis morality and law’’ (Finlayson & Freyenhagen, 2011, p. 
9). In a word, to Habermas, the presuppositions of language use oriented towards 
reaching agreement give rise to the principle of discourse which is legally 
institutionalised at the societal level in the form of the principle of democracy. This 
supposedly neutral principle of discourse, therefore, governs the justification of all 
legal rules within society among all citizens on the basis of validity claims.  
 
Habermas seems to think that the principle of discourse/democracy could remain 
culturally neutral, because its weak transcendental status secures only the 
unavoidable presuppositions of language use oriented towards reaching agreements. 
As Joseph Heath observes,  
 
(To Habermas) certain principles of rationality have a transcendental status 
for us, because they are necessary presuppositions for the interpretation of 
speech, and speech is unavoidable insofar as we depend upon language for 
certain higher cognitive competences. The transcendental claim as a whole 
is weak because there is no reason, in principle, that some other creature 
might not come along with a form of cognition or speech that is radically 
different from our own, and so not subject to such constraints (Heath, 2011, 
p. 123). 
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In other words, despite the fact that the presuppositions of a language use oriented 
towards reaching agreement are fallible, the principle securing these unavoidable 
presuppositions will remain in place as constraints on all discursive practices so long 
as no new empirical evidence arises to disprove their validity. Therefore,  
 
The transcendental status…is not intended as a justification of that principle, 
it merely explains why principles such as this seem to recur in every major 
human culture and religious tradition. If it turns out to be less than 
universal…then that would constitute fairly good evidence that the 
supposedly unavoidable underlying presuppositions are not in fact all that 
unavoidable (Heath, 2011, p. 124- 5).  
 
This means that until we find some cultural communities holding a radically 
different mode of language use which rejects Habermas’s principle of discourse, we 
could reasonably assume that it is inherent to all language uses. Additionally, 
Habermas claims that there is a sense of inevitability in the gradual evolution of the 
human race as a whole towards the formalism of law and in morality, because this 
social evolution ‘responds to anthropologically deep-seated features of the human 
species’ (Heath, 2011, p. 126). This claim essentially stresses the relatively low 
probability of ever disproving the validity of the principle of discourse, insofar as all 
cultural communities are anyway driven by human nature to endorse it in the long 
run.  
 
In a sense, given the supposedly low probability of disproving the unavoidable 
presuppositions of a language use oriented towards reaching agreements, ‘the best 
way to situate Habermas’s claim for weak transcendental status for his principles is 
to see it as establishing a boundary on the scope of reasonable pluralism’ (Heath, 
2011, p. 126- 7). Insofar as the people rejecting the principle of discourse are not 
only advancing validity claims against some fallible normative values but also 
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disputing a principle supported by rock-bottom, anthropologically proven human 
nature, they would fall outside of the scope of the cultural pluralism to be tolerated 
as reasonable. 
 
Nevertheless, Rawls argues that no political theory can be purely procedural, and 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action actually carries with it normative 
presuppositions that cannot be seen as value-neutral. On top of the fact that a legally 
institutionalised communicative action has to fulfil citizens’ generalisable interests—
a normative requirement in itself—there are five values embodied by the procedure, 
including impartiality and equality, openness and lack of coercion and unanimity. If 
this is the case, the presuppositions of language use oriented towards reaching 
agreements cannot be seen as neutral, insofar as ‘any of (the) five values are related 
to substantive judgments once the reason those values are included as part of the 
procedure is that they are necessary to render the outcomes just or reasonable. In that 
case, we have shaped the procedure to accord with our judgment of those outcomes’ 
(Rawls, 2011, p. 85).  
 
Even though Rawls is right to point out that Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action is not purely procedural, depending as it does on substantive 
contents, the crucial question, as James Gledhill suggests, is,  ‘whether the 
substantive content of normative procedures requires regulation by substantive 
principles or whether such substantive principles are implicit within the procedures 
of moral discourse and democratic procedures of the public use of reason’ (Gledhill, 
2011, p. 185). In other words, do the five values mentioned by Rawls actually 
govern communicative action as an imposition from outside the procedure itself? In 
other words, if these substantive values are presupposed by the very design of the 
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procedure, then the procedure does not count as substantive. To mitigate Rawls’s 
critique, Gledhill points out that a legally institutionalised communicative action is 
based on popular sovereignty—a democratic value already widely shared by the 
citizens in liberal countries. As he says, 
 
Habermas argues that the idea of citizens giving themselves laws, which is 
explicated in constitutional principles and a system of rights, ‘already 
contains as a doctrinal core the (Rousseauian-Kantian) idea of the self-
legislation of voluntarily associated citizens who are both free and equal.’ 
This can be ‘fully developed in the course of constitution-making processes 
that are not based on the previous choice of substantive values, but rather on 
democratic procedures’ (Gledhill, 2011, p. 195). 
 
Therefore, Gledhill seems to suggest that the five abovementioned values are not an 
imposition from outside of communicative action, since they are already necessarily 
presupposed by the idea of popular sovereignty. Alternatively, any theory of 
democratic procedure cannot avoid making these presuppositions, even though they 
are substantive, insofar as the democratic procedure tout court does not make sense 
without these embedded substantive values. I agree with Gledhill that Rawls’s 
criticism of communicative action on the basis of the supposedly grounding relation 
between the discursive procedure and the substantive principles produced is a bit 
hasty, since the procedure is grounded in widely acceptable democratic values alone, 
rather than by any substantive principle for judging the justness of the outcomes.  
 
However, insofar as Gledhill proves that communicative action is based on nothing 
but the democratic values already acceptable to the citizens within liberal societies, 
he conveniently neglects the impact of democratic procedure on the various 
minorities whose cultural values are in greater or lesser confrontation with the 
democratic political culture. Since these liberal values are imposed upon the whole 
society in the form of a unitary language for public deliberation, they are likely to 
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constrain the ways in which the illiberal minority cultures could flourish and 
influence policy outcomes. As Baumeister shows, from Habermas’s perspective, 
‘religious worldviews must differentiate themselves from the wider political 
community and must, from within their own worldview, develop the normative 
principles of the secular society that enable them to recognise why they ‘may realise 
that ethos inscribed in that view only within the limits of what everyone is allowed to 
do and to pursue’’ (Baumeister, 2007, p. 492). Provided that illiberal cultures, 
including some religious doctrines, are willing to subject themselves to revision 
under liberal values, it is highly doubtful that this revision will leave intact much of 
the substance that enables these cultures to claim universal validity among their 
members, insofar as some of their fundamental doctrinal cores are not allowed to 
‘shape the agendas and negotiations within political institutions and the broader 
political process that determines what the benefits and burdens of citizenship are’ 
(Baumeister, 2007, p. 494). In this light, it is doubtful that Habermas’s conception of 
legally institutionalised communicative action will actually gain genuine acceptance 
among illiberal minority cultural communities. According to Catherine Audard, ‘to 
ask, as Habermas does, for civic friendship, not simply toleration and coexistence on 
the basis of reciprocity and civility, is to ask too much from the use of public reason 
and fails to respect the separate identities of religious and nonreligious citizens alike’ 
(Audard, 2011, p. 243- 4). She goes as far as to conclude,  
 
There is no reason for any religion to accept what Habermas describes as a 
necessary adaptation to modernity, which is very different from and goes 
much beyond the demands of the rule of law… (For) the coercive power of 
the Habermasian state will not stop at enforcing legislation, it will try to 
conquer the ‘hearts and minds’ of religious citizens too. This is the danger of 
giving the law a normative content, as Habermas does, even if mitigated 
through the appeal to communicative morality (Audard, 2011, p. 244). 
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Hence, it seems that the liberal values embedded in communicative action do impose 
those normative constraints within which cultural values are to be tolerated and are 
therefore likely to create friction between liberal and illiberal cultural communities. 
The normative constraints imposed by the liberal values embedded in 
communicative action appear even more alienating to the social minorities, given 
that these constraints are not readily open to contestation, since they secure the 
unavoidable presuppositions of a language use oriented towards reaching agreement. 
As Lasse Thomassen observes, the justification for the limits of the tolerance of 
cultural values within liberal societies is carried out independently of actual public 
deliberation. According to her, ‘Habermas argues that those affected by the norms of 
tolerance including the threshold of tolerance must also agree to them, although he is 
not explicit as to who has to enter into dialogue and potentially agree.’ This is 
probably because ‘not only does tolerance require intolerance (of illiberal cultural 
values), the justification of the limit between tolerance and intolerance requires 
certain conditions and exclusions—that is, intolerance—to be set down in advance 
and beyond the reach of the justificatory discourse’ (Thomassen, 2006, p. 448).  
 
At this point, I wish to draw our attention to the beginning of this section. There, I 
established that the priority of rational argumentation over emotional expression 
tends to preclude minorities from exerting equal influence over the deliberative 
process, insofar as a unitary use of language based on validity claims might not be of 
use to minorities in accurately describing their life experiences. Now, since it is 
demonstrated that Habermas’s conception of communicative action does embody 
historically specific liberal values which are not likely to agree with the standards of 
rationality of some minorities within society, it makes sense to return to Young’s 
discussion of Lyotard’s differénd. The differénd denotes a situation in which some 
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social groups are deprived of equal opportunity to influence the deliberative process, 
because a unitary use of language is imposed on the society as a whole, regardless of 
the subject matter at hand.  
 
Young seems to suggest that incorporating emotional expression into Habermas’s 
conception of a communicative action could remedy the problem with the differénd. 
As she emphasises, ‘the purpose of theorising these (affective) modes of political 
communication is to add to, rather than replace, theorising that emphasises the role 
of argument’ (Young, 2000, p. 57). These new affective modes of political 
communication include greeting, as well as the affirmative uses of rhetoric and 
narratives. First, ‘greeting’ is defined by Young as the explicit recognition of the co-
deliberators’ equal status, which involves literal greeting, addressing people by name, 
leave-taking, the mild forms of flattery and various gestures (Young, 2000, p. 58). 
As Young says, ‘I refer to Levinas’s theory of speech and the ethical relation 
because I agree with Jurgen Habermas that a theory of communicative democracy 
should be grounded in everyday communicative ethics. ‘In my opinion Levinas’s 
account of the ‘Moment of Saying’ can supplement Habermas’s account of the Said’ 
(Young, 2000, p. 59). Second, rhetoric ‘refers to the various ways something can be 
said, which colour and condition its substantive content.’ It includes the following 
aspects of communication: (1) ‘emotional tone of the discourse,’ (2) ‘the use in 
discourse of figures of speech,’ (3) ‘forms of making a point that do not only involve 
speech,’ and, (4) ‘attention to the particular audience of one’s communication, and 
orienting one’s claims and arguments to the particular assumptions, history, and 
idioms of that audience’ (Young, 2000, p. 65). Rhetoric supplements rational 
argumentation, insofar as it (1) ‘help(s) to get an issue on the agenda for 
deliberation,’ (2) ‘fashions claims and arguments in ways appropriate to a particular 
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public in a particular situation,’ and, (3) ‘helps make possible the move from 
thinking to committed action’ (Young, 2000, p. 66, 67, 68). Lastly, narrative is a 
form of storytelling that aims to demonstrate, describe, explain or justify something 
to others in an ongoing political discussion. As Young claims,  
 
(Sometimes) participants in a political public do not have sufficiently shared 
understandings to fashion a set of arguments with shared premises, or appeal 
to shared experiences and values…In such situations arguments alone will 
do little to allow public voice for those excluded from the 
discourse…narrative…serves important functions in democratic 
communication, to foster understanding among members of a polity with 
very different experience or assumptions about what is important (Young, 
2000, p. 70- 1). 
 
In this light, narrative serves to remedy rational argumentation in the following 
senses: (1) ‘response to the differénd,  (2) ‘facilitation of local publics and 
articulation of collective affinities,’ (3) ‘understanding the experience of others and 
countering preunderstandings,’ (4) ‘revealing the source of values, priorities, or 
cultural meanings,’ and, (5) ‘aid in constituting the social knowledge that enlarges 
thought’ (Young, 2000, p. 72-7).  
 
From my perspective, greetings, rhetoric and narrative all aim to counterbalance the 
bias of a unitary language of rational argumentation towards cultural majorities 
within society, insofar as they aim to make the unitary language more sensitive to the 
life experiences of minorities through incorporating emotional expression into 
rational argumentation. Greetings reaffirm the equal status of minorities; rhetoric 
shapes rational argumentation in light of minorities’ life experiences; narrative 
accurately describes minorities’ life experiences. In this light, I agree with Young’s 
proposal to the extent that Habermas should place more emphasis on arriving at an 
accurate depiction of minorities’ life experiences through emotional expression, 
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since his conception of communicative action seems to presuppose the neutrality of 
its underlying unavoidable presuppositions.  
 
In order for communicative action to incorporate emotional expression, Habermas 
nonetheless has to do away with the arbitrary distinction between illocution and 
perlocution because, according to Young, the distinction equivocates emotional 
expression with strategic action, which is to be excluded from public deliberation. 
As Young argues, ‘the illocutionary component of a speech act…is the performative 
force with which the locution is uttered...The perlocution aspect of a proposition is 
its effect on the hearer.’ Illocution is associated with communicative action oriented 
towards reaching agreement, whereas perlocution with strategic action aims to 
further personal interests (Young, 2000, p. 63-4). This equivocation may obtain in 
Habermas’s earliest work, A Theory of Communicative Action (1984), which Young 
cites as the only reference to reinforce her conclusion. Since then, Habermas must 
have also realised the problem Young points out and its implications for his 
conception of communicative action, because he subsequently downplayed the 
importance of the distinction between illocution and perlocution in his later works. 
For instance, in Between Facts and Norms (1997), the concept of perlocution is not 
mentioned once. This move is coupled with Habermas’s insistence that 
communicative action is the universal mode of human communication. According to 
James Johnson, in Habermas’s conception of communicative action, raising validity 
claims so as to establish an interpersonal relationship is the universal rationale of 
human communication, which makes even strategic action a distorted form of 
language use parasitic on communicative action. In other words, in order to carry out 
any human communication at all, including strategic action that aims strictly to 
further personal interests, interlocutors have to at least pretend to submit to the 
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rationale of raising justifiable validity claims (Johnson, 1991, p. 191-2). Hence, these 
two concomitant moves on Habermas’s part serve to define the distinction between 
communicative and strategic actions on a basis other than the distinction between the 
illocutionary and the perlocutionary aspects of language use. In other words, the 
illocutionary aspect of language use that aims to establish new interpersonal 
relationships no longer distinguishes communicative from strategic action.  
 
Instead, what distinguishes a communicative action from a strategic one is the 
orientation towards reaching agreement among the interlocutors. Recall that 
communicative action occurs when ‘actors in the roles of speaker and hearer attempt 
to negotiate interpretations of the situation at hand and to harmonise their respective 
plans with one another through the unrestrained pursuit of illocutionary goals.’ In 
comparison, strategic action occurs when ‘language is used only as medium for 
transmitting information, (and) action coordination proceeds through the mutual 
influence that actors exert on each other in a purposive-rational manner’ (Habermas, 
1996, p. 18). Apparently, the attempt to ‘harmonise their respective plans with one 
another’ distinguishes communicative action from strategic action that ‘is used only 
as medium for transmitting information,’ rather than the language use itself. This 
means that the interlocutors aiming to pursue personal interests could just as easily 
manipulate the raising of validity claims in strategic action as the interlocutors 
aiming to reach agreements utilise them in communicative action, because illocution 
based on raising validity claims is an inevitable part of both communicative and 
strategic actions. In this light, by extension, Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action could be receptive to emotional expression, insofar as 
emotional expression, like the raising of validity claims, is only a means to a 
different end—be it to reach agreement or further personal interests. It is obvious 
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that interlocutors could adopt emotional expression to better shape their validity 
claims so as to accurately convey their own life experiences in communicative action, 
as long as they aim to reach an agreement rather than further personal interests. 
Hence, communicative action could allow political emotions to bear on our moral 
reasoning about political principles and social institutions, in the sense that 
emotional expression is an alternative mode of communication to rational 
argumentation in Habermas’s theoretical framework. 
 
3. Communicative action as a solution to the deficiency of Miller’s 
approach to political theory 
 
So far, I have demonstrated that Habermas could allow political emotions to bear on 
our moral reasoning about political principles and social institutions in two senses. 
Firstly, as discussed in section 1, Habermas requires a sufficient level of affective 
identification among citizens to support the legally institutionalised communicative 
action. Contrary to the interpretations of constitutional patriots such as Lacroix, 
Markell and Shabani, Habermas’s conception of communicative action relies on a 
shared lifeworld that has to open to contestation and, equally importantly, close for 
its own stability. Without this closure, a shared lifeworld cannot continue to serve as 
a settled and unquestionable normative background for citizens, which will 
undermine the affective identification among them, because the establishment of 
particular interpersonal relationships among citizens is inextricably linked to the 
normative consensus produced through communicative action. Secondly, as 
discussed in section 2, Young is correct to argue that Habermas requires emotional 
expression as an alternative mode of communication to rational argumentation in 
order to counterbalance the negative impact of a unitary language use on social 
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minorities’ opportunity to influence public deliberation. This problem is reversed if 
we recognise that Habermas’s distinction between communicative and strategic 
action is primarily defined on the ground that the former is oriented towards reaching 
agreement and the latter towards pursuing personal interests. In this sense, both 
rational argumentation and emotional expression could be adopted in communicative 
action, as long as interlocutors aim to reach agreement among themselves. 
 
The two senses in which communicative action could allow political emotions to 
bear on our moral reasoning are both consistent with the importance of a common 
nationality and reflective of the problem with Miller’s account of the nation-building 
process. On the one hand, as discussed in Chapter 3, I demonstrated that Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action requires the motivational force of a common 
nationality to explicate citizens’ motivation to support the law-making process. This 
is because a political-cultural collective self-understanding and a thin political 
culture draw on a very limited reservoir of cultural values that aim to validate the 
law-making process at the political level. As such, they cannot help citizens 
comprehend the political-cultural convictions about a legally institutionalised 
communicative action, since there will always be a gap between the existing political 
culture and the new political one that aims to validate the said law-making process. 
Miller’s notion of a common nationality draws on a more widely encompassing pre-
political cultural background that could fill the gap between the existing and the new 
political cultures, so that citizens could see the new political culture as something 
different yet reflective of the already widely accepted pre-political cultural values. 
Given that Habermas is quite ambiguous about the boundary between political and 
pre-political cultural values, talking about the inevitable ‘ethical permeation’ of 
political culture by a pre-political one, the development of a common nationality 
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could be thought of as part of the ethical-political discourse that aims to clarify the 
political-cultural self-understanding of citizens. Insofar as the boundary of Miller’s 
public culture could only be determined in public deliberation, my line of reasoning 
aims merely to challenge the limited scope of Habermas’s notion of political culture 
as centring on the validation of a legally institutionalised communicative action 
rather than the concept itself. In this sense, Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action is consistent with the importance of a common nationality. 
 
On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 4, I demonstrated that Miller’s account of 
the process of nation-building fails to clarify the way in which citizens could 
challenge the existing common nationality without understanding ex ante the 
distinction between public and private cultures. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
this problem could be further traced back to Miller’s approach to political theory in 
general. Miller’s methodological commitment to capturing common moral intuitions 
and political emotions lacks clear guidelines for selecting and assigning moral 
weight to these factors in moral reasoning. This negatively affects his account of 
deliberative democracy as an indispensable means to nation-building because he 
cannot explain how citizens could come to adopt the same approach to selecting 
those common moral intuitions and political emotions relevant to the task at hand. 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action helps Miller to remedy this failure 
in the sense that citizens would be able to give an account of the approach to 
common moral intuitions and political emotions and arrive at a shared approach 
through communication in a legally institutionalised communicative action. In this 
light, the development of a common nationality could be understood as a collective 
learning process in which citizens would gradually transform their own 
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interpretations of a common nationality and reach a context-specific consensus 
through communication based on raising justifiable validity claims. 
 
Political emotions, in my reconstruction of Miller’s account of deliberative 
democracy, play two roles at the same time. First, political emotion as supplied by 
cultural commonalities motivates citizens to support all major social institutions by 
instilling a sense of solidarity in them. This is true for both Miller and Habermas, in 
the sense that a feeling of solidarity is instilled by a sufficient number of cultural 
commonalities simultaneously, and in turn supports a functioning deliberative 
democracy, even though, Miller focuses on the importance of solidarity for all social 
institutions rather than deliberative democracy alone, and he broadens the scope of 
the common cultural values beyond the thin normative understanding about the 
validity of the deliberative procedure. Second, political emotions serve as a moral 
constraint on what may be accepted as normative truth in public deliberation. This 
point is less salient in Miller’s account of deliberative democracy, even though it 
could be seen as consistent with his notion of equal respect for co-deliberators. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, in light of the liberal multiculturalists’ criticism that a nation-
building process does not leave the social minorities with a meaningful context of 
choices, he suggests that the nation-building process relies on a division between 
public and private cultures that is itself subject to public deliberation based on the 
equal respect for co-deliberators. I suggested that this notion does not shed any light 
on how public deliberation could guarantee the equality of social majorities vis-à-vis 
minorities without further substantiation. In this sense, political emotions cannot be 
readily understood as a moral constraint on public deliberation, despite the fact that 
Miller allows both common moral intuitions and political emotions to shape what 
could be acceptable as the valid political principle in our moral reasoning.  
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Nevertheless, I further substantiated the notion in light of Miller’s account of 
deliberative democracy as being based on the equal footing of citizens. This gives 
rise to the principle for guiding public deliberation: each citizen should aim to 
advance their claims in public deliberation in the hope that the principle or policy 
decisions produced would benefit all citizens equally. With regard to the nation-
building process, the principle implies that each citizen should aim to advance their 
claims in public deliberation at the ethical-political level in the hope that the 
common nationality thereby produced benefits all citizens equally. Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action supplies a detailed account of a deliberative 
procedure that guarantees the equal opportunity of citizens to advance their claims 
and contribute to the normative consensus at the level of the state. This account 
focuses on the institutional guarantee of all citizens having an equal footing in public 
deliberation without emphasising the role of political emotions in the process. As 
such, Habermas’s conception of communicative action is consistent with my 
substantiation of Miller’s notion of equal respect for co-deliberators. However, it 
falls short of clarifying how political emotions fit into this account. Young’s 
interpretation of emotional expression as another mode of communication than 
rational argumentation sheds some light on this point, in the sense that it clearly 
positions political emotions as an equalising force that serves to prevent the 
deliberative process from disadvantaging social minorities through the imposition of 
a unitary language use. Without challenging communicative action as a viable basis 
for deliberative democracy, she aims to make rational argumentation based on 
validity claims more sensitive to minorities’ life experiences by supplementing it 
with emotional expression. In this sense, Young’s understanding of emotional 
expression together with Habermas’s conception of communicative action fully 
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remedy Miller’s account of deliberative democracy, leaving it consistent with his 
notion of equal respect for co-deliberators. This is because political emotions could 
be understood as a moral constraint on what could be accepted as normative truth in 
rational argumentation based on raising validity claims so as to uphold the equal 
relationships among citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I set out to demonstrate that Habermas’s conception of communicative action could 
allow common moral intuitions and political emotions to bear on our moral 
reasoning about the political principles governing social institutions. Pace the 
constitutional patriots such as Lacroix, Markell and Shabani, I showed in section 1 
that Habermas could allow common moral intuitions and political emotions to bear 
on public deliberation without causing his overall theoretical framework to become 
internally incoherent. There are two reasons for this. First, a communicative action 
has to not only serve as a mechanism for contestation among interlocutors regarding 
the contents of normative truth but also closes the shared normative background off 
for its own stability. Contrary to what Lacroix et al. believe, the stability of a legally 
institutionalised communicative action can only be guaranteed when interlocutors 
share a sufficient number of cultural commonalities and, as a result, a sense of 
affective identification among them. Second, the fact that Habermas prescribes 
discovering common European values among EU citizens so as to further the 
European project shows that he does not believe a legally institutionalised 
communicative action to be sufficient for securing a sense of solidarity at the EU 
level. Rather, common moral intuitions and political emotions at the national level 
place moral constraints on what could be accepted as legitimate democratic 
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institutions at the EU level. Common moral intuitions and political emotions are 
allowed to influence the deliberative process, with their existence recognised and 
their generative mechanism respected, as Habermas’s prescription for the EU project 
shows.  
 
Furthermore, section 2 demonstrated that Habermas’s conception of communicative 
action could acknowledge the intrinsic value of common moral intuitions and 
political emotions for two reasons. First, the unavoidable presuppositions of 
communicative action embody exclusively liberal values that could not hope to 
cohere with standards of rationality held by many minorities. This misfit between 
communicative action and minorities’ own standards of rationality would prevent the 
latter from effectively exerting the same influence over the deliberative process as 
their majority counterparts. In order to counterbalance the adverse impact of this 
misfit, at least in the short term, Habermas’s conception of communicative action 
needs to place more emphasis on emotional expression so as to remedy the 
deficiency of rational argumentation in capturing the life experience of minorities. 
Second, Habermas’s effort in his later works to downplay the importance of the 
distinction between illocution and perlocution and his claim that communicative 
action is the universal mode of human communication together solve the problem 
Young identifies. This is because the distinction between communicative and 
strategic action is no longer defined on the ground that they each adopt different 
modes of communication; rather, the difference is communicative action’s 
orientation towards reaching agreement. By implication, emotional expression could 
be adopted by interlocutors to accurately convey their own life experiences in 
communicative action, as long as the objective is to reach agreement rather than 
pursue personal interests. 
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Hence, Habermas’s conception of communicative action could be incorporated into 
Miller’s account of deliberative democracy without any contradiction between them 
at the conceptual level. Following this incorporation, Miller’s account of deliberative 
democracy would be able to explain public deliberation over (1) concrete social 
issues, and (2) the definition of a common national identity as a collective effort of 
citizens to put forward their different approaches to common moral intuitions and 
political emotions and transform these in order to arrive at a shared approach to the 
different social issues within society. This reflects the requirement of the first 
guiding principle of the global public deliberation that all human beings or their 
representatives ought to have equal rights to participate in public deliberation, 
because human beings are equally entitled to debate concrete global issues, the 
definition of common identity, and global regulative norms and values on the basis 
of their different moral intuitions and political emotions.  
 
Political emotions in particular would play two important roles in this deliberative 
process. Firstly, political emotions serve as a moral constraint on what could be 
accepted as the legitimate claims about political principles and social institutions in 
public deliberation. This reflects the second guiding principle of the global public 
deliberation that all human beings or their representatives should exert equal 
influence over the final policy outcomes of public deliberation. Nussbaum’s 
understanding of emotional expressions such as rhetoric, greetings, and narratives 
suggests that emotional expression should be utilised to secure cultural minorities’ 
ability to effectively influence the policy outcomes of public deliberation. In this 
sense, political emotions serve to guarantee all human beings’ equal influence over 
public deliberation, whether they are cultural minorities or majorities. Secondly, 
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political emotions as supplied by cultural commonalities among citizens could 
support the political principles produced by public deliberation and all major social 
institutions, including the deliberative procedure itself, through creating an affective 
identification among citizens. This reflects the third guiding principle of global 
public deliberation that all human beings or their representatives should aim to 
develop a common identity and a shared public culture. It is because political 
emotions such as nationalist sentiments could serve to motivate people to support 
institutions of citizenship within nation-states that I propose to facilitate a similar 
nation-building process at the global level to support global democratic institutions. 
 
I have so far discussed why Miller’s account of deliberative democracy should 
incorporate Habermas’s conception of communicative action and how this could be 
done in theory in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. The main purpose of these discussions is to 
reconstruct Miller’s account of deliberative democracy in order to produce an 
account of global citizenship that could serve to adjudicate among different 
distributive principles through obtaining actual consent from all human beings or 
their representatives. Three guiding principles for the global public deliberation have 
emerged in these previous chapters. In Chapters 7 and 8, I will discuss Miller’s 
contribution to the global justice debate and how my reconstruction of Miller’s 
account of deliberative democracy could resolve the two impasses in the debate. 
There I will explain in more details how these guiding principles are derived and 
how they will place normative constraints on the global public deliberation. 
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Chapter 7: Resolving the Two Impasses in the Global Justice Debate: 
the Impasse at the Level of Substantive Theory 
 
Introduction 
 
There has been a debate among the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal 
nationalists over what should be the most appropriate distributive principles at the 
global level. In other words, in response to unmet basic needs and/or radical 
substantive inequality in material terms, what obligations should we discharge 
towards the population of needy across the globe? Distributive justice refers to the 
fairness of the various ways of distributing material advantages among a group of 
moral agents. The debate between the cosmopolitans, on the one hand, and the 
statists and the liberal nationalists on the other, revolves around the proper scope of 
substantive inequality regulation in material terms. To a large extent this is owing to 
the existing general agreement on social justice as involving the egalitarian concern 
within nation-states. In this and the following chapter, I will show that this debate 
has led to two impasses at the level of, respectively, the substantive theory and the 
methodology. In this chapter, I will focus on the impasse at the level of substantive 
theory, which consists in the dispute over whether the ethical significance of human 
association within nation-states should be allowed to bear on our moral reasoning 
about distributive justice. I will then discuss the impasse at the methodological level, 
which consists in the dispute over whether moral reasoning about distributive justice 
should take account of the facts about a particular distributive context. In order to 
describe and discuss these two impasses, I will utilise the arguments raised in the 
previous chapters, insofar as Miller’s works on social justice, global justice, the 
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theory of nationality and the contextualist approach to political theory stand a good 
chance of resolving these impasses.  
 
In section 1, I will introduce the accounts of distributive justice advanced by the 
humanist and the associativist cosmopolitans, alongside the statists and the liberal 
nationalists. In section 2, I will discuss the impasse between the cosmopolitans on 
the one hand and the statists and the liberal nationalists on the other at the level of 
substantive theory, wherein the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists 
disagree as to whether the theories of distributive justice should be grounded in the 
ethical significance of human association within nation-states. First, the humanist 
cosmopolitans aim to justify the regulation of substantive inequality at the global 
level on the basis of its compatibility with the moral equality of all human beings. At 
the same time, the humanists insist that the regulation of substantive inequality does 
not conflict with the ethical significance of human association within nation-states, 
since nation-states could be seen as indispensable to the process of discharging the 
responsibility to regulate substantive inequality globally. In response, pace Tan, I 
will demonstrate that the humanist cosmopolitans’ consideration of existing nation-
states amounts to a denial of the ethical significance of human association because 
they do not allow it to bear on our moral reasoning about distributive justice. As 
such, they do not directly engage in any fruitful dialogue with the statists and the 
liberal nationalists. Second, in reply to the humanists’ disregard of nation-states in 
the process of moral reasoning, the statists and the liberal nationalists advance three 
lines of objections to the regulation of substantive inequality at the global level: the 
metric problem, the dynamic problem and the respect for national self-determination. 
I will examine the validity of these objections and demonstrate, contra Rawls and 
Miller, that the metric problem obtains in the short term because cultural pluralism 
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precludes a normative consensus on the metric of substantive equality at the global 
level. However, in the long term, due to purposeful cultural exchange via formalised 
channels of public deliberation, cultural pluralism will not continue to pose a 
difficulty for the said consensus. The dynamic problem does not obtain in that the 
notion of national responsibility needs to be situated within a prior theory of 
distributive justice that specifies the legitimate amount of reward each nation-state 
may acquire from the global economic order. National self-determination does not 
directly justify the restriction of the regulation of substantive inequality to the 
domestic level, insofar as it cannot be treated as a decisive factor in our moral 
reasoning about distributive justice. Rather, it has to be considered  on a case-by-
case basis together with other ethical demands. Finally, since the above-mentioned 
objections all fail to prevent the regulation of substantive inequality at the global 
level, I will discuss the direct justification the statists and the liberal nationalists give 
for restricting the regulation of substantive inequality. There are three statist 
accounts of distributive justice grounded in a coercive institutional relationship, 
involuntary membership and reciprocal cooperation, and a liberal nationalist account 
based on common identity on top of the recognition of the three statist accounts. 
Pace Blake, Nagel, Sangiovanni and Miller, I will prove that the statists and the 
liberal nationalists cannot persuade the associativist cosmopolitans to accept a 
restricted scope of the regulation of substantive inequality and vice versa, because 
they cannot agree on a specific criterion for the equivalence between human 
associations at the global and the domestic levels that will warrant the regulation of 
substantive inequality. As such, an impasse arises at the level of the substantive 
theory of distributive justice.  
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1.  The Global Justice Debate among the Cosmopolitans, the Statists and 
the Liberal nationalists 
 
First and foremost, the cosmopolitans seek to address the legitimacy of particular 
distributive schemes under which some suffer relative deprivation. There are two 
strands of cosmopolitanism: humanist and associativist cosmopolitanism. A 
humanist account of distributive justice directly translates the moral equality of 
human beings into substantive equality in material terms across the globe. Similarly, 
the associativist account recognises the significance of the moral equality of human 
beings, but nonetheless emphasises that the moral reasoning about global justice 
needs to take account of the intrinsic value of human association. Their differences 
therefore lie in whether the ethical significance of human association within nation-
states is allowed to bear on our moral reasoning about distributive justice. It should 
be noted that most cosmopolitans who resort to a humanist account all reach the 
logical conclusion that the regulation of substantive inequality is warranted at the 
global level. If belonging to the human race means that all individuals share certain 
characteristics in common and these characteristics in certain contexts manifest 
themselves in the form of similar interests, then the moral equality of human beings 
would require access to the essential goods that satisfy these interests to be equalised. 
In comparison, associationism seems to be more directly engaged with the dialogue 
among the cosmopolitanists, the statists and the liberal nationalists, in the sense that 
they all believe that human association should be allowed to bear on our moral 
reasoning about global distributive justice.  
 
For instance, in Political Theory and International Relations (1979), Charles Beitz’s 
arguments for the regulation of substantive inequality at the global level are 
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exemplary of the contrast between humanism and associationism. On the one hand, 
Beitz’s humanist account of global justice questions the fundamental premise that 
human association is of intrinsic value and needs to be factored into moral reasoning 
at the level of the principle. He identifies natural resources as the morally relevant 
factor that generates the duties of justice regardless of the prior existence of any 
cooperative scheme between nation-states. Beitz distinguishes between two elements 
that contribute to the material advancement of societies: that is, first, human 
cooperative activity, and, second, ‘the utilities derived from any portion of the 
earth’s surface.’ While the former is the subject of domestic justice, as mentioned 
above, the latter is ‘morally relevant even in the absence of a functioning scheme of 
international social cooperation’ (Beitz, 1979, p. 137). On the other hand, Beitz’s 
associationist account extends Rawls’s original position to the global level and 
argues that Rawls’s two principles of social justice are required globally because 
there is a global basic structure which affects the life prospects of human beings 
everywhere. The validity of this global position depends on defeating Rawls’s 
important assumption of the self-sufficiency of nation-states, which serves to prevent 
the possibility of a global basic structure existing or emerging. Here, to counter it, 
Beitz utilises the empirical facts of international interdependence generated by 
globalisation. He observes, ‘International interdependence is reflected in the volume 
of transactions that flow across national boundaries—for example, communications, 
travel, trade, aid, and foreign investment’ (Beitz, 1979, p. 144). This increasing 
interdependence produces benefits as well as burdens globally, and has led to the 
development of a ‘global regulative structure.’ ‘Taken together, these institutions 
and practices can be considered as the constitutional structure of the world economy, 
which has important distributive implications’ (Beitz, 1979, p. 148-9). Therefore, 
given that the global regulative structure contradicts Rawls’s assumption of the self-
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sufficiency of nation-states, his two principles of justice cannot be restricted to the 
domestic sphere. 
 
The second school of thought in the global justice debate is statism. This stresses the 
moral particularities of the relationship between citizens and their administrative 
states. Based on this conviction, most statists require the regulation of substantive 
inequality to be restricted to the domestic sphere. There are mainly three routes for 
argumentation here: (1) the coercion-based account, (2) the involuntariness-based 
account, and (3) the reciprocity-based account. Firstly, Blake advances a coercion-
based account of distributive justice called ‘liberal internationalism,’ that grounds 
concern with the regulation of substantive inequality in a distinct institutional 
relationship between state and citizens that is coercive in nature. According to this 
account, the regulation of substantive inequality acquires its moral relevance through 
its contribution to maintaining the procedural justice of the democratic decision-
making process, and to justifying the coercive nature of a shared legal system among 
citizens. Since there is currently no international legal system imposing coercion 
upon all human beings in a manner equivalent to the domestic sphere, there is no 
need for a shared democratic decision-making procedure at the international level to 
impose any legal coercion on human beings as is required at the domestic level. As a 
result, in the absence of a democratic procedure, human beings do not require the 
regulation of substantive inequality in order to maintain the equal relationship among 
them, and thereby exert equal influence over the final policy outcomes (Blake, 2013, 
p. 87; 94-6).  
 
Secondly, stressing the existence of a sovereign authority capable of implementing 
distributive justice, Thomas Nagel furthers an account based on involuntariness. 
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Two preconditions jointly generate the moral relevance of the regulation of 
substantive inequality at the domestic level: that is, first, the involuntary nature of 
membership in a political society; and, second, active agency on the part of citizens. 
The empirical observation that substantive inequalities have a profound effect, 
according to Nagel, is necessarily supplemented by the fact that ‘A sovereign state is 
not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage. The societal rules 
determining its basic structure are coercively imposed: it is not a voluntary 
association’ (Nagel, 2005, p.128). Moreover, as a closely related and, indeed, 
derivative normative claim, it is a demand generated by such an involuntary 
membership that justification be sought for the arbitrary inequalities coercively 
imposed upon the population within a political society. As Nagel emphasises, ‘The 
required active engagement of the will of each member of the society in its operation 
is crucial’ (Nagel, 2005, p. 129). He further maintains that international legal rules 
and institutions lack a crucial element that would enable them to resemble domestic 
society, because, ‘They are not collectively enacted and coercively imposed in the 
name of all the individuals whose lives they affect; and they do not ask for the kind 
of authorisation by individuals that carries with it a responsibility to treat all those 
individuals in some sense equally. Instead, they are set up by bargaining among 
mutually self-interested sovereign parties’ (Nagel, 2005, p. 138). Therefore, the lack 
of equivalence between the degree of involuntariness at the domestic and the 
international level determines the moral relevance of the regulation of substantive 
inequality globally. 
 
Lastly, Sangiovanni proposes an alternative approach: that of reciprocity-based 
internationalism. He argues, ‘equality is a relational ideal of reciprocity among those 
who support and maintain the state’s capacity to provide the basic collective goods 
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necessary to protect us from physical attack and to maintain and reproduce a stable 
system of property rights and entitlements’ (Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 19-20). In 
domestic society, both coercive institutional relations and involuntary membership 
are present. When functioning well, the basic state capacities are continually backed 
by state coercion in various forms and to a varying extent. On top of that, it requires 
a financial and a sociological base in order to exist and function effectively. These 
financial and sociological bases are supported actively by the individuals sharing this 
political regime (Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 20). In comparison, ‘(G)lobal order lacks an 
autonomous means of coercion. More fundamentally, the order does not have the 
financial, legal, administrative, or sociological means to provide and guarantee the 
goods and services necessary to sustain and reproduce a stable market and legal 
system, indeed to sustain (on its own) any kind of society at all’ (Sangiovanni, 2007, 
p. 21). Hence, the difference between the domestic and the international level in 
terms of the reciprocal relations among individuals means that the regulation of 
substantive inequality is not required by global distributive justice. 
 
The third school of thought in the global justice debate is that of liberal nationalism. 
Liberal nationalism offers an alternative account of distributive justice that 
understands the intrinsic value of nation-states in a cultural sense, instead of the 
political sense accorded to it by statism. The necessary and sufficient condition for 
activating the regulation of substantive inequality consists in a shared nationality 
combined with an administrative state. For instance, Tamir endorses the ‘cultural 
nationalism’ that recognises the centrality of individual choice, and assumes that 
living within one’s national community is an important moral good for individuals. 
Cultural nationalism, therefore, is predicated on the assumption that interpersonal 
relationships within a national community have a morally relevant importance, 
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which will remain undiminished for the foreseeable future (Tamir, 1993, p. 99). 
Accordingly, the special obligations derived from the interpersonal relations among 
co-nationals need to be factored into the formulation of global distributive principles. 
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 3, Miller offers a particularist defence of 
nationality that captures the ethical significance and the constitutive nature of 
nationality. Nationality, so understood, serves as a necessary normative background 
for moral reasoning and naturally necessitates a special obligation among co-
nationals which is distinct from other lesser communities. The implication of the 
ethical importance of nationality, as discussed in Chapter 2, points to a split-level 
conception of distributive justice that restricts the regulation of substantive 
inequality to the domestic level. The domestic and the global level are two different 
distributive contexts, grounded in two different modes of interpersonal relationships: 
first, the interpersonal relationships between individuals qua human beings at the 
global level; and, second, the interpersonal relationships between individuals qua co-
nationals at the domestic level. Membership of a nation generates the special 
obligations between co-nationals that, in turn, make the regulation of substantive 
inequality possible; whereas, internationally, similar interpersonal relationships that 
ground the said concern are lacking as such (Miller, 1995, p. 72). Hence, the 
existence of a common nationality within a nation-state distinguishes the domestic 
from the global sphere as two different distributive contexts, and thereby restricts the 
regulation of substantive inequality to the former. 
 
2. Debating the Moral Particularities of Nation-States 
 
First and foremost, as discussed in section 1, the cosmopolitans, especially the 
humanist strand, directly derive the moral relevance of the regulation of substantive 
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inequality from the moral equality of human beings at the global level. According to 
them, when judged against the most fundamental principle—the moral equality of 
human beings—the boundaries separating nation-states seem arbitrary. For instance, 
Tan advances a humanist account of cosmopolitanism in Justice, Institutions and 
Luck (2014) that treats human association within nation-states as an arbitrary factor 
that has not been consciously chosen by individual moral agents at the global level. 
According to Tan, a plausible account of global distributive justice should be based 
on a strict ‘luck-choice distinction’ that is consistent with the moral equality of 
human beings. Moreover, ‘the moral difference between luck and choice, along with 
the presumption of the moral equality of persons, suggests…a moral default of 
equality in distribution, and that any departure from this benchmark of equality is 
justifiable only when it is the result of agential choices and decisions, but not when it 
is a matter of pure luck’ (Tan, 2014, p. 89). As a result, when formulating global 
distributive principles that regulate the global background context, we should not 
take account of the human association within nation-states, insofar as nationalities 
are social contingencies that have not been consciously chosen by individuals. 
 
This reflects a previous debate between the distributive and the relational egalitarians 
over what should ground the ethical demands of social justice within nation-states. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the distributive egalitarian stance grounds the concern 
with social justice directly in the moral equality of human beings, and treats 
substantive equality as the default position in the distributional pattern within a 
nation-state. In contrast, the relational egalitarians ground the concern with the equal 
relationship among the citizens of the same nation-state and do not value substantive 
equality for its own sake. Tan and other humanist cosmopolitans agree with the 
distributive egalitarians, and thereby reject any boundary among human beings as 
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being morally irrelevant factors, whereas the statist and the liberal nationalists take 
the side of the relational egalitarians and believe that substantive equality is relevant 
because it could contribute to an equal relationship among the members of the same 
nation-state. Nevertheless, Tan asserts repeatedly that the cosmopolitans do not have 
to deny the intrinsic value of human association within nation-states while holding 
onto substantive equality in material terms among human beings as the default 
position globally. His claim does not deviate far from the usual attitude of humanist 
cosmopolitans towards human association within nation-states. For instance, in 
‘What is so special about our fellow countrymen?’ Goodin proposes an ‘assigned 
responsibility model,’ which strips the special relationship between co-nationals of 
its independent moral force and suggests that these special duties derive their moral 
force from the general duties owed among individuals qua human beings. ‘That is to 
say, special duties are…merely devices whereby the moral community’s general 
duties get assigned to particular agents’ (Goodin, 1988, p. 678). In other words, 
‘Territorial boundaries are merely useful devices for ‘matching’ one person to one 
protector…at root…it is the person and the general duty that we all have toward him 
that matters morally’ (Goodin, 1988, p. 686). This way of accounting for the ethical 
significance of human association within nation-states seems to assign nothing 
substantive to the statists and the liberal nationalists’ stance on global justice, 
because when the statists and the liberal nationalists emphasise the intrinsic value of 
human association within nation-states, they mean for it to bear on the actual 
formulation of global distributive principles. Therefore, the exchange between the 
humanist cosmopolitans on the one hand and the statists and the liberal nationalists 
on the other is likely to end in a deadlock, insofar as they have different methods of 
developing global principles of distributive justice. In order to resolve this deadlock, 
the statists and the liberal nationalists could plausibly argue that the humanist 
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cosmopolitans’ sole reliance on the moral equality of human beings cannot justify 
different approaches to the satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of 
substantive inequality. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the distributive egalitarian 
position cannot justify taking a different approach to responsibility-insensitive basic 
needs satisfaction and responsibility-sensitive substantive inequality regulation on 
the basis of a luck-choice distinction alone. The luck-choice distinction has to be 
anchored in an overarching ideal of an equal relationship among citizens, which in 
effect amounts to the partial or total subsumption of distributive egalitarianism into 
relational egalitarianism. This means that humanist cosmopolitanism could plausibly 
be subsumed into statism and liberal nationalism.   
 
In response to the humanist cosmopolitans’ disregard of human association within 
nation-states, the statists and the liberal nationalists advance three lines of argument 
to remove the regulation of substantive inequality at the global level: (1) global 
cultural pluralism makes it improbable to reach any consensus on the metric of 
substantive equality, (2) nation-states should be held responsible for their past 
decisions that have distributive implications today, and, (3) national self-
determination should be respected by global justice. I will demonstrate in turn that in 
light of the cosmopolitans’ counter arguments, the argumentative avenue (1) obtains, 
because the lack of cultural commonalities makes it less probable to formulate a 
common metric of substantive equality globally than at the domestic level. 
Argument (2) does not obtain, because the notion of national responsibility has to be 
situated within a prior theory of distributive justice that determines the justness of 
the background context of distribution at the global level. Finally, argument (3) leads 
to a compromise between cosmopolitanism, statism and liberal nationalism, insofar 
as none of them would reject outright the moral weight of either national self-
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determination or global distributive justice. This can only mean that our obligations 
towards the global poor vary from case to case, because the moral weight we 
attribute to national self-determination vis-à-vis other ethical demands of justice 
cannot be decided on a priori. Miller’s theory of nationality and his principles of 
global justice cover these three themes most extensively. I have addressed the main 
cosmopolitan and statist critiques against them in Chapter 2. Here, I will therefore 
use Miller’s arguments to structure my discussion of the debate among the 
associativist strand of cosmopolitanism, statism and liberal nationalism.  
 
Firstly, Miller discusses the potency of global cultural pluralism under the rubric of 
the ‘metric problem.’ Due to the plurality of conceptions of moral goods in different 
cultural communities, there is no common currency of substantive equality in terms 
of both material advantages and the opportunity to acquire them (Miller, 2007, p. 62- 
8). Similarly, when Rawls determines The Law of Peoples (1999), he defines ‘people’ 
as the basic subject of his global distributive principles. The peoples, as he defines it, 
consist of institutional, cultural and moral components: that is, in his words, ‘a 
reasonable just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental 
interests; citizens united by what Mill called ‘common sympathies;’ and finally, a 
moral nature’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 23). In particular, common sympathies are at least 
partially dependent on ‘a common language, history, and political culture, with a 
shared historical consciousness’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 24). Therefore, insofar as each 
people shares a different culturally defined common sympathy that drives them 
collectively to make the decisions that will have distributive implications in the 
future, in order to respect ‘reasonable pluralism’ at the global level, more affluent 
people should not aim to reduce interpersonal substantive inequality, for fear of 
being overtly paternalistic (Rawls, 1999, p. 106-12). Therefore, both the liberal 
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nationalists and the statists agree that shared cultural values at least partially account 
for a nation-state’s collective decision that has distributive implications. Because of 
this ‘reasonable pluralism’ of cultural values regarding distribution, we cannot 
expect all cultural communities to reach a consensus on the metric of substantive 
equality at the global level.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two paths discussion toward a rejection of the 
‘metric problem’ may follow. On the one hand, cosmopolitans such as Daniel 
Weinstock and Cecile Fabre challenge the metric problem by pointing to the over-
emphasis on cultural homogeneity within nation-states, arguing that if the culturally 
plural society of a nation-state can reinforce the redistributive measures to regulate 
substantive inequality among citizens, surely global society could find a way to 
counter cultural pluralism and, thereby, formulate a consensus on the metric of 
substantive equality (Weinstock, 2003, p. 277; Fabre, 2003, p. 319). In response, I 
showed that this line of argument does not decisively refute the metric problem, 
insofar as it does not prove that cultural pluralism at the domestic level is on a par 
with that at the global level. In order to salvage the cosmopolitans’ critique, some 
will still argue that there are common metrics of substantive equality at the global 
level, such as power. For instance, Gilabert and Ypi similarly develop common 
metrics of substantive equality for global justice, the difference, nonetheless, being 
that Gilabert’s three-fold metric encompasses Ypi’s notion of power as a global 
‘positional good’ (Gilabert, 2012, p. 216; Ypi, 2012, 123). In response, I 
demonstrated that Gilabert’s and Ypi’s notions are abstract, and very similar to the 
term ‘substantive equality.’ Granting that they have gone further to substantiate 
substantive equality in material terms with more narrowly defined categories such as 
power, cultural pluralism will still present great obstacles to forming a consensus on 
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a notion specifically defined and, as such, quantifiable enough to guide actual 
policy-making at the global level. 
 
Nevertheless, a shared culture is a contingent factor that could be developed and 
preserved through an institutionalised mechanism such as deliberative democracy. 
As Chapter 3 shows, both Miller and Habermas believe that deliberative democracy 
could be utilised to develop shared cultural values among citizens of the same 
nation-state. Therefore, the metric problem in and by itself cannot decisively deflect 
the cosmopolitans’ challenge to statism and liberal nationalism, insofar as, once 
established, an institutional mechanism such as deliberative democracy is expected 
by both the statists and the liberal nationalists to produce a normative consensus on 
essential political principles and social institutions. Indeed, as discussed, 
cosmopolitans such as Weinstock suggest that a deliberative democracy could also 
be established at the global level to ameliorate the problem of cultural pluralism, and 
thereby help human beings of different nation-states to reach a normative consensus 
on the metric of substantive equality in material terms (Weinstock, 2003, p. 278). 
Hence, the metric problem can only obtain if we assume that the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship based on deliberative democracy is 
impossible rather than improbable. I will debunk this assumption in Chapter 8 with 
my reconstruction of Miller’s account of nation-building through deliberative 
democracy.  
 
Secondly, the dynamic problem implies that nation-states, as corporate bodies, are 
expected to take collective responsibility for decisions made in the past, assuming 
the existence of a common currency of substantive equality at the global level. The 
regulation of substantive inequality at the global level represents a breach of this 
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rightful expectation that is also consistent with the prevailing logic within social 
justice theories: a conception of distributive justice should be sensitive to personal 
choices and preferences (Miller, 2007, p. 70). As discussed in Chapter 2, in order to 
refute the objection to the regulation of substantive inequality at the global level on 
the basis of the dynamic problem, the cosmopolitans advance two lines of argument. 
First, Caney completely rejects the idea that a group of people should ever be held 
responsible for the past decisions of their administrative state that have distributive 
implications today. According to him, the notion of collective responsibility 
contradicts the traditional view of moral agency that only holds individuals 
responsible for their own decisions (Caney, 2003, p. 302). In response, I 
demonstrated that Caney rejects the notion of collective responsibility tout court, 
because he is oblivious to the moral urgency of responsibility assignment at the 
global level. Miller’s notion of national responsibility is motivated by the urgent 
situation in which no single moral agent can be individually held responsible for the 
absolute deprivation faced by the global south. In this light, holding a corporate 
agent such as a nation, rather than an individual agent responsible could serve to 
discharge the moral obligation to relieve absolute deprivation more efficiently and 
effectively. Second, as Caney and Tan argue, the dynamic problem in and by itself 
does not explain why the regulation of substantive inequalities is not required by 
distributive justice at the global level, because the notion of national responsibility 
needs to be anchored in a prior understanding of distributive justice, not the other 
way around (Caney, 2003, p. 303; Tan, 2013, p. 87). This is true, because Miller fails 
to recognise the fact that the dynamic problem is based on a notion of national 
responsibility which is derived from his theory of distributive justice in the first 
place. It is his theory of distributive justice rather than the derivative notion of 
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national responsibility that should do the work of defeating the cosmopolitans’ 
stance on the regulation of substantive inequality. 
 
Finally, in On Nationality (1993), Miller considers that the regulation of substantive 
inequality at the global level compromises the political self-determination of nation-
states. He sees an incongruity in holding two conflicting principles at the same time: 
‘(O)ne attaches value to national self-determination and argues that nations have no 
right to interfere in one another’s domestic affairs (except perhaps in very extreme 
cases); the other holds that we have a positive obligation to protect the basic rights of 
our fellow human beings’ (Miller, 1995, p. 77). The former should to a great extent 
place constraints on the latter, otherwise it breeds ‘benevolent imperialism.’ Rawls’s 
‘law of peoples’ seems to agree with Miller’s position, in the sense that Rawls argues 
that once a people meet the two minimum criteria of legitimacy, they should be free 
from outside intervention and distribute material advantages according to their own 
cultural conception of justice. In other words, if a people have the interests of all 
sections within society fairly represented in their legal system and continuously 
respect human rights, their self-determination should be respected by all other 
peoples, and therefore no assistance should be extended to them (Rawls, 1999, p. 64-
70). Following Rawls, statists such as Nagel, Blake and Sangiovanni agree that as 
long as nation-states respect one another’s self-determination, respect basic human 
rights and assist the needy only in absolute deprivation, the requirements of global 
distributive justice are fulfilled (Nagel, 2005; Blake, 2001; Sangiovanni, 2004).  
 
The cosmopolitans such as Gilabert and Tan object to this claim, advancing two 
main critiques. On the one hand, they argue that national self-determination of each 
nation-state is not the optimal solution to a stable world order, in light of the intra- 
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and inter-state violence caused by secessionist movements, territory disputes, and so 
on. On the other hand, respect for national self-determination is conditional on its 
compatibility with global justice (Gilabert, 2012, p. 210; Tan, 2004, p. 120). These 
objections are correct to the extent that the world order, which is currently based on 
respect for national self-determination, has often contradicted the ethical demands of 
distributive justice at the global level. However, the cosmopolitans, the statists and 
the liberal nationalists are not in as much a disagreement as their debate might show 
at a first glance, since both sides refrain from completely denying the relevance of 
either national self-determination or the ethical demands of global distributive justice. 
Therefore, the arguments on both sides in effect amount to the assertion that global 
justice should carefully balance concern with national self-determination and global 
distributive justice on a case-by-case basis. More importantly, the debate over the 
moral weights of national self-determination vis-à-vis global justice does not seem to 
resolve the real dispute among the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal 
nationalists, insofar as it does not directly supply a reason for rejecting the relevance 
of the regulation of substantive inequality at the global level.  
 
In this light, since the abovementioned objections to the regulation of substantive 
inequality at the global level all presuppose the ethical significance of human 
association within nation-states, their failure to persuade the cosmopolitans naturally 
leads the cosmopolitans to challenge the said presupposition itself. In the following, 
I will first address the validity of the statists’ justification on the basis of the ethical 
significance of the relationship between citizens and administrative states at the 
political level. Then, I will address the validity of the liberal nationalists’ 
justification on the basis of the ethical significance of the relationship among co-
nationals sharing a common national identity and a public culture. The comparison 
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between these two types of justification will show that the liberal nationalists stand a 
better chance than the statists in the face of the cosmopolitans’ challenge, because 
their justification is grounded in the motivation for citizens to support the 
functioning of an administrative state. As such, the liberal nationalists’ justification 
is less vulnerable than that of the statists to the cosmopolitans’ proposal to further 
institutionalise global citizenship on the basis of deliberative democracy.  
 
First and foremost, the statists justify the restriction of the regulation of substantive 
inequality to the domestic level on the ground that the citizens of the same nation-
state stand in a particular relation to their administrative state at the political level. 
This relation is differently defined as involuntariness-based, coercion-based and 
reciprocity-based by, respectively, Nagel, Blake and Sangiovanni. I introduced these 
accounts in section 1, and will here focus on showing that these accounts similarly 
run up against the cosmopolitans’ ‘continuum objection:’ there are no specific 
criteria that distinguish the domestic from the global level qualitatively. Firstly, 
Nagel contends that international legal rules and institutions do not resemble those of 
domestic society, because ‘they are not collectively enacted and coercively imposed 
in the name of all the individuals whose lives they affect; and they do not ask for the 
kind of authorisation by individuals that carries with it a responsibility to treat all 
those individuals in some sense equally. Instead, they are set up by bargaining 
among mutually self-interested sovereign parties’ (Nagel, 2005, p. 138). Secondly, 
Blake argues that nation-states are distinguished from the international realm in the 
sense that there is no unified legal system at the international level that can impose 
coercion upon all human beings (Blake, 2013, p. 87; 94-6).  
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In a sense, Nagel and Blake’s accounts of global distributive justice share the same 
conviction about the need for a justification for coercive institutional relations 
between citizens and their legal system and, as such, both commit to respect for 
individual autonomy. The difference lies in the fact that Nagel’s account takes the 
justification for coercive institutional relations as given and therefore treats 
institutional coercion as a necessary but not sufficient condition for triggering 
concern with the regulation of substantive inequality. As Chris Armstrong points out, 
in Nagel’s account, ‘the presence of coercion is not on its own a decisive factor in 
favour of relations of justice…a system of coercive rules would not generate duties 
of distributive justice unless those rules were then involuntarily imposed’ 
(Armstrong, 2009, p. 300). In other words, it is not enough to ground distributive 
justice in the ‘material effects that the system imposes on its members;’ individuals 
under these coercive legal rules have to be simultaneously presupposed by the same 
legal system as the ‘joint author’ of the said legal rules without being given a choice 
a priori (Nagel, 2005, p. 129). In this light, however, Nagel’s account is vulnerable 
to the empirical fact that human beings are constantly and increasingly exposed to 
varying degrees of coercion by systems of rules and norms without being given a 
choice in advance. As Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel show in the case of the 
World Trade Organisation, ‘opting out is not a real option (the WTO is a ‘take it or 
leave it’ arrangement, without even the formal option of picking and choosing the 
parts to comply with), and, given that it is not…there is a direct rule- making 
relationship between the global bodies and the citizens of different states’ (Cohen 
and Sabel, 2006, p. 147-75, 168). Hence, Nagel’s distinction between the domestic 
and the international realm cannot be justified on the basis of the involuntary nature 
of citizenship as both the subject and the active author of a coercive legal system, 
because human beings have already been presupposed by the system of rules and 
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norms to be the subject and the joint authors globally, despite the fact that there is as 
yet no formal democratic procedure to legitimate this coercion.  
 
In contrast, although Blake bases his account of global distributive justice on the 
same commitment to individual autonomy, he treats the coercive nature of a legal 
system as a necessary and sufficient condition for triggering a concern with the 
regulation of substantive inequality. As he says, ‘all human beings have the moral 
entitlement to exist as autonomous agents, and therefore have entitlements to those 
circumstances and conditions under which this is possible’ (Blake, 2013, p. 21). As 
two faces of the same coin, the unavoidable existence of coercion in political lives 
poses an apparent paradox: ‘coercion is both prima facie opposed to the existence of 
autonomy, and yet without some form of coercive political life, autonomy itself is 
not capable of being exercised.’ Because of the liberal commitment to respecting 
individual autonomy, any type of coercion needs to be justified to the group of 
agents being coerced. Different types and degrees of coercion require different 
procedures to justify them, and only a democratic decision-making procedure 
requires the regulation of substantive inequality to maintain its functioning. The 
coercive legal system imposed upon citizens within nation-states makes it necessary 
to maintain a functioning democratic decision-making procedure to justify it through 
the regulation of substantive inequality, whereas the non-existence of an equivalent 
coercive legal system at the global level nullifies the cosmopolitans’ call for the 
regulation of substantive inequality (Blake, 2013, p. 89-90).  
 
Nevertheless, this coercion-based account is similarly vulnerable to the associativist 
cosmopolitans’ attempt to prove the existence of a coercive institutional relationship 
at the global level. For instance, Valentini strives to bridge the difference between 
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the cosmopolitans’ and the statists’ accounts of global distributive justice by proving 
that a coercive relationship exists at the global level and, as such, requires 
justification. She makes a distinction between two types of coercion: interactional 
and systemic. ‘Interactional coercion’ occurs between two moral agents when one of 
them foreseeably and avoidably places non-trivial constraints on another’s freedom, 
compared to the latter’s freedom in the absence of the former’s intervention 
(Valentini, 2011, p. 130). On the other hand, ‘systemic coercion’ occurs when a 
system of rules foreseeably and avoidably places non-trivial constraints on the 
freedom of some moral agents, compared to their freedom in the absence of that 
system (Valentini, 2011, p. 137). Sharing Nagel and Blake’s fundamental 
commitment to individual autonomy, Valentini’s theoretical framework is based on 
the conviction that any coercion, interactional and systemic alike, stands in need of 
justification because of the fundamental liberal commitment to equal respect; justice 
serves to evaluate the legitimacy of the coercive relationship.  
 
Insofar as Blake’s account bases a concern with the regulation of substantive 
inequality on the coercive nature of a legal system, Valentini’s discussion of 
systemic coercion serves to challenge Blake’s statist stance. According to her, the 
current global economic order, underpinned as it is by neoliberal values, serves to 
‘foster trade liberalisation through the abolition of trade barriers,’ which, however 
systemically, undermines the position of newly emerging national economies that 
cannot compete with the advanced market economies. This, in most cases, leads to 
poverty, unemployment and dependence on imported foreign goods. Moreover, the 
erosion of trade barriers is often asymmetrical, ‘with developing countries being 
forced to open their markets, while developed nations continue to protect those 
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sectors in which developing countries would otherwise have been most competitive, 
namely agriculture and the textile industries’ (Valentini, 2011, p. 194).  
 
In line with Valentini’s observation that there is systemic coercion through the 
formal and informal rules underpinning the global economic order, Nicole Hassoun 
goes further to prove that this is a system of rules equivalent to the coercive legal 
system at the domestic level, because it regulates the behaviour of various actors in 
the global economy and could be seen as a collective moral agent with a clear 
structure. As she explains, ‘international law regulates the international 
institutions…along with states, many NGOs, and some corporations. It does not 
matter whether the rules…of international law are properly law. What is important is 
that the relevant rules determine what counts as an act of the global institutional 
system as opposed to one of its parts in isolation’ (Hassoun, 2014, p. 78). Since most 
international organisations such as the UN, WTO, WHO, IMF and WB are based on 
treaties kept in line with the system of rules referred to as international law, these 
treaties serve to delineate the actions of the constituent parts of the international legal 
system from unregulated actions. In this sense, when the actors in the global 
economic order act in accordance with the treaties of various international 
organisations, they are in effect under the regulation of a coercive system of legal 
rules. Moreover, the system of legal rules at the global level could serve as a 
collective moral agent capable of coercion, insofar as ‘the basic structure of the 
global institutional system, now embodied in the UN, IMF, WB, and WTO, was 
created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference for a common purpose—“to 
establish a framework for economic cooperation and development that would lead to 
a more stable and prosperous global economy”’ (Hassoun, 2014, p. 82). This 
common purpose has united most prominent international organisations, despite the 
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fact that there is now a division of labour among them. Hence, Blake’s distinction 
between the international and the domestic level does not obtain, in light of Valentini 
and Hasoun’s observation that there exists a system of formal and informal rules and 
values underpinning the global order, which exerts an effective coercion over human 
beings at the global level, because this coercion requires not only a democratic 
decision-making procedure to justify it but also the regulation of substantive 
inequality to maintain the said procedure.  
 
The last line of argument for restricting the regulation of substantive inequality to the 
domestic level is supplied by Sangiovanni, on the basis of the reciprocal relationship 
among a group of moral agents. According to him, rather than focusing on the 
degree to which the administrative state ‘performs its functions coercively or 
noncoercively,’ we should focus on ‘exactly what the state does.’ In other words, 
pace Nagel and Blake, Sangiovanni considers the coercive nature of the legal system 
as neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for triggering a concern with the 
regulation of substantive inequality. As he says, coercion is ‘of only contingent, 
indirect, and instrumental concern to a theory of distributive equality’ (Sangiovanni, 
2007, p. 20). Therefore, a reciprocity-based account of global distributive justice 
requires the regulation of substantive inequality exclusively among a group of people 
who contribute to ‘the reproduction and maintenance of the basic collective goods 
constitutive of the state’ (Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 28). He then suggests that, despite 
the growing interdependence at the global level, the institutionally mediated 
relationships among human beings are still different from those within nation-states 
in nature (Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 33-5). Thus, the regulation of substantive inequality 
is only required within nation-states in virtue of citizens’ contribution to the 
reproduction of the collective goods through their shared administrative state. 
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Unfortunately, Sangiovanni has not specified the list of collective goods that warrant 
the regulation of substantive inequality. However, based on the examples he gives in 
order to illustrate the operational domain of a reciprocity-based account of 
distributive justice, two categories of collective goods can be identified as being 
morally relevant: (a) security and order and (b) a system of property relations 
(Armstrong, 2009, p. 307). This list would appear to be too thin to capture all the 
functions of the administrative state in supplying collective goods for the population 
within its jurisdiction. As Armstrong suggests, a fuller list should ideally include (1) 
order and security, (2) the formal and informal requisites of economic production, 
distribution, and exchange, (3) environmental goods, (4) civic infrastructure, (5) a 
system of cultural reproduction, (6) a system of physical reproduction and (7) a 
system of collective government (Armstrong, 2009, p. 309). This fuller list of 
collective goods should cast a shadow of doubt over Sangiovanni’s distinction 
between the domestic and the international level as two different distributive 
contexts, because collective goods such as environmental goods, economic 
production, distribution and exchange, et cetera, are increasingly coordinated by 
international organisations such as the IMF, the WB and the UN to counter 
globalised threats, including global warming, economic recession and chronic 
poverty. Even if Sangiovanni rejects the relevance of some of the items on the fuller 
list of collective goods, his own thin list still fails to take note of increasing 
international cooperation in the areas of physical security, world order and 
international property rights. For instance, as Armstrong points out, ‘nations share 
nuclear technology, base missiles, and early-warning devices on each other’s 
territory, and sign pacts agreeing to mutual defence,’ all examples of the provision of 
physical security at a global level. Moreover, ‘property regimes are increasingly 
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being coordinated by international agreements, so that violations of intellectual 
property rights, for instance, by inhabitants of one state can be punished by the 
government of another state’ (Armstrong, 2009, p. 310-1). 
 
Thus, the three derivative accounts of global distributive justice are similarly 
vulnerable to the associativist cosmopolitans’ criticism that the relationships among 
human beings at the global level bear equivalent characteristics to human association 
within nation-states. This is because the statists have not supplied any quantifiable 
criteria for the extent to which human association at the global level should resemble 
that within nation-states in order for it to warrant the regulation of substantive 
inequality. This failure on the part of the statists is described by Armstrong as the 
‘the continuum objection’ which ‘questions whether a qualifying criterion for the 
egalitarian relations could be advanced that reliably demarcates intra-state from 
inter-state or supra-state relations, or whether in fact the criteria provided thus far 
fail to discriminate sufficiently clearly.’ This objection suggests that, rather than 
identifying human association within nation-states as being something qualitatively 
different than that existing at the global level, it might be more reasonable to depict 
‘a continuum of more and less intense relations that play out across state borders’ 
(Armstrong, 2009, p. 298). Since human association within nation-states cannot 
definitively be proven as being qualitatively different from that at the global level, 
and the statists cannot yet provide a quantifiable threshold above which human 
association should be counted as sufficiently similar to that at the domestic level, an 
impasse appears between the statists and the associativist cosmopolitans. 
 
In order to solve the continuum objection, we need to review the liberal nationalists 
such as Miller’s contribution to the global justice debate, insofar as they focus on a 
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more fundamental factor that contributes to the maintaining of the administrative 
state; that is, a common identity among citizens. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
according to Miller, an administrative state needs to develop a common national 
identity and a shared public culture so as to instil a sufficient level of mutual trust 
among citizens. Mutual trust among citizens enables an administrative state to solve 
collective action problems, pursue distributive justice and practice deliberative 
democracy. All these three tasks that nation-states currently take for granted, in 
effect depend on the fact that citizens have a sufficient number of cultural 
commonalities shared among themselves, so as to trust each other. First, when 
citizens trust each other sufficiently, they will be able to assume the obligations 
implicated by collective action, such as the provision of public goods, the regulation 
of the market, et cetera, without excessive worry that others will free-ride on their 
compliance with state policies or even take advantage of their compliance (Miller, 
1995, p. 91-2). Second, with a sufficient level of mutual trust among citizens, they 
‘will give their support to schemes of social justice, particularly schemes involving 
redistribution to those not able to provide for their needs through market transactions’ 
(Miller, 1995, p. 93). Third, sufficient mutual trust among citizens will also motivate 
them to behave responsibly in public deliberation, in the sense that they are more 
likely to (1) advance claims sincerely held, rather than adopted as an expedient way 
to further their self-interests, and, (2) moderate their original claims so as to reach a 
compromise with others (Miller, 1995, p. 96-7). Hence, to Miller, a nation-state 
always already presupposes the existence of a national community within its 
jurisdiction that shares a common national identity and a public culture.  
 
With regard to the scope of the regulation of substantive inequality, therefore, Miller 
argues that this is predicated on both the existence of institutions of citizenship and a 
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common national identity and a shared public culture. On the one hand, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, the relational ideal of social equality is fundamental to Miller’s theory 
of distributive justice, insofar as the need to maintain equal relations among citizens 
participating in deliberative democracy grounds different approaches to the 
satisfaction of basic needs and the regulation of substantive inequality. As a 
corollary, I discussed in Chapter 2 one of Miller’s reasons for restricting the 
regulation of substantive inequality to the domestic realm; the absence of institutions 
of citizenship at the global level. Insofar as there are no institutions of global 
citizenship based on deliberative democracy, human beings do not need the 
regulation of substantive inequality in order to help them maintain their equal status 
as citizens participating in public deliberation. On the other hand, equally important 
for the moral relevance of the regulation of substantive inequality is citizens’ 
motivation to support extensive redistributive measures. As Miller argues, the 
regulation of substantive inequality presupposes citizens’ willingness to shoulder 
special obligations towards each other. As he explains,  
 
The duties in question must be integral to the relationship in the sense that 
the relationship could not exist in the form that it does unless the duties were 
generally acknowledged. In other words, the duties are not merely an ethical 
superstructure erected on top of an attachment whose real basis is something 
else…but they are central to the way that the relationship is understood by 
the participants (Miller, 2007, p. 35). 
 
In other words, the particular obligation to support the regulation of substantive 
inequality should be integral to the human association in question, so that the ethical 
demand of substantive equality in material terms and the motivation to comply with 
it are one and the same. This understanding of the regulation of substantive 
inequality and the motivation is shared by other liberal nationalists. For instance, 
Tamir argues that, ‘willingness to assume the burdens entailed by distributive 
 
 
257 
justice…rests on…a feeling of relatedness to those with whom we share our assets’ 
(Tamir, 1993, p. 118). This implies that special obligations to regulate substantive 
inequality in material terms among citizens of the same nation-state are possible ‘not 
only because (the state) ...is effective as a mechanism of coordination and as a 
protector of their rights and interests, but rather because it serves as an object for 
their identification’ (Tamir, 1993, p. 135). Hence, to liberal nationalists, the nation-
state as a distinct distributive context that warrants the regulation of substantive 
inequality already presupposes the coincidence between the administrative state and 
the national community, so as to combine the ethical demand of substantive equality 
implicated by the institutions of citizenship and the motivation to comply with it as 
supplied by a common nationality.   
 
In the global justice debate, the cosmopolitans and the statists both question the 
liberal nationalists’ attempt to ground the moral relevance of the regulation of 
substantive inequality in the correspondence between the institutions of citizenship 
and the citizens’ motivation to comply with it, in the sense that the said 
correspondence will necessarily yield the ethical demand for substantive inequality 
regulation. For instance, starting from the standpoint of the cosmopolitans, Gilabert 
argues that the absence of a national community based on shared cultural values does 
not stand in the way of a concern with the regulation of substantive inequality in 
material terms, insofar as a national community is a contingent historical fact that 
cannot be considered fundamental to individual well-being as are other associations 
such as friendship and familial relationship. As he says, ‘not all special relationships 
have the same normative weight. Some are obviously very strong, and others are 
clearly very weak. It is worth asking whether national ties provide a compelling case 
for special relationships with great normative weight’ (Gilabert, 2012, p. 203). Since 
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‘nationhood and states are clearly contingent historical formations humans could 
avoid without fundamental losses to their wellbeing,’ this implies that ‘national 
identity and institutions might best be seen as valuable to the extent that they 
facilitate servicing other values such as solidarity, distributive justice, and 
democratic participation’ (Gilabert, 2012, p. 204). Similarly, attempting to validate 
the statists’ account of global distributive justice in light of cosmopolitanism, 
Valentini agrees with Gilabert’s conclusion by emphasising the instrumental value of 
national community to motivate citizens to comply with the ethical demands of 
distributive justice. She maintains, 
 
Of course, fellow feelings are likely to facilitate the realisation of justice. 
People are much more likely to accept and abide by principles of justice 
when these are perceived as applying to their associates. This, however, is a 
purely instrumental consideration: the existence of a sense of community 
should not affect the normative applicability of principles of justice as such 
but only their prospects of success (Valentini, 2012, p. 62-3). 
 
Nevertheless, these objections to the liberal nationalists’ account of distributive 
justice do not dispute the motivational force of a sense of national community among 
citizens. They are merely opposed to the idea that the above-mentioned motivational 
force should be given so much moral weight as to block the regulation of substantive 
inequality outright. As Gilabert concedes, the complete rejection of the intrinsic 
value of national community is not the only option available to cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitans could also hold the view that a national community ‘may have 
intrinsic value, but not enough weight to limit global egalitarian demands to secure 
for all equal chances to live good lives’ (Gilabert, 2012, p. 204).  
 
Note that these objections do not directly engage with the liberal nationalists’ 
account of distributive justice as do the associativist cosmopolitans with the statists’ 
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account, in the sense that they do not strive to prove that human beings actually 
share a sense of common identity based on common cultural values at the global 
level. However, were they to take serious account of the motivational force of 
national community, as do the associativist cosmopolitans with the statists’ account, 
they would find the liberal nationalists’ account more convincing than that of the 
statists for two reasons. Firstly, the liberal nationalists do not reject the moral 
relevance of the institutions of citizenship which the statist accounts take to be 
fundamental to the grounding of the regulation of substantive inequality. In fact, as 
discussed above, they propose an account based on the coincidence of the 
institutions of citizenship and the motivational force of a national community and, as 
such, should logically have a stronger and more nuanced interpretation of the 
grounding of the regulation of substantive inequality. For instance, Miller recognises 
the validity of the statists’ accounts of global distributive justice based on 
involuntariness, coercion and reciprocity, while insisting that these accounts need to 
be combined with the liberal nationalists’ account based on a common identity 
among citizens, in order to justify the restriction of the regulation of substantive 
inequality to the domestic level. As he says, nation-states should be treated as a 
different distributive context than the global level because ‘political communities of 
this kind combine at least three different modes of human relationship, each of them 
relevant to distributive justice.’ In particular, a nation-state ‘applies coercive laws to 
all its members; those members identify with one another as compatriots; and 
although it is not fully self-contained from an economic point of view, its economy 
and accompanying set of social services can be regarded as a large-scale cooperative 
practice since most production, exchange and distribution occurs within the borders 
of the state’ (Miller, 2013, p. 161-2). Thus, the aforementioned cosmopolitans’ 
challenge to the statists’ account of global distributive justice will not undermine 
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Miller’s liberal nationalist account immediately, insofar as his account employs four 
factors that define nation-states as a distinct distributive context: involuntariness, 
coercion, reciprocity and common identity. 
 
Secondly, the liberal nationalists go to greater lengths than the statists to reveal the 
motivational base of any institution of citizenship, insofar as existing nation-states 
cannot fulfil their functions without instilling a sense of common nationality based 
on shared cultural values among their citizens in the first place. As I demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, a nation-state cannot bypass the need for a common national identity and 
a shared public culture, even if it resorts to Habermas’s constitutional patriotism—
one of the most plausible accounts of social integration based on the legitimation of 
all legal rules within society. In contrast to the liberal nationalists’ belief that a 
common nationality should be purposefully developed and preserved through 
deliberative democracy, Habermas argues that a sense of solidarity among citizens 
could be developed through the legitimation of all legal rules in a legally 
institutionalised communicative action alone. In effect, constitutional patriotism has 
to rely on the conviction that a communicative action, once legally institutionalised 
as a law-making procedure, could strengthen the interpersonal relationships among 
citizens through increasing the amount of shared normative understandings in the 
process of negotiating different interpretations of legal rules among themselves 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 15). Nevertheless, as I showed, Habermas and the constitutional 
patriots do not have an explanation for why citizens could be motivated to participate 
in a legally institutionalised communicative action in the first place. Without a 
shared national identity, citizens would not have sufficient mutual trust among 
themselves to believe that others will advance claims in good faith if they are willing 
to do so in the law-making process. Of course, the constitutional patriots could 
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respond that citizens could be motivated by a shared political culture that situates the 
validity of a legally institutionalised communicative action in the broader historical 
development of the democratic decision-making procedure in their nation-state 
(Michelman, 2001, p. 269; Ferrara, 2001, p. 787). In other words, citizens could be 
motivated to comply with the rationale of a communicative action if a shared 
political culture could help them understand communicative action as the result of a 
gradual historical development of a democratic decision-making procedure. 
Unfortunately, this claim does not obtain, insofar as there is a gap between the 
existing political culture and the new one that is to validate the legally 
institutionalised communicative action. In other words, Habermas’s conception of 
political culture is too thin to help citizens understand the evolution of democracy as 
a continuous process, for it consists merely in essential normative convictions about 
the validity of the law-making process and nothing more. Therefore, citizens could 
only be sufficiently motivated to comply with the rationale of communicative action 
if they share a more comprehensive public culture that could help them understand 
the gap between the existing and the new political culture. This means that nation-
states cannot bypass the need for a common national identity and a shared public 
culture in order to exist and fulfil their duties towards the citizens in the long term. 
Thus, in this light, the statists’ accounts of distributive justice are predicated on the 
validity of the motivational force of national community, since without it the 
institutions of citizenship cannot exist, let alone fulfil their obligations towards 
citizens within nation-states.  
 
In a sense, therefore, the liberal nationalist account of distributive justice stands a 
good chance of subsuming the statist accounts because it is developed on top of the 
three statist accounts combined, and is predicated upon the motivational force of a 
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common identity, which enables any institution of citizenship to exist and fulfil its 
obligations to citizens. However, in light of these two advantages, could the liberal 
nationalists’ account of distributive justice overcome the aforementioned ‘continuum 
objection’ levelled by the cosmopolitans against the statist accounts? Recall that the 
‘continuum objection’ suggests that it is unreasonable to expect a single criterion to 
qualitatively distinguish nation-states as a different distributive context from the 
global level, in that the human associations at the domestic and the global levels 
differ from each other in degree. Therefore, considering that the statists fail to 
provide a definite threshold above which the human association will qualify as 
sufficiently similar to the one within nation-states, the impasse between the 
associativist cosmopolitans and the statists cannot be resolved simply by arguing for 
the similarities between the domestic and the global realms. In this sense, the liberal 
nationalists inherit the problem of the ‘continuum objection’ by combining the three 
statist accounts with a new criterion—common identity—insofar as the multi-faceted 
criterion still cannot distinguish the human association within nation-states as being 
qualitatively different from that obtaining in the global realm. In other words, the 
global level differs from the nation-state in terms of the involuntariness of 
membership, institutional coercion, reciprocal relations among human beings and the 
strength of a common identity to some degree. Therefore, without a definite 
threshold, we could only be sure that there is a difference in degree between the 
human associations at the domestic and the global level. Nonetheless, we are unable 
to draw the conclusion from this difference that it justifies the restriction of the 
regulation of substantive inequality to the domestic level.  
 
 
 
 
 
263 
Conclusion 
 
I have established in this chapter that the global justice debate among the 
cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists sees an impasse gradually 
being formed with regard to the moral relevance of the regulation of substantive 
inequality at the global level. The cosmopolitans believe that the moral equality of 
human beings is the most fundamental moral principle, whereas they disagree among 
themselves over the intrinsic value of the human association within nation-states. I 
have demonstrated that the humanist cosmopolitans do not engage in a fruitful 
dialogue with the statists and the liberal nationalists, as the humanist cosmopolitans 
reject outright the latters’ view that the intrinsic value of the human association 
within nation-states grounds the moral relevance of the regulation of substantive 
inequality. Nevertheless, the statists and the liberal nationalists could refute the 
humanist cosmopolitans’ account of distributive justice on the ground that the luck-
choice distinction in and by itself cannot justify different approaches to the 
responsibility-insensitive satisfaction of basic needs and the responsibility-sensitive 
regulation of substantive inequality. It has to be anchored in the relational ideal of 
the equal relationship among citizens, which amounts to the total and/or partial 
subsumption of humanist cosmopolitanism into statism and/or liberal nationalism.  
 
In contrast, despite the associativist cosmopolitans’ recognition of the grounding 
relation between human association within nation-states and the regulation of 
substantive inequality, I demonstrated that their continual challenge of the statist 
accounts will eventually lead to an impasse, insofar as the latter fails to offer a 
definitive threshold above which human association at the global level will resemble 
sufficiently that at the domestic level. Moreover, the liberal nationalist account 
 
 
264 
combines the three statist accounts based on involuntariness, coercion and 
reciprocity with a new, culturally defined criterion—a common identity among 
citizens. In this light, the liberal nationalists could subsume the statist accounts 
because it is based upon those statist accounts and adds a new criterion that is 
fundamental to the sustaining of any institution of citizenship. However, when the 
liberal nationalists subsume the statist accounts of global distributive justice, they 
inherit the latter’s problem with the ‘continuum objection’ as well, in that the liberal 
nationalists such as Miller still cannot decisively prove to the cosmopolitans that the 
difference in degree between the human associations at the domestic and the global 
levels generates different requirements for distributive justice. Hence, it seems that 
the impasse at the level of substantive theory persists, mainly between associativist 
cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism. In the next chapter, I will go further to 
discuss a similar impasse among cosmopolitanism, statism and liberal nationalism at 
the methodological level and show that my reconstruction of Miller’s account of a 
deliberative democracy on the basis of Habermas’s conception of communicative 
action could help resolve these two impasses. 
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Chapter 8: 
 Resolving the Two Impasses in the Global Justice Debate:  
the Argument for the Further Institutionalisation of Global 
Citizenship 
 
I have demonstrated in Chapter 7 that the global justice debate among the 
cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists over the scope of the regulation 
of substantive inequality in effect leads to an impasse between the associativist 
cosmopolitans and the liberal nationalists at the level of substantive theory. This is 
because the liberal nationalists cannot persuade the associativist cosmopolitans to 
accept the validity of grounding the restriction of the regulation of substantive 
inequality in the difference in degree between human association at the domestic and 
the global level. In this section, I will focus on another impasse in the global justice 
debate at the methodological level, wherein the cosmopolitans disagree with the 
statists and the liberal nationalists over the method of developing a substantive 
theory of distributive justice. I will argue that the statists’ and the liberal nationalists’ 
insistence on accounting for common people’s motivation to comply with the ethical 
demands of distributive principles cannot successfully persuade the cosmopolitans to 
accept the irrelevance of the regulation of substantive inequality at the global level.  
 
In section 1, I will introduce two means of justification in the cosmopolitan theories 
of distributive justice based on, respectively, the logical compatibility of distributive 
principles with the moral equality of human beings and its acceptability to those who 
are subject to its regulation. In section 2, I will address three lines of argument 
criticising the first way of providing justification advanced by the statists and the 
liberal nationalists: (1) the cosmopolitan approach to distributive justice is not 
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realistic, (2) the cosmopolitan approach does not take serious account of feasibility 
constraints, and, (3) the cosmopolitan approach does not take account of the 
common people’s motivation to comply with distributive principles. Out of these 
critiques, only the last one obtains in light of the cosmopolitans’ challenge, insofar as 
moral reasoning is likely to lead to purely utopian ideals without taking account of 
the common people’s motivation to comply with moral principles. Nevertheless, I 
will show that the liberal nationalists cannot effectively persuade the cosmopolitans 
to accept the moral irrelevance of the regulation of substantive inequality at the 
global level, despite the fact that their methodological commitment to accounting for 
common people’s motivation is not only valid but also more sophisticated than the 
statists’ similar approach to distributive justice. This is because the cosmopolitans 
and the liberal nationalists understand differently the implications of common moral 
intuitions and political emotions for distributive justice at the global level. In section 
3, I will show that, in order to resolve the two impasses at the level of substantive 
theory and the level of methodology, the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal 
nationalists all need to endorse the further institutionalisation of global citizenship 
based on my reconstruction of Miller’s account of deliberative democracy. This is 
because an institutionalised deliberative procedure could, in principle, help people 
reach a normative consensus on a set of global distributive principles most consistent 
with their common moral intuitions and political emotions. 
 
1. The Two Means of Justification 
 
First and foremost, the cosmopolitans usually adopt two ways of justifying 
distributive principles; that is, (1) the logical compatibility of the distributive 
principle with the moral equality of human beings, and, (2) the acceptability of the 
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distributive principle to those who are regulated by it. The humanist cosmopolitans 
usually adopt the first means of justification alone, as exemplified in Caney’s 
argument presented in Justice beyond Borders (2005). Caney demonstrates the 
existence of universal principles of distributive justice, partly through investigating 
the logical coherence of the prevalent cosmopolitan conceptions of distributive 
justice and thereby proving the compatibility between those conceptions and the 
moral equality of human beings. Moreover, the objection to the division between the 
domestic and the international spheres also contributes to translating the moral 
equality among moral agents into substantive equality in material terms. For 
example, he rejects Rawls’s argument in The Law of Peoples (1999) that egalitarian 
social justice should not be extrapolated to the global level. Rawls resorts to the 
moral significance of a people’s autonomy to make collective and binding decisions. 
A similar line of argument is made by David Miller to justify the division between 
the domestic and the international spheres with distributive implications, which I 
covered in the last chapter with regard to the validity of the ‘dynamic problem.’ 
According to Caney, a critical problem with such a division is that the moral 
significance of peoples’ autonomy is not a valid justification. ‘(I)t would be highly 
unjust to disadvantage an individual because of a decision that he or she did not take 
but that some, possibly unelected, politicians took’ (Caney, 2005, p. 130), meaning, 
as I interpret Caney’s words, that Rawls’s and Miller’s justifications for the division 
between the domestic and the international spheres is logically incompatible with the 
moral equality of human beings, because it amounts to an unequal treatment of 
individuals in illiberal societies.  
 
Secondly, the associativist cosmopolitans also endorse an additional justification on 
top of the first one, which is the logical compatibility with the moral equality of 
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human beings. This justification is defined as the general acceptability to most of 
those who are regulated by the principles. It derives from the notion of ‘reasonable 
rejection’ created by the contractarian thinker, Thomas Scanlon. He argues that 
sound moral principles could only be justified when the agents affected by them 
could not reasonably reject them, ex ante, under some appropriate method of 
modelling rational consent (Scanlon, 1998, p. 338-49). Moreover, Brian Barry, 
following Scanlon’s theory, tailors the idea of reasonable rejection in light of the 
global justice debate, insisting that principles of justice could only be justified when 
no one affected by them could reasonably reject them (Barry, 1995). Gilabert terms 
this variant of Scanlon’s reasonable rejection in light of the global justice debate as 
‘cosmopolitan justifiability’—that is, ‘We should treat each other on the basis of 
principles of justice that no one, as free and equal persons, could reasonably reject’ 
(Gilabert, 2012, p. 10). According to him, cosmopolitan justifiability is ‘an epistemic 
operationalisation of the idea of moral equality’ that imposes a constraint on the 
development of particular principles of global distributive justice. The moral equality 
of human beings and cosmopolitan justifiability together justify any appropriate 
principle of global distributive justice.  
 
2. Debating the Fact-Dependency of Distributive Principles 
  
In the global justice debate, the first justification falls under repeated criticism from 
the statists and the liberal nationalists for failing to offer a morally relevant account 
of distributive justice at the global level. That is to say, the cosmopolitans’ attempt to 
justify their theory of global distributive justice on the basis of logical compatibility 
with the moral equality of human beings suffers from three deficiencies. First, the 
cosmopolitan vision of distributive justice is merely a chimera, insofar as it ignores 
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the fact that nation-states are self-interested corporate moral agents and differ from 
each other in terms of their cultural values. Second, the cosmopolitan vision cannot 
offer any immediate guidance for realising its ideal. Third, the cosmopolitan vision 
does not provide a valid account of people’s motivation to support the regulation of 
substantive inequality at the global level, because this vision is imposed upon the 
world population without taking into account their common moral intuitions and 
political emotions.  
 
First and foremost, statists and liberal nationalists point to the fact that there are 
substantial differences between the international and the domestic arenas. For 
instance, according to Kenneth Waltz, ‘the international system is a ‘self-help’ 
system in which the unit members (i.e. states) have no choice but to pursue their own 
interests. If they do not they will lose out...There is therefore no possibility for the 
pursuit of moralistic ideals like eliminating poverty’ (Waltz, 1983, p. 1-32; cited by 
Caney, 2005, p. 137). From a realist perspective, this view depicts a conflict between 
the ethical demands of global distributive justice in general and the world order as a 
‘state of nature.’ Insofar as nation-states will lose out if they aim to further ethical 
ideals at the global level, they will refrain from this attempt altogether in reality. 
Nevertheless, since this criticism is levelled against global justice theories in general 
rather than cosmopolitanism in particular, I will briefly explain how it does not 
obtain in light of the questionable link between the empirical claim that world order 
is and can only be a state of nature, and the normative claim that global distributive 
justice in general is not applicable. As Beitz and Jon Mandel demonstrate, nation-
states do not always favour a course of action that leads to the maximisation of their 
national interests, insofar as there are many other considerations—some of which 
concern ethical demands—influencing the final foreign policies of each nation-state 
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(Beitz, 1979, p. 37-50; Mandel, 2014, p. 34). Moreover, even given the accurate 
depiction of the international system, the normative conclusion that morality is not 
applicable still does not follow, because there are conceptual difficulties in 
analogising the international system with a state of nature. In a state of nature, the 
parties are individual persons, whereas in the international system, the equivalents 
are nation-states. Beitz goes further to argue that using the analogy of a state of 
nature to facilitate the conceptual jump from a description of international relations 
to the prescriptive claims is at best a limited device, whereas ‘the justification of 
international principles is independent of this comparison’ (Beitz, 1979, p. 63). In 
other words, the realist normative claim that distributive justice is not required in a 
world similar to a state of nature still begs the fundamental question: why is it not 
required?  
 
The second charge claims that the ‘top-down approach’ adopted by the 
cosmopolitans overlooks the specific context which distributive principles are to 
regulate and, as such, is not morally relevant. As Caney understands this criticism, 
‘universal principles are inappropriate, if not useless, because they are too general 
and abstract to have much applicability. All the relevant work is done by local 
circumstance. What is needed is a contextualist approach that articulates principles 
appropriate for specific historical circumstances’ (Caney, 2005, p. 40). For instance, 
Walzer argues, ‘Morality is thick from the beginning, culturally integrated, fully 
resonant, and it reveals itself thinly only on special occasions, when moral language 
is turned to specific purposes’ (Walzer, 1994, p. 4). Consistent with the 
abovementioned bottom-up approach to moral issues, Walzer here stresses the need 
to derive moral principles from existing practices and conventions, because they are 
both deeply situated within specific cultural understandings and applicable to 
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specific occasions. In other words, he rejects the cosmopolitans’ tendency to 
formulate global principles of distributive justice independently of local contexts and 
then substantiate them further with particular cultural values prevalent within 
specific contexts. As I discussed in Chapter 5, Miller calls the said tendency of 
cosmopolitanism to treat contextualist morality as the localised extension of the 
general and abstract principle the ‘starship enterprise view of political philosophy.’ 
According to him, the starship enterprise view is doomed to irrelevance because,   
 
(It) draws a line between political philosophy proper, which involves 
defining concepts and setting out principles in an entirely fact-free way, and 
applied political theory, which takes these basic concepts and principles and, 
in the light of empirical evidence, proposes a more concrete set of rules to 
govern the arrangements of a particular society, or a particular group of 
societies (Miller, 2008, p. 31). 
 
Nevertheless, in relevant moral reasoning—what he calls a ‘political philosophy for 
earthlings’—‘even the basic concepts and principles of political theory are fact-
dependent’ (Miller, 2008, p. 31). Philosophers need to be concerned with two types 
of feasibility constraints: political feasibility and technical feasibility. According to 
the former, ‘whether a proposal is feasible depends on whether it can command 
sufficient political support to be adopted.’ The latter focuses on ‘whether a proposal 
contravenes physical laws or rock bottom social or psychological laws’ (Miller, 2008, 
p. 46). Therefore, it seems that the difference between the cosmopolitan approach on 
the one hand and the statist and the liberal nationalist approach to formulating global 
principles of distributive justice lies in the relationship between principles and the 
contexts they are supposed to regulate. Whereas the cosmopolitans aim to develop 
distributive principles independently of the particularities of contexts and then 
further substantiate these principles with particular cultural values of the latter, 
statists and the liberal nationalists such as Miller and Walzer strive to allow the 
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particularities of the context to contribute to the formulation of distributive principles 
from the very beginning.  
 
The stark contrast between both these interpretations of Rawls’s notion of ‘realist 
utopia’ supports my identification of the difference at stake here. Rawls, in The Law 
of Peoples (1999), memorably coins the notion of ‘realistic utopia’ to denote the 
division of labour between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘non-ideal’ approaches that jointly 
bring the ideally desirable vision of social institutions closer to the world as it is, 
within various constraints posed by the particular context. Nonetheless, he claims,  
 
The problem here is that the limits of the possible are not given by the actual, 
for we can to a greater or lesser extent change political and social 
institutions and much else. Hence, we have to rely on conjecture and 
speculation, arguing as best we can that the social world we envision is 
feasible and might actually exist, if not now then at some future time under 
happier circumstances (Rawls, 1999, p. 12).  
 
According to this notion, the cosmopolitans, statists, and liberal nationalists each 
highlight their preferred portion of the aforementioned notion. To the cosmopolitans, 
it is the utopian part, whereas to the statists and the liberal nationalists, it is the 
realist part.  
 
Taken at face value, the cosmopolitans believe that, following Rawls, developing 
fundamentally appropriate moral principles to substantiate the utopian vision is 
critical above all else. They accept the contextualisation of moral principles in 
different non-ideal situations where they are meant to apply. However, the facts 
about the real world as it is should not constrain moral reasoning at the fundamental 
level in order to preserve the critical bite of the utopian vision. As a direct corollary, 
most cosmopolitans also adopt the Rawlsian notion of ‘natural duty of justice;’ that 
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is, it ‘requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply 
to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least 
when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 99). At 
the global level, since the basic background conditions are not yet regulated by just 
institutions, we are morally obligated to create them, even if there are currently 
various unfavourable factors present (Buchanan, 2005, p. 85-94).  
 
On the other hand, statists and liberal nationalists offer a different interpretation of 
Rawls’s ‘realistic utopia,’ stressing the centrality of the fact-dependence of moral 
principles at the fundamental level. For instance, Risse argues that the said notion 
breaks down into three characteristics. First, ‘a realistic utopia is relative to time. 
What is realistically utopian now may differ from what it is generations later.’ 
Second, ‘a realistic utopia reconciles us with our social world: some aspects of that 
world we cannot change, at least now, or we would be ill-advised to change.’ Third, 
although a realistic utopia goes beyond what is feasible to achieve now, it ‘must 
contain principles that members of that society could be brought to accept by 
reasoned discussion, which means that the principles cannot have implications that 
those citizens would find abhorrent’ (Miller, 2008, p. 46-7; cited by Risse, 2012, p. 
322). That is to say, fundamentally appropriate principles depend on the socially 
contingent facts about the real world. Likewise, Miller points out, ‘Rawls himself 
would have no problem with this dependence on contingent facts.’ His idea of 
realistic utopia is that ‘by extending the limits of political possibility…we shall also 
come to a better understanding of the limits of the reshaping, and therefore become 
reconciled to those aspects of our condition that cannot be changed’ (Miller, 2008, p. 
40, 41). 
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I agree with the cosmopolitans that, in order to retain the critical bite of global 
principles of distributive justice, one has to distance oneself from the world as it is. 
Otherwise, the best we can achieve would be an affirmation of the normative 
understandings which the existing world order inculcates in each of us through 
socialisation, and a fundamental change in the world would indeed be unattainable. 
This line of reasoning is often adopted by the cosmopolitans to fuel their counter-
argument against the charge of irrelevance levelled by the statists and the liberal 
nationalists. They call it ‘the status-quo charge.’ Valentini reports two versions of 
the status-quo-bias charge against statism and liberal nationalism; that is, the static 
and the dynamic version. The static version contends that a fixation on sovereign 
states is not justified until all units of analysis, such as supranational organisations, 
politically autonomous regional governments, transnational cultural communities 
and so on are considered in turn. Although, it is not in itself problematic that human 
association within nation-states is deemed by the statists and the liberal nationalists 
to be morally relevant; there might be other equally, if not more fundamentally 
appropriate units to be chosen. Hence, with regard to the statists and the liberal 
nationalists’ accounts of distributive justice, ‘(t)he selection of the unit of analysis 
and the distribution of boundaries separating one set of practices from the other has 
so far remained unjustified’ (Ypi, 2012, p. 74).  
 
The dynamic version of the status-quo-bias charge claims that the statists and the 
liberal nationalists’ wilful ignorance of the important facts about the current world 
order due to the idealisation of human association within nation-states as well as 
territorial distribution leads to an inability to assist moral agents with practical 
choices. Ypi reports that the cosmopolitans generally level a criticism of an idealised 
human association against both the ‘cultural-conventionalist’ and the ‘political-
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institutionalist’ accounts. According to his definitions of the said two accounts, one 
can only assume them to be equivalent to the liberal nationalist and the statist 
accounts respectively. Indeed, the statists and the liberal nationalists do not take 
offence at the charge of idealisation. The liberal nationalists admit that they intend 
their theory of global justice to be ideal at this level, because ‘(t)he real issue…is not 
so much verifying whether any existing collection of individuals really exhibits all 
the relational properties associated with cultural conventionalism’ (Ypi, 2012, p. 73). 
Moreover, the point about the statist account is ‘not about how the world would look 
if its basic social institutions were redesigned from scratch. It is about how we could 
justify the existence of such institutions to the specific agents they serve to represent’ 
(Ypi, 2012, p. 74). However, by emphasising the overarching significance of nation-
states, statism and liberal nationalism beg the question as to whether problems at the 
systemic level, such as environmental degradation, international immigration flow, 
terrorism and so on can be successfully resolved. These globalised threats cannot be 
tackled single-handedly by each nation-state, and have to rely on a coordinated effort 
at the global level. With regard to distributive justice in particular, as the 
cosmopolitans continually point out, extreme poverty and radical substantive 
inequality in material terms at the global level can be traced back to the background 
fairness of the global economic order. By letting an idealised account of human 
association within nation-states trump all ethical concerns with globalised threats, 
including the unfair distribution of material advantages, our moral reasoning does 
not offer any actionable guidance for resolving these urgent problems faced by 
humanity as a whole. 
 
These are indeed forceful challenges against statism and liberal nationalism, insofar 
as both schools of thought place great emphasis on preserving the nation-state as the 
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primary distributor of material advantages at the global level without considering 
alternative political arrangements. Nevertheless, given that a complete ignorance of 
all alternative political arrangements will not elevate us sufficiently above the world 
as it is to tackle newly emerging problems at the global level, it still does not serve to 
decisively refute the statists and the liberal nationalists’ insistence on allowing the 
moral particularities of nation-states to bear on our moral reasoning about 
distributive justice. This is because, even though the ideal world order is not given 
by the actual, as Rawls says, we still have to rely on speculation and conjecture in to 
order to argue that it could actually exist. Note that there is a big difference between 
conjecture and speculation on the one hand and fantasy on the other, for the former 
has to be based on reality, whereas the latter relies on our wishful thinking alone. 
Therefore, Rawls’s ‘realist utopia’ should take feasibility constraints into 
consideration in the process of speculating about principles of distributive justice, 
meaning that the cosmopolitans’ proposal to imagine the world as it should be from 
the word go is a one-sided portrayal of Rawls’s approach to political theory. Hence, 
the statists and the liberal nationalists are correct to point out that political principles 
cannot be imposed from nowhere, as the cosmopolitans suggest. Rather, they have to 
be developed in the specific contexts that are subject to their regulation insofar as the 
facts about these distributive contexts are highly particular. 
 
This brings us to the third criticism of the cosmopolitan account of global 
distributive justice. This points to the lack of motivational strength in the 
cosmopolitan conception of distributive justice. ‘(P)roponents of this critique argue 
that cosmopolitan theories lack a capacity for guidance because they fail to motivate 
existing agents: in practice, cosmopolitanism is doomed to fail because no one is 
willing to follow its prescriptions’ (Valentini, 2011, p. 32; original emphasis). This 
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line of criticism draws strength from the conviction that ‘moral principles must 
resonate with those subject to them: they must be able to inspire them to comply 
with them’ (Walzer, 1988, p. 16; cited by Caney, 2005, p. 41). Among Walzer’s 
most influential proponents, Miller provides a forceful account of cosmopolitanism’s 
said deficiency in motivating moral agents, claiming that it relies on an implausible 
picture of moral agency in two aspects: ‘It draws a sharp line between moral agency 
and personal identity on the one hand, and between moral agency and personal 
motivation on the other’ (Miller, 1995, p. 57). With the counterfactual device based 
on the wedge driven between moral agency and personal motivation, however, 
cosmopolitanism is incapable of successfully comprehending the ethical significance 
of human association within nation-states. As a result, the cosmopolitan conception 
of distributive justice could not motivate moral agents in the real world either. 
 
These criticisms against the cosmopolitan theories are consistent with a growing 
awareness in the field of political philosophy in general; that is, ‘it must be at least 
theoretically plausible that individuals could be motivated to act in the ways that a 
theory of justice demands’ (Cameron, 2017, p. 3). This trend accompanies a second 
way to justify distributive principles that has been gradually gathering momentum of 
late; that is, normative principles of distributive justice have to be acceptable to those 
whose behaviour patterns are subject to their regulation. As a matter of fact, many 
associativist cosmopolitans have come to take serious account of motivation. For 
instance, A. Burcu Bayram has recently analysed the psychological effects of 
individual values on people’s voluntary choice to see themselves as world citizens. 
He adopted four perspectives to inform this research: normative, economic, cultural 
and liberal. First, the normative account considers that the cosmopolitan motivation 
derives from a desire to further others’ well-being regardless of their race, sex, 
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ethnicity, et cetera. Second, the economic account derives motivation from the 
shared lifestyle of a class of elites who benefit from the globalised economic order. 
Third, the cultural account derives motivation from the desire to promote the 
tolerance of difference and the pluralism of values. Lastly, the liberal account 
derives motivation from people’s desire to promote their independence from 
imposed national identities. In order to test the validity of these accounts, Bayram 
then posits four testable variables: self- transcendence, self-enhancement, openness 
to change and conservation. The self-transcendence value serves to operationalise 
the normative account of the cosmopolitan motivation, insofar as it emphasises 
altruism and concern for others’ well-being. The self-enhancement value serves to 
operationalise the economic account, as someone scoring high on this value will be 
more driven to pursue self-interests. The conservation value operationalises the 
cultural account, since an individual with a high score on this value will be more 
willing to conform to convention and tradition and, as such, disapprove of the 
cultural account of cosmopolitan motivation. The openness to change operationalises 
the liberal account because it emphasises an individual’s tendency to learn about 
diversity and novelty through independent thoughts (Bayram, 2015, p. 452- 9). 
Based on data collected through the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey, 
Bayram derives the following conclusion through establishing a statistical 
correlation between cosmopolitan allegiance and the four individual values 
respectively. As he shows, a strong positive correlation exists between cosmopolitan 
allegiance and self-transcendence, a positive correlation between self-enhancement 
and openness to change, and nonetheless a negative one between cosmopolitan 
allegiance and the conservation value. This proves that world citizenship appeals to 
self-transcendence and self-enhancement alike. However, the conservation values 
hinder cosmopolitan allegiance since they call for self-restraint and obedience to 
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authority. Therefore, the four accounts of cosmopolitan motivations are to a great 
extent correct (Bayram, 2015, p. 459-72).  
 
At first glance, Bayram’s research seems to undercut the statists and the liberal 
nationalists’ assertion that a cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice will remain 
abstract and inapplicable as long as it does not allow the motivational force of 
particular attachment to administrative state or national community to bear on the 
formulation of principles. Nevertheless, the negative correlation between the 
conservation value and cosmopolitan allegiance does not necessarily suggest that 
conformity to tradition and convention hinders a cosmopolitan allegiance. Rather, it 
could be understood as a powerful source of motivation that could be reformed in the 
long run to support cosmopolitan allegiance, insofar as tradition and convention 
change according to the collective will of the people. There is no reason why 
existing traditions and conventions cannot change to accommodate cosmopolitanism 
through cosmopolitan education, as Nussbaum suggests. Even though she argues that 
national attachments prevent us from recognising our moral status as cosmopolitans, 
at the same time she believes that we could resort to what she calls ‘cosmopolitan 
education’ in order to realise the cosmopolitan ideals. If it starts from a very young 
age, cosmopolitan education serves to broaden children’s locus of care beyond the 
attachment to the local, including especially nationhood, to cover the whole human 
race. In other words, Nussbaum wants to harness the motivational force of the 
particular attachments concentrated most intensely in familial relations, friendship 
groups and nationhood to support the universalist principles of distributive justice 
through purposeful education from a young age. This amounts to the recognition of 
political emotions as an important source of motivational force for human beings to 
support political principles and social institutions.  
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Moreover, John David Cameron argues that besides long-term education, there are 
also strategies that may motivate citizens of each nation-state to support 
cosmopolitan ideals: audience segmentation, values and framing and emotional 
messaging. First, audience segmentation points to the possibility that cosmopolitans 
can tailor their messages to the general public differently, according to the 
preferences of the group of people they are appealing to. Second, values and framing 
suggest that, depending on the different issues, the cosmopolitans can frame their 
message purposefully in order to stimulate a favourable emotional reaction in the 
general public. Third, emotional messaging emphasises the need to adopt more 
emotionally charged strategies to elicit cosmopolitan appeal; for instance, rhetoric 
and narratives as Young suggests (Cameron, 2017, p. 10-3). However, this account 
of the value of political emotions in the global justice debate differs from the statists 
and the liberal nationalists’ understanding, in the sense that the associativist 
cosmopolitans like Nussbaum and Cameron do not allow political emotions to bear 
on our moral reasoning about political principles and social institutions. Conversely, 
they only develop specific strategies to utilise political emotion as an instrument to 
motivate human beings to support universalist moral principles.  
 
Insofar as the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists all resort to 
interpretations of Rawls’s notion of a ‘realist utopia,’ it is relevant here to clarify the 
counterfactual method which realist utopia enables—the ‘original position.’ As I 
suggested at the end of the second charge against the cosmopolitan theory of 
distributive justice as being too abstract and general, ‘realist utopia’ does not 
implicate a moral reasoning independent of the actual conditions of particular 
contexts. Although a realist utopia is proposed in The Law of Peoples (1999), it 
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enables both the initial original position adopted by Rawls at the domestic level in A 
Theory of Justice (1977) and Political Liberalism (1993), and the second original 
position at the international level. The original position is the hypothetical setting 
within which, behind a ‘veil of ignorance,’ rational individuals with equal standing 
choose freely among the possible governing principles of justice in order to advance 
their respective personal interests (Rawls, 1999, p. 17). It is set up according to a 
criterion which Rawls calls ‘reasonableness.’ Reasonableness is associated ‘with the 
willingness to propose and honour fair terms of cooperation, and second, with the 
willingness to recognise the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences.’ 
As such, reasonableness guarantees that if the moral agents are correctly represented 
at the original position, the produced principles of justice would be acceptable to the 
actual citizens/peoples within a liberal society/society of peoples.  
 
Reasonableness is concerned with motivation insofar as Rawls associates it with 
Scanlon’s principle of moral motivation. As he explains, 
 
Scanlon’s principle is more than a psychological principle of motivation 
(though it is that) since it concerns the fundamental question why anyone 
should care about morality at all. The principle answers this by saying that 
we have a basic desire to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds 
they could not reasonably reject—reasonably, that is, given the desire to find 
principles that others similarly motivated could not reasonably reject…The 
two aspects of reasonable as a virtue of persons one may see as two related 
expressions of this desire (Rawls, 2005, p. 49f). 
 
In other words, by correctly modelling citizens/peoples at the first and the second 
original position, political theorists could formulate those principles of justice most 
likely to motivate actual citizens/peoples within liberal societies and at the 
international level. Therefore, the original position as a counterfactual thought 
experiment attempts to abstract from social contingencies such as social class, 
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ethnicities, talents, et cetera through a veil of ignorance, while at the same time 
retains a sufficient number of features of particular context in its own design so as to 
motivate people’s actual acceptance in reality. This is consistent with Risse’s 
interpretation of Rawls’s methodology that the validity of principles of justice 
depends on three factors: time, place and the actual acceptance of the people. 
According to him, principles of justice change over time, reconcile us with the 
relatively unchangeable facts of our society and have to win actual acceptance from 
people after reasoned discussion (Risse, 2012, p. 322). In a sense, statists like Rawls 
and Risse share the conviction that the formulation of principles of justice has to 
allow the facts of the particular context to bear on our moral reasoning, so as to 
motivate people’s actual acceptance.  
 
Nevertheless, as compared to the liberal nationalists such as Miller, the statists fall 
short of specifying the categories of facts that should be considered when 
formulating principles of justice. As I discussed in Chapter 5, the abovementioned 
facts include people’s common moral intuitions and political emotions. As I 
understand these terms, ‘common moral intuitions’ refers to the range of widely held 
and yet unclarified intuitions about morality in general within society. ‘Political 
emotions’ refers to the range of human emotions that could potentially be utilised to 
realise social integration, motivate altruism and preserve shared cultural values 
within society. Even though the statists will have no problem agreeing with the three 
ways in which Miller reconciles the facts about our social world with normative 
ideals, insofar as they adhere to Rawls’s notion of realist utopia. In particular, 
Rawls’s approach to the principles of justice requires us to survey as many of the 
prevalent values and philosophical doctrines within our society as possible before 
making individual judgments about the conception of justice. Additionally, as 
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mentioned above, Rawls requires the modelling of the moral agents at the original 
position to be based on particular facts about the context, so as to motivate people’s 
actual acceptance. Therefore, the statists could agree with Miller’s claim that 
common moral intuitions should be allowed to bear on our moral reasoning about 
distributive justice. 
 
However, they may not readily accept political emotions, including nationalist 
sentiments, as a relevant factor to be considered in the process of formulating 
political principles, insofar as they ground their account of distributive justice in the 
relationship between citizens and the administrative state. They could be persuaded 
if, and only if, political emotions are necessary for the maintenance of the 
institutions of citizenship itself, because their accounts of distributive justice will be 
undermined when its moral basis has to be stabilised by an extraneous factor such as 
political emotions. As demonstrated in the last chapter, the substantive theory of 
distributive justice advanced by liberal nationalists such as Miller could plausibly 
subsume statism for two reasons. First, the liberal nationalist account of distributive 
justice recognises the relevance of coercion, involuntary membership and reciprocity, 
and includes a new moral basis: common nationality. Second, insofar as a common 
nationality is indispensable for the administrative state to exist and fulfil its functions 
such as solving a collective action problem, pursuing distributive justice and 
practising deliberative democracy, liberal nationalism taps into the motivational 
force which statism takes for granted in stabilising the moral basis for its accounts of 
distributive justice. In the same vein, the statists should recognise the relevance of 
political emotions such as nationalist sentiments to the formulation of distributive 
principles because they partly determine whether the administrative state could 
continue to exist and fulfil its functions.  
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Nevertheless, even if the liberal nationalists could subsume the statists’ approach to 
motivation when formulating global principles of distributive justice and manage to 
persuade the cosmopolitans to see merit in an equal consideration of both normative 
ideal and the motivation to support it, the cosmopolitans could still refuse to accept 
the conclusion that substantive inequality regulation is not required globally. Insofar 
as different people would select different common moral intuitions and political 
emotions as relevant to their moral reasoning about distributive principles and assign 
different moral weights to them, it is unfeasible to arrive at the same set of 
distributive principles without an institutionalised procedure for actual 
communication. As discussed in Chapter 5, Miller explicitly admits having inherited 
the basic rationale of the ‘reflective equilibrium’ from Rawls. Rawls’s method 
encourages individual citizens to conduct moral reasoning through surveying as wide 
a range of norms, values and philosophical doctrines within their society as possible 
before arriving at their own conceptions of justice. Insofar as this process of moral 
reasoning is carried out by each individual in isolation, it cannot guarantee that 
citizens will come to realise that they share the same set of principles of justice 
without actual communication. Since Miller recognises this problem, he proposes an 
improved approach to political theory that encourages people to survey the common 
moral intuitions and political emotions actually held by other citizens within their 
society, rather than their own perception of these factors. However, as I 
demonstrated, Miller’s approach does not solve the fundamental problem with 
Rawls’s ‘reflective equilibrium,’ because citizens still cannot know for sure others’ 
approaches to selecting and attributing moral weights to common moral intuitions 
and political emotions without an actual communication among them. Hence, the 
liberal nationalist and the statists’ challenge to the cosmopolitans obtains to the 
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extent that the cosmopolitans either completely denounce the relevance of 
motivation or reduce the role of motivation to a factor to be considered when 
applying distributive principles produced independently of the facts of particular 
contexts. They nonetheless fall short of decisively refuting the cosmopolitan 
principles of distributive justice because their approaches to distributive principle 
fail to explain how they intend citizens to accept the same set of distributive 
principles if they have different approaches to selecting and attributing moral 
weights to common moral intuitions and political emotions.   
 
In summary, this section has introduced the two ways of justifying the cosmopolitan 
theories of distributive justice. The first way focuses on justifying distributive 
principles on the basis of their logical compatibility with the moral equality of 
human beings, whereas the second is based on their acceptability to those who are 
subject to their regulation. I have demonstrated that the three lines of criticism 
levelled by the statists and the liberal nationalists do not decisively refute the 
cosmopolitans’ proposal to regulate substantive inequality at the global level. First, 
agreeing with Beitz and Mandel, I showed that the depiction of the world order as a 
‘state of nature’ does not serve to refute the cosmopolitan stance because the 
depiction itself is contestable, and a link is missing between the said depiction and 
the refutation of the regulation of substantive inequality at the global level. Second, I 
traced the difference between the cosmopolitan stance on the one hand and the statist 
and the liberal nationalist ones on the other regarding their fundamentally different 
interpretations of Rawls’s notion of ‘realist utopia.’ Whereas the cosmopolitans 
emphasise the independence of normative ideals from the facts about particular 
contexts in order to retain the ideals’ critical bite, the statists and the liberal 
nationalists emphasise the ideals’ inevitable anchorage in the facts about particular 
 
 
286 
contexts in order for them to be relevant. Then, pace Valentini and Ypi, I showed 
that the dynamic and the static versions of the status-quo charge do not serve to 
reject the need to anchor the normative ideals in particular contexts, insofar as the 
‘realist utopia’ should not be interpreted as an endorsement of groundless fantasies. 
Third, I demonstrated that Rawls’s ‘realist utopia’ and the statists and liberal 
nationalists’ approaches to formulating distributive principles that follow from it 
essentially consist in the methodological commitment to account for people’s 
motivation to support normative ideals. In this light, the statists and the liberal 
nationalists’ charge against the cosmopolitan stance obtains, to the extent that their 
first way of justifying this denounces the need for taking account of motivation, and 
the second way reduces the role of motivation to a factor to be considered when 
applying distributive principles to particular contexts. Nevertheless, this charge 
based on motivation still does not serve to decisively refute the cosmopolitan stance, 
because the statists and the liberal nationalists fail to explain how individuals could 
come to share the same set of distributive principles when they select different facts 
about the social world and attribute different moral weights to these facts in moral 
reasoning without institutionalising a specific channel of actual communication 
among them. 
 
3. The Argument for the Further Institutionalisation of Global Citizenship 
 
So far, I have discussed the two impasses in the global justice debate among the 
cosmopolitans on the one hand and the statists and the liberal nationalists on the 
other. At the level of substantive theory, the cosmopolitans, the statists and the 
liberal nationalists all agree that the moral equality of human beings is the most 
fundamental principle, which then generates specific global principles of distributive 
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justice. At the methodological level, the impasse between the cosmopolitans on the 
one hand and the statists and the liberal nationalists on the other lies in the moral 
relevance of the facts about particular contexts which the principles of distributive 
justice are supposed to regulate.  
 
In light of these two impasses at the methodological level and the level of the 
substantive theories, I will firstly argue in this section that the methodological 
difference identified by the statists and the liberal nationalists between their theories 
and the cosmopolitan theories of distributive justice is overstated, in the sense that 
they both base their theories of distributive justice on universalist values. In 
particular, even though the statists and the liberal nationalists criticise the 
universalist values embedded in the cosmopolitan theories and emphasise the need to 
ground distributive theories in particular contexts, the fact remains that the ethically 
significant characteristics of nation-states are chosen by the statists and the liberal 
nationalists on the basis of values that they deem justifiable, regardless of cultural 
differences. Secondly, I will demonstrate that one way to resolve the global justice 
debate over the scope of the regulation of substantive inequality is to institutionalise 
global citizenship based on deliberative democracy. In this way, a formalised 
channel of actual communication could help human beings to reveal their different 
approaches to selecting the morally relevant common moral intuitions and political 
emotions and assigning moral weights to them in the moral reasoning about global 
justice. Through public deliberation among human beings or their representatives, 
they could negotiate their different approaches to the facts about our world order and 
their impacts on our moral reasoning about global justice, and thereby reach a 
consensus on the universalist values that anchor global principles of distributive 
justice in the world as a particular distributive context different from nation-states. 
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Lastly, I will demonstrate that the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal 
nationalists could be persuaded to accept my normative reason for further 
institutionalising global citizenship. More importantly, I will here propose three 
guiding principles for my reconstruction of Miller’s account of deliberative 
democracy on the basis of Habermas’s conception of communicative action. These 
principles are derived on the basis of my arguments in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 and are 
meant to generate more substantive principles in particular contexts. 
 
First and foremost, as shown in the last section, the humanist and the associativist 
cosmopolitans both advance accounts of distributive justice that involve universalist 
values, insofar as they either completely dismiss the importance of the facts about 
particular context or reduce the role of these facts to a mere instrument of or an 
obstacle to realising distributive principles. However, as I will show below, 
something that is often downplayed in the global justice debate is the fact that statists 
and liberal nationalists also have to rely on universalist values in formulating their 
principles of distributive justice, despite their professed methodological commitment 
to capturing the facts about a particular context in moral reasoning. For instance, as 
Gilabert argues against the statist account of distributive justice based on 
institutional coercion, involuntary membership and reciprocity, statists such as Nagel, 
Blake and Sangiovanni have not given any argument for the assumption that the 
regulation of substantive inequality has to be based on the already existing social 
institutions within nation-states (Gilabert, 2012, p. 168-75). In other words, the 
ethical significance of human association within nation-states is a universal value 
that has to be argued for. Moreover, even if we assume the universality of the ethical 
significance of nation-states, how we match particular distributive principles with 
different contexts such as the domestic and the global realms needs also to be 
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justified. As Pogge points out, Miller’s contextualist theory of distributive justice is 
not that different from his own, in the sense that there is a universalist element in 
Miller’s account. Despite the fact that Miller applies different distributive principles 
to different distributive contexts, there is ‘an underlying transcontextual logic’ that 
justifies the distinction among distributive contexts on the basis of the modes of 
human relations prevalent within them. As such, even though the different 
distributive principles P1, P2 and P3 are applied to, respectively, the distributive 
contexts C1, C2 and C3, the discrimination of C1 from C2 and C3 has a justification 
which is universal across all cultural contexts (Pogge, 2002, p. 109- 10). Hence, it 
seems that the statists and the liberal nationalists’ methodological commitment to 
anchoring distributive principles in particular distributive contexts does not 
automatically exempt them from the need to justify the universalist elements in their 
accounts of distributive justice. In this sense, what the cosmopolitans, the statists and 
the liberal nationalists have in common in the global justice debate is the need to 
justify those universal values that are fundamental to their respective global 
principles of distributive justice.  
 
In this sense, the impasse at the level of substantive theory could be seen as an 
insurmountable disagreement over the universalist values inherent in different 
accounts of distributive justice. The cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal 
nationalists all agree that the moral equality of human beings is the most 
fundamental principle, which then generates specific global principles of distributive 
justice. Cosmopolitanism encompasses two schools of thought. The humanist 
cosmopolitans insist that the logical consistency of specific principles of distributive 
justice with the moral equality of human beings should be maintained. They reject 
the statists and the liberal nationalists’ belief that the ethical significance of human 
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association within nation-states should constrain the scope of the regulation of 
substantive inequality. I have demonstrated that the humanist cosmopolitans’ narrow 
focus on the logical consistency of distributive principles with the moral equality of 
human beings makes it virtually impossible to further a fruitful dialogue between 
cosmopolitanism on the one hand and statism and liberal nationalism on the other, 
insofar as their disagreements are located at the methodological level, rather than the 
level of substantive theory. In other words, what lies behind their disagreement is the 
humanists’ refusal to allow the ethical significance of human association within 
nation-states to bear on our moral reasoning about distributive justice. On the other 
hand, the associativist cosmopolitans agree with the statists and the liberal 
nationalists that human association within nation-states should ground the concern 
with the regulation of substantive inequality, and nonetheless strive to demonstrate 
the equivalence between human associations at the global and the domestic level. 
The statist and the liberal nationalist account of distributive justice cannot decisively 
refute the associativist cosmopolitans’ challenge and vice versa, which naturally 
gives rise to an impasse at the level of substantive theory, because the liberal 
nationalists fail to specify the exact degree of equivalence between human 
association at the global and the domestic level that warrants the regulation of 
substantive inequality globally. Therefore, it seems that the humanist cosmopolitans 
do not accept the ethical significance of human association within nation-states as a 
universal value which should inform the formulation of global distributive principles. 
In contrast, the associativist cosmopolitans do not accept the validity of the 
universalist values based on which the statists and the liberal nationalists distinguish 
nation-states from the global level as being two different distributive contexts. 
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Since the need to justify the universalist elements in the accounts of distributive 
justice is derived from the methodological commitment to better account for 
common peoples’ motivation to comply with these principles, the validity of any 
distributive principle is partially determined by its ability to appeal to people’s 
common moral intuitions and political emotions, as Miller argues. As shown in the 
last section, both the humanist and the associativist cosmopolitans have so far failed 
to take serious account of common moral intuitions and political emotions, as they 
either denounce their moral relevance to the formulation of distributive principles or 
reduce their roles to an instrument of or an obstacle to realising the said principles. 
The statists take better account of motivation in general, yet nonetheless fail to 
recognise the moral relevance of political emotions to the formulation of distributive 
principles, insofar as they ground a concern with distributive justice in the existing 
institutions of citizenship. The liberal nationalists agree with the statists’ 
methodological commitment in general, and add a new factor for consideration when 
formulating the global principles of distributive justice: political emotions. As such, 
they stand a better chance than the statists to account for people’s motivation to 
comply with distributive principles, because political emotions such as nationalist 
sentiment are indispensable to the existence of the administrative state and its ability 
to fulfil its main functions including, but not limited to, the pursuit of distributive 
justice. Therefore, in the following, I will focus on fleshing out the implications of 
Miller’s approach to political theory for how we should justify the universalist 
values embedded in accounts of distributive justice in the global justice debate. 
 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 5, Miller, who provides the most influential liberal 
nationalist approach to political theory, similarly suffers from his failure to justify 
his account of common moral intuitions and political emotions. In other words, 
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despite his explicit endorsement of grounding distributive principles in the facts 
about the existing social world, he fails to explain why people should accept his 
distributive principles as the only valid derivation from the prevalent common moral 
intuitions and political emotions within the context in question. There is a slightly 
different though closely related problem regarding the global justice debate in 
academia. As mentioned above, the impasse in the global justice debate at the level 
of substantive theory manifests itself because the cosmopolitans on the one hand and 
the statists and liberal nationalists on the other cannot justify their universal values to 
the other side. However, they all recognise the need to ground the validity of 
distributive principles at least partially in people’s acceptance of them. In Chapter 5, 
I argued that the need to justify one’s distributive principles to those whose 
behaviour patterns are regulated by them implies two different questions. On the one 
hand is the debate over what the most appropriate principles of justice within 
academia are, whereas on the other, there is the question regarding the actual 
acceptance of these principles within the context in question. Political theorists 
usually have to straddle these two questions, since they serve as mediator between 
people’s common moral intuitions and political emotions and the distributive 
principles that are to inform specific policies at the political level. In other words, 
since the presumably valid distributive principles debated by the academics have real 
political impact upon common peoples’ life prospects, their methodological 
commitment to accounting for people’s motivation should already presuppose the 
actual acceptance of their distributive principles within the institutionalised setting of 
public deliberation. The need to flesh out the institutional implication of Miller’s 
methodological commitment becomes more pressing, since the impasse at the 
methodological level shows that a genuine consensus on how to account for the 
abovementioned factors is truly difficult to achieve, even within academia. Given 
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that the global justice debate is conducted primarily within academia in the 
developed world which shares a similar historical background and many common 
cultural values, the disagreement over how to interpret the implications of the 
prevalent moral intuitions and political emotions at the global level tells us a lot 
about the nature of the task at hand. Without a proper consideration of the institution 
that is supposed to secure people’s actual acceptance of distributive principles at the 
global level, the global justice theorists’ commitment to capturing common moral 
intuitions and political emotions is going to sound hollow in the final analysis. 
 
In this light, Miller’s approach to political theory fails to explain how people could 
come to realise that they share the same set of distributive principles despite their 
different ways of selecting and attributing moral weights to common moral intuitions 
and political emotions without having an institutionalised channel of actual 
communication among them. As I explained in the last section, this is a problem 
inherited from Rawls’s approach to political theory, the ‘reflective equilibrium,’ that 
requires an individual to arrive at his/her own conception of justice by surveying as 
wide a range of values and philosophical doctrines as possible in isolation from all 
other people within his/her society. Miller’s attempt to specify the two categories of 
facts about the social world—common moral intuitions and political emotions—does 
not change the fact that ‘reflective equilibrium’ is an individual endeavour and, as 
such, cannot facilitate an actual communication among people. Insofar as actual 
communication is a necessary tool for people to know whether they share the same 
distributive principles, ‘reflective equilibrium’ as an individual method of moral 
reasoning needs to be supplemented by an account of public deliberation that could 
help people explicate their different ways of selecting and attributing moral weights 
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to common moral intuitions and political emotions and finally reach a consensus on 
a unified approach to these factors.  
 
Without a more substantive account of institutionalised public deliberation among 
individuals, Miller cannot possibly justify restricting the regulation of substantive 
inequality to the domestic level and, more importantly, validate his account of 
nation-building through a deliberative democracy, something that is fundamental to 
his liberal nationalist account of distributive justice. With regard to Miller’s account 
of distributive justice, as I argued in Chapter 5, Brock and Wenar are correct to point 
out the arbitrariness of the way in which Miller brackets these rights as the global 
moral minimum and excludes all socio-economic rights (Brock, 2013, p. 68; Wenar, 
2013, p. 32). According to Miller, basic human rights are grounded in basic human 
needs defined by both physical-cum-biological conditions and social norms, whereas 
the concern with substantive inequality regulation is grounded in the existing 
institutions of citizenship (Miller, 2007, p. 184-5). In other words, compared to the 
regulation of substantive inequality, the protection of basic human rights is less 
dependent on there being any shared social institution among human beings. 
Nevertheless, as Miller himself acknowledges, the development of basic human 
rights has to rely on shared social norms at the global level, which is why he believes 
that the list could only be very stringent in the short run, while there are relatively 
few cultural commonalities globally. Even though this could explain the stringency 
of the list of basic human rights, it does not serve to justify the specific rights 
included in the list without an account of how human beings could agree on the 
relevance of these rights on the basis of different common moral intuitions and 
political emotions resulting from different cultural values. As Wenar says, Miller’s 
grounding of human rights in the moral equality of human beings rather than shared 
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social institutions will carry with it a momentum which is hard to contain and will 
eventually lead to the moral relevance of the regulation of substantive inequality at 
the global level (Wenar, 2013, p. 32). This momentum increases as Miller’s account 
of deliberative democracy lacks an account of the institutionalised public 
deliberation that will enable individuals to reveal their different approaches to 
common moral intuitions and political emotions and thereby reach a normative 
consensus on various subjects including, but not limited to, basic human rights. 
Moreover, in a more negative light, the abovementioned momentum could lead to 
both the conclusion that the regulation of substantive inequality should be considered 
as part of basic human rights and the comparatively pessimistic conclusion that basic 
human rights should be further watered down to better respect global cultural 
pluralism. The latter is a logical implication because the universality of the specific 
rights included in Miller’s list cannot be decisively justified in the absence of an 
institutionalised channel of actual communication among human beings or their 
representatives.  
 
Similarly, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, Miller’s account of nation-building through 
deliberative democracy encounters a problem because he fails to specify the scope of 
the shared public culture that would be necessary for preserving a national 
community. In a sense, this is a dilemma he has to confront, insofar as his account of 
nation-building requires the scope of the shared public culture to be determined 
during the process of public deliberation rather than ex ante. However, the difficulty 
remains that citizens would not be able to know the extent to which they could safely 
challenge the existing public culture without a prior knowledge of the necessary 
parameters of that public culture. Since the possibility of developing a common 
national identity and a shared public culture within society is fundamental to 
 
 
296 
validating Miller’s account of distributive justice, the contradiction between citizens’ 
practical need to know the necessary parameters of public culture beforehand and 
Miller’s insistence on determining the said parameters through actual public 
deliberation potentially undermines the liberal nationalist stance on distributive 
justice. In other words, if the deliberative democracy cannot serve to develop 
sufficient mutual trust among citizens while leaving sufficient space for all sections 
of society to challenge the common nationality, the liberal nationalist account of 
distributive justice based on the motivational force of national community will 
collapse. This dilemma calls for an institutionalised channel of public deliberation 
that enables citizens to negotiate their different interpretations of nationality and 
reach a consensus on the scope of the public culture that would be sufficient for 
preserving their national community in a particular context. 
 
In light of Miller’s problem with justifying his conception of basic human rights and 
his account of nation-building through deliberative democracy, I suggested in 
Chapter 5 that in order to solve Miller’s problem at the methodological level, his 
account of deliberative democracy has to incorporate Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action, because the latter specifies the institutionalised channel of 
actual communication among individuals that will eventually lead them to a 
normative consensus. Habermas’s conception of communicative action was 
developed as a procedure of public deliberation in light of increasing cultural 
pluralism within liberal society. In such societies, due to a change in the individual 
identity-formation process from the conventional to the post-conventional level, 
values and norms have lost their hitherto taken-for-granted authoritative status, and 
therefore have to be legitimated through an equal and un-coerced public deliberation 
among individuals (Habermas, 1991, Chap. 2). According to Habermas, a 
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communicative action is possible because there is a rational basis to every human 
communication, meaning that human beings cannot avoid giving reasons for the type 
of interpersonal relationships they are trying to establish among themselves. By 
participating in a communicative action, individuals raise validity claims regarding 
the interpersonal relationships they are trying to establish, and are open to challenges 
from others at the same time (Habermas, 1991, Chap. 1). A successful 
communicative action would lead to a mutual recognition of the validity claims 
regarding the interpersonal relationships in question and is called a ‘transcendence 
moment of unconditionality.’ As a result of a successful communicative action, the 
participants will engage in a more complex interpersonal relationship, sharing an 
increased amount of normative understandings together (Habermas, 1996, p. 15- 8).  
 
A communicative action is suitable for solving Miller’s problem insofar as it is 
predicated upon three fundamental beliefs about the impact of cultural pluralism on 
the possibility of reaching a normative consensus among individuals. First, a 
communicative action presupposes that there is an objective world out there for 
individuals to refer to and develop a particular interpretation of. This presupposition 
guarantees that individuals could meaningfully communicate their different 
interpretations of the external world by referring to the same objects. Second, a 
communicative action presupposes that a claim to truth, normative or otherwise, 
could only be established by participating in the actual process of public deliberation 
on the basis of raising validity claims and being open to others’ challenges. This 
presupposition is founded on the conviction that in modern society, cultural 
pluralism makes it practically impossible for anyone to claim a privileged access to 
truth, normative or otherwise. These three fundamental beliefs are closely aligned 
with Miller’s understanding of the equal relation between political theorists and 
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common people and the role of deliberative democracy in modern liberal society. As 
I demonstrated in Chapter 5, Miller claims that political theorists do not have a more 
privileged access to truth than lay persons, meaning that they are equally able to 
formulate appropriate principles of justice, despite the fact that political theorists 
have more training and time resources for conducting moral reasoning. This 
understanding of the equal relation between political theorists and lay persons is 
consistent with the abovementioned belief that there is an objective world out there 
for individuals to develop different interpretations of and, more importantly, no one 
person has a privileged access to truth. It is only through actual public deliberation 
that individuals could negotiate their different interpretations of the external world 
on the basis of validity claims and finally reach a normative consensus. This is 
consistent with Miller’s understanding of deliberative democracy as an institution for 
holding distributive practices within society accountable to citizens’ democratic 
control. Insofar as individual autonomy should be respected by the administrative 
state, the only way to guarantee that individuals are not alienated by the capitalist 
market and, by extension, other distributive contexts is to derive the regulative 
principles from individuals’ actual participation in deliberative democracy (Miller, 
1989, Chap. 7 and 8). Moreover, in the deliberative process, every individual is 
guaranteed an equal influence over the final policy outcomes, political theorists and 
lay persons alike. Therefore, Habermas’s conception of communicative action could 
remedy Miller’s problem at the methodological level, because it specifies the 
institutionalised process of public deliberation that helps individuals to reveal their 
common moral intuitions and political emotions and reach a shared approach to 
selecting and attributing moral weights to these factors with regard to distributive 
principles. 
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The necessity for Miller’s account of deliberative democracy to incorporate 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action is combined with the fact that 
Habermas’s theory is compatible with Miller’s approach to political theory, insofar 
as the conception of communicative action could allow both common moral 
intuitions and political emotions to bear on our moral reasoning about political 
principles and social institutions. Given that communicative action is widely seen as 
a procedure for individuals to reach a normative consensus on the basis of different 
moral intuitions, in Chapter 6, I focused on proving that communicative action could 
also acknowledge the role of political emotions in shaping the normative consensus 
resulting from public deliberation. Contra Lacroix, Markell and Shabani, I 
demonstrated that Habermas’s conception of communicative action could allow 
political emotions to bear on our moral reasoning about political principles and 
social institutions, because the stability of a shared lifeworld requires an affective 
identification among citizens. Moreover, contra Young, I demonstrated that 
communicative action could allow political emotions to bear on our moral reasoning, 
since his attempts to downplay the importance of the distinction between illocution 
and perlocution and to conceptualise communicative action as a universal mode of 
human communication serve to define both rational argumentation and emotional 
expression as alternative modes of communicative action. Therefore, Miler’s 
incorporation of Habermas’s conception of communicative action is not only 
necessary but also possible in order to solve his problem at the methodological level.  
 
The cosmopolitans will have the least problem with accepting my argument that in 
order to justify any universalist element embedded in the accounts of distributive 
justice, the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists need to already 
presuppose the moral desirability of the further institutionalisation of global 
 
 
300 
citizenship. Despite the possibility that they might not immediately agree with the 
explicit connection between the claim on normative truth and actual communication 
among individuals, the cosmopolitans have consistently supported the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship of various kinds. The cosmopolitans such as 
David Held and Richard Falk base their proposal of global citizenship on the 
increasing pressure on the traditional nation-states to deal with the impacts of 
globalisation, including the transnational economic order, the rise of new mass 
media, the globalised environmental problems, the increasing cultural pluralism 
within liberal societies and secessionism, and the emerging international normative 
governance centred around international law (Held, 2011, p. 93-7; Falk, 2011, p. 15-
8). In light of the deficiency of the traditional nation-states to cope with the 
mounting pressures of globalisation, the cosmopolitans often endorse two categories 
of solutions. Whereas some cosmopolitans support a formalised world government 
based on a democratic decision-making procedure, others propose gradually 
reforming and granting more authority to the existing international organisations, so 
as to approximate the ideal of global citizenship without engendering the risk of 
globalised tyranny posed by a unified world government (Gould, 1990, Chap. 12; 
Craig, 2010, p. 29-33). For instance, Alexander Wendt and Daniel Deudney, both of 
whom are international relation theorists by training, and of a cosmopolitan 
persuasion, believe that a formalised world government is inevitable, because inter-
state conflicts can only be effectively curbed by a centralised authority (Wendt, 2003, 
p. 507-10, 514-16; Deudney, 2006). In contrast, Held, Falk, John Wiliams and Eric 
Cavallero seek to preserve the existing international system that consists of separate 
nation-states, while at the same time rearranging and reforming the international 
organisations so as to vertically disperse the authorities previously concentrated at 
the national level (Held, 2011; Falk, 2011; Williams, 2011; Cavallero, 2010).  
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Even though the cosmopolitans might have no problem with accepting my 
endorsement of the further institutionalisation of global citizenship, they may have 
conceptual issues with my normative reasons for it, insofar as the cosmopolitans are 
often perceived by the statists and the liberal nationalists as being insensitive to 
particular contexts. As discussed in the last section, the cosmopolitans—especially 
the humanists, who base their justification of universalist principles solely on their 
logical compatibility with the moral equality of human beings—believe that there are 
universalist principles that transcend different cultural communities. This seems to 
suggest, as the statists and the liberal nationalists point out, that the said universalist 
principles are imposed on people by political theorists without due attention to the 
particularities of context. However, as discussed in section 2, cosmopolitans have 
another way to justify their stance based on the acceptability of the universalist 
principles to common people, in addition to their logical compatibility with the 
moral equality of all human beings. Despite the fact that the cosmopolitans in 
general still account for the contribution of common moral intuitions and political 
emotions by the formulation of universalist principles in a reductionist way, the fact 
that they start to focus on the motivational force of these factors seems to reinforce 
the need for common peoples’ presence in the process of formulating universalist 
principles. In other words, since common peoples’ motivation to comply with 
universalist principles is increasingly recognised as a necessary factor to be 
considered in the political theorists’ moral reasoning, their direct participation in the 
said process should not be considered unreasonable, should there be an urgent need 
for it.  
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Moreover, this urgent need is provided by the increasing level of cultural pluralism 
within liberal societies and across the globe, in the sense that it becomes more 
difficult to assert universal values, as different cultural values are recognised as 
being important factors in defining morality. Sabina Alkire, who is trying to discover 
ways to apply global ethics in order to inform the institutionalisation of global 
citizenship, bases her research on John Finnis’s six basic reasons for action, and 
argues that human beings across the globe might be able to agree on the six 
categories of reasons, rather than the specific ways of substantiating these reasons 
and attributing moral weight to them. These reasons are, respectively, the following: 
life, knowledge and aesthetic experience, some degree of excellence in work and 
play, friendship, self-integration, self-expression or practical reasonableness, and 
transcendence. Agreeing with Finnis, Alkire maintains, ‘any value in any culture—
whether it seems to you to be ‘moral’ or ‘immoral’—could be described by looking 
at the basic dimensions of value to which it pertains’ (Alkire, 2011, p. 172-5). In 
other words, regardless of cultural differences, human beings could come to 
recognise the core categories of reasons grounding moral or immoral actions in 
communities other than their own. Nevertheless, since the universality that could 
thus be achieved consists in the general categories of reasons for action rather than 
specific values, it would be difficult for any single person or community to 
absolutise their interpretation of morality and dismiss others’ interpretations. As 
Alkire says, ‘the moral, the truly human sets of action, the ‘right’ thing to do, is 
underdetermined. It requires free choice’ (Alkire, 2011, p. 178). In other words, only 
through actual communication with people from other cultural communities, could 
we come to realise the difference between our and their interpretations of the moral 
acts derived from the core categories of reasons.  
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Here, in order not to erroneously exclude other consent theories, such as the 
hypothetical consent based on Scanlon’s notion of ‘reasonable rejection,’ I distance 
my reason for supporting the institutionalisation of a deliberative procedure at the 
global level from Habermas’s insistence that actual acceptance through a 
communicative action is the only way to justify any normative claim. I maintain that 
Miller’s account of deliberative democracy, after incorporating Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action, is a possible way to resolve the impasse in the 
global justice debate. This means that my normative reason does not conflict with 
other consent theories at the metaphysical level, insofar as I do not dispute that a 
normative truth could be attained by ways of justification other than actual 
acceptance. What I do want to suggest is that the impasse between the cosmopolitans 
on the one hand and the statists and the liberal nationalists on the other exacerbates 
the urgent need for the direct participation of common people in the process of 
formulating distributive principles at the global level. The reason here seems to be 
more pragmatic than metaphysical, in that the two impasses at the methodological 
level and the level of the substantive theories have blocked all the routes by which 
the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists could persuade each other 
on the basis of their particular universalist values alone. Therefore, they need to 
resort to some extraneous factors other than their own preferred value systems in 
order to adjudicate among their principles of distributive justice. In this light, the 
pragmatic need for the said adjudication brings into relevance the institutionalised 
channel of actual communication among human beings whose common moral 
intuitions and political emotions are already appealed to as necessary factors to 
consider for the justification of distributive principles. Hence, the normative reason 
for supporting the further institutionalisation of global citizenship based on 
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deliberative democracy is derived from the pragmatic need for, rather than the 
metaphysical superiority of, Habermas’s conception of communicative action. 
 
The statists will agree with my normative reason for the further institutionalisation of 
global citizenship to the extent that they could recognise the function of democratic 
participation as holding the instrument of institutional coercion accountable to its 
legal subjects. In other words, even if the statists might continue to reject any 
proposal of extending citizenship to the global realm, they would still maintain their 
commitment to the respect for individual autonomy. As discussed in the last chapter, 
of the three statist accounts of distributive justice, Nagel’s involuntariness-based 
account and Blake’s coercion-based account are both derived from a respect for 
individual autonomy and, as such, focus on different aspects of the coercive relation 
between the administrative state and citizens. In contrast, although Sangiovanni’s 
reciprocity-based account is concerned with what benefits the administrative state 
usually provides for its citizens rather than its relationship with them, he does not 
dispute Blake and Nagel’s conviction that ‘shared participation in the authorship and 
reproduction of the state puts us in a special relation that we do not have with those 
outside its borders’ (Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 19). Accordingly, ‘state coercion is 
relevant to the construction of a conception of egalitarian justice, not because it 
violates autonomy but because it is a useful…way to preserve it’ (Sangiovanni, 2007, 
p. 20). In this sense, Sangiovanni focuses on how institutional coercion contributes 
to individual autonomy rather than violating it. This essentially reflects Blake’s 
discussion of the paradoxical nature of state coercion as both the vanguard and the 
violator of individual autonomy. As he argues, ‘coercion is both prima facie opposed 
to the existence of autonomy, and yet without some form of coercive political life, 
autonomy itself is not capable of being exercised’ (Blake, 2013, p. 22). The 
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institutional coercion imposed on citizens by their administrative state, then, creates 
the normative reason for establishing the democratic decision-making procedure 
which is supposed to justify the coercive relation through citizens’ democratic 
participation. Nagel emphasises the need for justification in light of institutional 
coercion thus: ‘this request for justification has moral weight even if we have in 
practice no choice but to live under the existing regime. The reason is that its 
requirements claim our active cooperation, and this cannot be legitimately done 
without justification—otherwise it is pure coercion’ (Nagel, 2005, p. 129). Therefore, 
in the face of the unjustified universal values embedded in the global principles of 
distributive justice that are meant from the very beginning to regulate the 
behavioural patterns of human beings across the globe, the statists should be 
persuaded to at least endorse the further institutionalisation of global citizenship.  
 
However, despite the fact that most statists recognise the mounting pressure imposed 
on the traditional nation-states by globalisation, they continue to oppose the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship. From their perspective, there are moral and 
material costs attached to any attempt to realise global citizenship which may turn 
out to be quite unimaginable, especially considering that we do not yet understand 
what the world order will be like once these institutions are put in place. As Blake 
says, ‘we have reason to take the forms of political institution we have as 
provisionally settled, and see what these institutions would have to do in order to be 
justified. Given the tremendous human and resource costs of creating fundamentally 
new institutions, I think we have reason to first see what might be done by the 
institutions we have now’ (Blake, 2013, p. 47). Nevertheless, there is a big 
difference between adjusting the existing institutions as much as possible to cope 
with newly emergent issues, and taking these institutions as given. In other words, 
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even though we can take the existing as ‘provisionally settled,’ we cannot grant these 
contingent social facts the same status as natural phenomena, insofar as they are 
malleable and to a great extent depend on human beings’ moral agency.  
 
As Falk remarks regarding the future of global citizenship, ‘the only kind of 
visionary citizenship that can be taken seriously will have to be grounded in what is 
occurring at the level of fact, norm and values as both trend and potentiality. It must 
be rooted in the future, the not-yet, rather than unconvincingly affirm as ‘real’ such a 
reconfiguring of political allegiance as is so unconvincingly claimed by secular-
minded ‘world citizens’’ (Falk, 2011, p. 27). In other words, although human beings 
at the global level are not yet sharing the formal institutions of citizenship equivalent 
to that within nation-states, they could be counted as global citizens in the moral 
sense. Insofar as globalisation has created a wide array of issues that cannot be 
effectively dealt with by the traditional nation-states, including but not limited to, the 
unjustifiably imposed universalist values, we are placed under the moral obligation 
to take the initiative to create institutions of global citizenship. The point I am trying 
to make is that the universalist elements in all accounts of distributive justice create 
two powerful impasses among global justice theorists, and therefore have to resort to 
the extraneous venue of justification, which is deliberative democracy at the global 
level. Here the same argument applies to the statists’ reason to block the proposal of 
global citizenship, in the sense that the reasons such as Blake’s ‘institutional 
conservatism’ rely on some inevitable universalist values to derive the said 
conclusion from what they take as the ‘provisionally settled.’ What one takes to be 
provisionally settled may be quite different from another’s, and even the 
implications derived from the same set of provisionally settled institutions are sure to 
be different. Therefore, insofar as global citizenship could be seen as a moral status 
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in addition to a legal status, it ought to place all provisionally settled institutions and 
universalist values embedded in them under public scrutiny. Given that the 
universalist values inherent to all accounts of distributive justice cannot be 
successfully justified within academia, their validation should be based on actual 
acceptance by human beings as global citizens in the moral sense.  
 
Finally, the liberal nationalists such as Miller could recognise the force of my 
normative reason for further institutionalising global citizenship, insofar as 
validating universalist values on the basis of actual acceptance is a logical extension 
of their methodological commitment at the global level. As discussed above, Miller’s 
methodological difficulty in explaining how citizens holding different moral 
intuitions and political emotions could come to share the same set of universalist 
principles mirrors his failure to justify his thin list of basic human rights and validate 
his account of nation-building through a deliberative democracy at the level of 
substantive theory. These two problems should press him to incorporate Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action in his account of deliberative democracy, so as 
to reinterpret the deliberative procedure as a collective learning process whereby 
citizens reach a normative consensus on universalist principles, common nationality 
and other common social issues.  
 
Nevertheless, Miller continues to reject any proposal for further institutionalising 
global citizenship on the ground of the feasibility constraints posed by the lack of 
favourable structural conditions and sufficient mutual trust among human beings 
from different nation-states. First, Miller appeals to the difficulty of reforming the 
existing world order to accommodate a unified legal system with individual human 
beings as its subjects, to establish a democratic decision-making process with a 
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morally relevant demos and to reinforce a civil society as a determinate community. 
Insofar as this line of objection resembles the statists’ abovementioned objection, it 
does not serve to decisively refute my normative reason for further institutionalising 
global citizenship. These unfavourable conditions could be overcome in time and 
even be transformed so as to support the further institutionalisation of global 
citizenship. Moreover, people have different understandings of the implications of 
unfavourable structural conditions at the global level, and this inevitably involves 
universalist values. Without endorsing the establishment of formalised channels of 
actual communication among human beings, it is very hard for Miller to assert his 
rejection of global citizenship as the only valid conclusion drawn from observing the 
conditions at the global level.  
 
Second, there is another, more salient reason for Miller’s objection to the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship; that is, the lack of sufficient mutual trust 
among people from different nation-states. Similar to the institutions of citizenship, 
mutual trust among human beings is a social contingency that could be developed 
through purposeful nurturing. As Miller’s account of nation-building through 
deliberative democracy shows, even though the administrative state cannot bypass 
the need for a common nationality, it could resort to deliberative democracy to 
define and redefine a common national identity and a shared public culture among its 
citizens over time. After incorporating Habermas’s conception of communicative 
action into Miller’s account of deliberative democracy, public deliberation about the 
definition of a common nationality could be understood as a collective learning 
process for citizens to reach a normative consensus on the scope of the public culture 
needed to preserve their national community. What is more, insofar as, according to 
Habermas, a communicative action in and by itself could strengthen interpersonal 
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relationships by increasing the shared normative understandings among interlocutors, 
the institutions of citizenship based on deliberative democracy would not collapse as 
long as citizens continue to try to reach a normative consensus on a common 
nationality. By extension, the further institutionalisation of global citizenship could 
be sustained by a deliberative democracy that serves to define and redefine a 
common identity and a shared public culture among people from different nation-
states over time, so as to develop a sufficient level of mutual trust at the global level. 
This prospect is further reinforced by the fact that the deliberative process in and by 
itself could serve to cement interpersonal relationships among human beings to a 
certain extent by increasing the number of shared normative understandings and, as 
such, prevent the institutions of global citizenship from collapsing. Therefore, 
although people may not yet have a sufficient level of mutual trust among them, the 
further institutionalisation of global citizenship could rely on the establishment of a 
deliberative democracy to provide this in the long term.  
 
Thus, the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists could agree that the 
further institutionalisation of global citizenship based on a deliberative democracy is 
required in order to justify the universalist elements embedded in their accounts of 
distributive justice. As discussed in Chapter 2, cosmopolitan justifiability should be 
the philosophical underpinning for such an account of global citizenship, because it 
is widely compelling among all global justice theorists. It requires that all principles 
of justice should be justifiable to all human beings as free and equal moral agents. 
Due to the limited scope of this thesis, I will only put forward three foundational 
principles for such global institutions as do not exclude any cosmopolitan proposal 
of global citizenship, be it based on a formalised world government or the gradual 
strengthening of the already existing international organisations. These three 
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principles include: (1) a normative consensus ought to be reached through an un-
coerced and equal communication among human beings or their representatives on 
the basis of validity claims, (2) human beings or their representatives ought to have 
equal influence over the final normative consensus, and, (3) human beings or their 
representatives ought to aim to develop a common identity and a shared public 
culture among themselves. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, these principles emerged 
alongside the discussion of the strengths and the weaknesses of both Miller’s 
account of nation-building through deliberative democracy and Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action. They are in line with cosmopolitan 
justifiability and serve to secure the preconditions for the global public deliberation 
to be possible in the long term.  
 
First, Principle 1 conveys Habermas’s regulative principle of a legally 
institutionalised communicative action that serves to legitimate all norms and values 
within a society; that is, the discourse principle. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
discourse principle states, ‘just those action norms are valid to which all possibly 
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses’ (Habermas, 1996, 
p. 107). In order to preserve this principle in the functioning of the institutions of 
global citizenship, human beings require both human rights and popular sovereignty. 
As Habermas argues, the protection of human rights requires individuals to have 
equal rights to participate in the law-making process, which thereby enables them to 
be both the addressees and authors of law. On the other hand, popular sovereignty 
requires legal institutionalisation in order to have a binding power over its 
corresponding jurisdiction (Habermas, 1996, p. 99- 104).  
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Second, Principle 2 reveals the nature of a deliberative democracy as balancing the 
need of social integration with respect for cultural pluralism, in the sense that all 
individuals should be able to challenge the mainstream narratives, while at the same 
time preserving a sufficient level of mutual trust among themselves. As shown in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Miller’s account of deliberative democracy is consistent with 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action in terms of their concerns with the 
balance between the demand for social integration and respect for cultural minorities. 
Miller’s account of deliberative democracy requires the scope of the shared public 
culture to be determined by actual public deliberation on an equal footing, so as to 
ensure that cultural minorities would have an equal opportunity to challenge the 
definition of a common nationality from their own perspective. Similarly, 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action could incorporate emotional 
expressions such as greetings, rhetoric and narratives, so as to enable the cultural 
minorities to have an equal opportunity to share their life experiences. On the other 
hand, Miller and Habermas both aim to realise social integration through increasing 
the amount of shared normative understanding among individuals, despite that 
Habermas restricts the scope of the said normative understanding to the political 
level. As long as the institutions of global citizenship aim to increase the amount of 
normative understanding shared among individuals, a sufficient level of mutual trust 
could potentially be achieved at the global level. Even if occasionally the scope 
proves insufficient to guarantee social integration at the global level, the act of 
communicative action in and by itself could strengthen interpersonal relationships to 
a certain extent, and thereby prevent the institutions of global citizenship from 
collapsing in the short term.  
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Principle 3 clarifies the source of cultural values from which human beings are to 
draw inspiration in order to define and redefine their common identity and public 
culture at the global level. Unlike Habermas’s conception of communicative action, 
the institutions of global citizenship have to draw upon a more comprehensive 
source of cultural values than what Habermas calls political culture. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Habermas explicitly specifies the scope of political culture as ‘the 
rationally based conviction that unrestrained freedom of communication in the 
political public sphere, a democratic process for settling conflicts, and the 
constitutional channelling of power together provide a basis for checking illegitimate 
power and ensuring that administrative power is used in the equal interest of all’ 
(Habermas, 1994, p. 135). Nevertheless, in order to sufficiently motivate individuals 
to shoulder special obligations towards others and help them understand the validity 
of a deliberative procedure based on communicative action, the institutions of global 
citizenship should not hold a predetermined notion of what counts as political culture. 
It is only through communicating with others in the deliberative process that 
individuals can come to realise how much shared public culture is needed to achieve 
social integration in a specific context, insofar as what is deemed sufficient in a 
public culture now may prove insufficient at some point in the future.  
 
Ideally, these three guiding principles should place normative constraints on the 
policy outcomes of the global public deliberation. This is to say, despite being an 
open-ended process, the global public deliberation should not generate any policy 
outcomes that undermine all human beings’ equal rights to participate in the 
deliberative process, prevents all human beings from exerting equal influence over 
the deliberative process, and diminishes the possibility of developing a common 
identity and a shared public culture among all human beings. By ‘open-ended’ I 
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mean what Nussbaum means in developing ‘capability approach’. Capability 
approach aims to formulate a list of central capabilities which all human beings 
ought to have in order to pursue the activities indispensable to their flourishing 
within any society. Open-endedness in this approach refers to how the list of central 
capabilities could be contested and remade and how the items on the list could be 
further substantiated by local beliefs and circumstances in each nation-state 
(Nussbaum, 2001, p. 70-7). Regardless of the variations on the list of capabilities and 
the different substantiations of these capabilities in local contexts, the whole process 
is constrained by an Aristotelian-Marxian conception of human dignity. This 
conception requires that human beings should be able to effectively pursue certain 
activities so as to live in a truly human way (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 71-2). Therefore, in 
effect, this conception of human dignity delineates the boundary within which 
people could identify specific human capabilities and interpret them on the basis of 
local cultural values. Likewise, the three guiding principles for my account of global 
citizenship set down the boundary within which human beings or their 
representatives could discuss concrete global issues, the definition of a common 
identity, and global regulative norms and values.   
 
Within the normative constraints set down by the three guiding principles, the global 
public deliberation will consist of three levels of discourse, concerning pragmatic 
questions, ethical-political questions and moral questions. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the pragmatic questions deal with the explicitly given preferences and goals with 
regard to common issues at the global level that could be settled primarily by the 
empirical knowledge of how best to realise and/or reconcile them, for instance, 
global warming, terrorism, immigration and refugees, et cetera. The ethical-political 
questions aim to define and redefine a collective identity and a public culture shared 
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among all human beings that guides humanity’s value judgments in the face of 
different solutions that might be equally effective in tackling common issues at the 
global level.  
 
I have not discussed the level of moral questions before. However, in light of the 
discussion in this chapter, another level of discourse should be added to Miller’s 
account of deliberative democracy, in addition to the levels of the pragmatic and the 
ethical-political questions. Insofar as human beings should all have an equal right to 
participate in the discussion of those political principles that regulate their 
behaviours at the global level—including but not limited to the global principles of 
distributive justice, this level of discourse is concerned with moral questions. Moral 
questions focus on the justification of those universalist values and norms involved 
in the principles of distributive justice, nationality and other moral principles that 
require human beings’ compliance regardless of cultural differences. Here my 
account of global citizenship departs from the existing global justice theories in a 
significant way. Most existing global justice theorists explicitly or implicitly 
presuppose human beings’ consent, given right circumstances, and therefore relies 
on good arguments alone to justify the universal values embedded in their 
distributive principles. Democratic participation is only relevant in the further 
substantiation of these universal distributive principles, when their implementation is 
at stake in specific local contexts. My account of global citizenship does not 
presuppose human beings’ consent to any global regulative norms and values. In this 
sense, it relies on human beings’ actual consent rather than the hypothetical one to 
validate the universal values embedded in distributive principles and to further 
substantiate them in local contexts. The only normative constraints on the 
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deliberative process that are beyond the review of human beings are the principle of 
cosmopolitan justifiability and the three guiding principles.  
 
Given that the values under discussion at this level are universal across different 
cultural contexts, once validated these values should constrain both how a collective 
identity is formulated for humanity as a whole at the ethical-political level, and how 
solutions could be found for common global issues at the pragmatic level. 
Conversely, when unresolvable conflict arises among stances on common global 
issues at the level of the pragmatic questions, human beings or their representatives 
would aim to clarify their conceptions of the common good by redefining the shared 
collective identity and public culture, and thereby adjudicate among equally effective 
solutions to the global issues in question. Then, when unresolvable conflicts among 
different interpretations of the collective identity and the public culture at the level of 
ethical-cultural questions arise, human beings or their representatives will aim to 
reach a common consensus on the universalist moral principles that ground their 
different interpretations. As such, a continuous reiterative process is established 
among the three levels of discourse which would ideally guarantee that solutions to 
common global issues and the definition of the collective identity of humanity are 
developed within the bounds of widely accepted universalist values. On the other 
hand, this process would also in principle ensure that the morally problematic 
aspects of the universalist values inherent in the international legal system could be 
effectively detected through the discussion of common global issues and the 
formulation of a collective identity of humanity. 
 
In summary, this section has firstly shown that the two impasses between the 
cosmopolitans on the one hand and the statists and the liberal nationalists on the 
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other boil down to the absence of a deliberative procedure to justify the universalist 
elements embedded in the accounts of distributive justice at the global level. Then, in 
order to justify the universalist elements in the accounts of distributive justice, I 
argued that the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists should all 
endorse the further institutionalisation of global citizenship based on deliberative 
democracy. This deliberative procedure should be based on a combination of 
Miller’s account of deliberative democracy and Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action, so as to reinterpret the said deliberative procedure as a 
collective learning process whereby human beings may reach a normative consensus 
and at the same time realise social integration among themselves. Thirdly, I 
demonstrated that the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists all have 
reason to accept my normative reason for further institutionalising global citizenship 
based on deliberative democracy. The cosmopolitans could accept my normative 
reason because they already actively support the further institutionalisation of global 
citizenship ranging from a formalised world government to the gradual strengthening 
of the existing international organisations. The statists have to accept my normative 
reason because ‘institutional conservatism’ does not prevent the further 
institutionalisation of global citizenship, especially given that the existing 
institutions of citizenship within nation-states are social contingencies which can be 
changed by the moral agency of human beings. The liberal nationalists could not 
successfully refute my normative reason, insofar as a deliberative democracy at the 
global level could in principle develop a collective identity and a public culture 
among human beings in the long term, and thereby provide a sufficient level of 
mutual trust among human beings to maintain the institutions of global citizenship. 
Finally, I advanced three principles that ought to inform the development of the 
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institutions of global citizenship on the basis of Miller’s account of deliberative 
democracy and Habermas’s conception of communicative action.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter sets out to demonstrate that a further institutionalisation of global 
citizenship based on Miller’s account of deliberative democracy and Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action is required to resolve the two impasses in the 
global justice debate at the levels of substantive theory and methodology. This 
essentially connects the global justice debate with proposals for global citizenship 
which offer a new approach to the former. So far, the global justice debate has led to 
two impasses at the levels of substantive theory and methodology. First, the impasse 
at the level of substantive theory persists because the cosmopolitans cannot be 
persuaded to accept the restricted scope of the regulation of substantive inequality in 
the face of the statists and liberal nationalists’ failure to specify the criteria for giving 
equivalence to human associations at the domestic and the global levels. Second, the 
impasse at the methodological level arises because the statists and the liberal 
nationalists cannot persuade the cosmopolitans to accept their approach to 
distributive justice on the basis of the commitment to accounting for common 
people’s motivation to comply with the ethical demands of distributive justice.  
 
Insofar as the two impasses boil down to the cosmopolitans, the statists and the 
liberal nationalists’ failure to justify the universal values inherent in their accounts of 
distributive justice, an institutionalised deliberative procedure at the global level 
could be utilised to reach a normative consensus on these values on the basis of 
human beings’ actual acceptance of them. This implies that the norms and values 
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supporting basic human rights and the regulation of substantive inequality at the 
global level cannot be taken for granted. Nevertheless, considering that these 
accounts are developed mainly by academics in the developed world, and stand a 
good probability of impacting on the life chances of people in the developing world, 
it is quite concerning that there is no institutionalised channel of public deliberation 
to render them accountable to all human beings. In this light, the two impasses in the 
global justice debate highlight the essentially contestable nature of the universalist 
values supporting all accounts of distributive justice. If the global justice debate 
conducted within western academia has met this much resistance in reaching a 
consensus on the proper scope of the regulation of substantive inequality, how can 
we expect there to be genuine consensus on global justice among human beings 
without having an institutionalised deliberative procedure at the global level?  
 
Therefore, global citizenship based on my reconstruction of Miller’s account of 
deliberative democracy is required to adjudicate among different accounts of 
distributive justice through an equal and un-coerced public deliberation, because a 
genuine consensus on distributive justice is not plausible within academia, let alone 
across the globe, without having actual communication among human beings. This 
normative reason for the further institutionalisation of global citizenship could be 
accepted by the cosmopolitans because their account of distributive justice already 
presupposes global citizenship. The statists’ notion of ‘institutional conservatism’ 
cannot overturn my normative reason because the institutions of citizenship are a 
social contingency that could be extended to the global level by the moral agency of 
human beings. The liberal nationalists’ objection to my reason, on the basis of the 
lack of mutual trust at the global level, could be mitigated by the fact that the 
deliberative process could develop a common identity and a public culture among 
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human beings through an equal and un-coerced communicative action at the global 
level. Thus, in order to overcome the current impasses in the global justice debate, 
the cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists all need to endorse the 
further institutionalisation of global citizenship. 
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Conclusion 
 
As the global justice debate has progressed over the years, it has come up against a 
seemingly insurmountable deadlock between cosmopolitanism, statism and liberal 
nationalism. This disagreement naturally hampers attempts to reinforce the ethical 
aspects of human relationships at the global level and empower various international 
organisations in order to cope with the pressure of globalisation. Therefore, without 
a solution at the conceptual level at least, the ethical demands of global justice 
cannot possibly go beyond the traditional considerations of peace and stability. This 
thesis sets out to resolve the deadlock between cosmopolitanism, statism and liberal 
nationalism in the global justice debate and argues that the three main schools of 
thought all need to endorse the further institutionalisation of global citizenship based 
on a deliberative democracy, so as to justify any global principle of distributive 
justice. This democratic procedure should be modelled according to my 
reconstruction of Miller’s account of deliberative democracy on the basis of 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action. 
 
The logical structure of the key arguments in this thesis has been as follows: 
 
Premise 1: Globalisation has put great pressure on traditional nation-states that have 
to cope with many new ethical issues at the global level;  
 
Premise 2: The deadlock in the global justice debate exacerbates the situation in 
which each nation-state is reluctant to recognise its moral obligations beyond the 
satisfaction of basic needs; 
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Argument 1: Miller’s ideal of an equal relationship among citizens is better suited 
than the distributive egalitarians’ ideal of substantive equality in material terms to 
justify different approaches to responsibility-insensitive basic needs satisfaction and 
responsibility-sensitive substantive inequality regulation;  
 
Argument 2: Miller could ground the restricted scope of the regulation of substantive 
inequality in the absence of institutions of global citizenship, if and only if, he 
endorses the further institutionalisation of global citizenship based on a deliberative 
democracy. This is because his split-level conception of distributive justice (SCDJ) 
could only be justified to the cosmopolitans if there were formalised channels of 
public deliberation to adjudicate among different global principles of distributive 
justice;  
 
Argument 3: The institutions of citizenship require a common national identity and a 
shared public culture to supply a sufficient level of mutual trust among citizens to 
support the functioning of the major social institutions, including, but not limited to, 
deliberative democracy. The constitutional patriots cannot refute the need for a 
common nationality because they do not have a valid explanation for citizens’ 
motivation to participate in an institutionalised communicative action so as to realise 
social integration. Moreover, a shared political culture is too thin to help citizens 
understand the validity of a legally institutionalised communicative action, insofar as 
there is a difference between the existing political culture and the morally desirable 
one in favour of a communicative action; 
 
Argument 4: Miller’s account of deliberative democracy needs to be reconstructed 
on the basis of Habermas’s conception of communicative action because it fails to 
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explain how citizens could reach a normative consensus on the definition of a 
common nationality without knowing the scope of the shared public culture 
necessary to preserve their national community ex ante;  
 
Argument 5: Miller’s contextualist approach to political theory fails to explain how 
individuals could reach a normative consensus when they each have different ways 
of selecting common moral intuitions and political emotions and assigning moral 
weights to them in their moral reasoning about political principles and social 
institutions. This failure implies that the validation of Miller’s political principles has 
to rely on an account of deliberative democracy which could enable individuals to 
spell out their different approaches to common moral intuitions and political 
emotions and reach a normative consensus through a reasoned deliberation. 
Therefore, Miller’s account of deliberative democracy has to incorporate 
Habermas’s conception of communicative action; 
 
Argument 6: It is possible to incorporate Habermas’s conception of communicative 
action into Miller’s account of deliberative democracy because Habermas could 
allow common moral intuitions and political emotions to bear on our moral 
reasoning about political principles and social institutions; 
 
Argument 7: An impasse has arisen among the cosmopolitans, the statists and the 
liberal nationalists at the level of substantive theory because Miller is unable to 
prove the inequivalence between the modes of human relationship within nation-
states and at the global level; 
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Argument 8: An impasse has arisen among the cosmopolitans, the statists and the 
liberal nationalists at the methodological level because Miller could not persuade the 
associativist cosmopolitans to accept his distributive principles as the only valid 
account derived from common moral intuitions and political emotions at the global 
level; 
 
Conclusion: In order to resolve the two impasses in the global justice debate at the 
level of substantive theory and methodology, the cosmopolitans, the statists and the 
liberal nationalists all need to endorse the further institutionalisation of global 
citizenship. This is because they all require an institutionalised deliberative 
procedure to adjudicate among the universalist values embedded in their distributive 
principles and thereby produce a set of principles that is most consistent with human 
beings’ common moral intuitions and political emotions.  
 
This conclusion has implications for both Miller’s SCDJ and the global justice 
debate. Firstly, it implies that Miller’s SCDJ could be justified on the absence of the 
institutions of global citizenship in the short term, insofar as the ideal of the equal 
relationship among citizens brings the concern with the regulation of substantive 
inequality into relevance. Nevertheless, Miller’s failure to explain how citizens could 
reach a normative consensus on the definition of a common nationality at the level of 
substantive theory, and his similar failure to explain how individuals could derive 
shared political principles from common moral intuitions and political emotions at 
the methodological level necessitates an institutionalised deliberative procedure at 
the appropriate level. Since SCDJ is a set of distributive principles at the global level 
that requires validation, Miller needs to endorse the further institutionalisation of 
global citizenship modelled after my reconstruction of his account of deliberative 
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democracy on the basis of Habermas’s conception of communicative action. This 
necessity would ideally lead to a series of initiatives that would end in a set of 
institutions of global citizenship equivalent to the ones found within nation-states. 
Therefore, in the long term, as the institutions of global citizenship gradually expand 
their authority to more and more areas, the regulation of substantive inequality 
would be required by global justice to the same extent as now obtains within nation-
states, and SCDJ would eventually become redundant.  
 
Secondly, the conclusion also implies that the deadlock within the global justice 
debate cannot be decisively resolved without the establishment of global citizenship 
modelled after my reconstruction of Miller’s account of deliberative democracy on 
the basis of Habermas’s conception of communicative action. In other words, an 
institutionalised deliberative procedure is required, logically prior to the resolution of 
the global justice debate. The said deliberative procedure is predicated on the 
principle of cosmopolitan justifiability. Cosmopolitan justifiability requires all 
principles of justice to be justifiable to all human beings, as free and equal moral 
agents. In line with cosmopolitan justifiability, three principles are put forward in 
Chapter 8: (1) the normative consensus ought to be reached through an un-coerced 
and equal communication among human beings or their representatives on the basis 
of validity claims, (2) human beings or their representatives ought to have equal 
influence over the final normative consensus, and, (3) human beings or their 
representatives ought to aim to develop a common identity and a shared public 
culture among themselves. These principles set down the normative constraints on 
global public deliberation, in the sense that human beings or their representatives are 
able to discuss concrete global issues, the definition of a common identity, and 
global regulative norms and values, as long as the policy outcomes will not 
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contradict the requirements of the said principles. In other words, the deliberative 
process should not undermine the status of all human beings as equal participants, 
bias towards a particular section of the world population, and diminish the possibility 
of formulating a common identity and a shared public culture among all human 
beings. 
 
According to these three principles, the deliberative procedure consists of three 
levels of discourse: pragmatic discourse, ethical-political discourse and moral 
discourse. At these three levels of discourse, human beings or their representatives 
will aim to reach a consensus on the definition of a collective identity and a set of 
universalist political principles alongside the discussion of concrete social issues at 
the global level. This means that the public deliberation about a common identity 
and universalist political principles is not developed independently of particular 
contexts. By deliberating about common pressing issues such as global warming, 
terrorism and immigration at the global level, people would have a better sense of 
what humanity’s collective identity actually means, and which cultural values are 
actually held in common everywhere. Moreover, since the said public deliberation 
aims to develop a collective identity and a shared public culture, it would supply a 
sufficient level of mutual trust among different people so as to support the 
functioning of the institutions of global citizenship in the long term.  
 
Thus, my reconstruction of Miller’s account of deliberative democracy on the basis 
of Habermas’s conception of communicative action could contribute to the global 
justice debate in three ways. First, it could resolve the impasse among the 
cosmopolitans, the statists and the liberal nationalists through an institutionalised 
deliberative procedure that serves to adjudicate among different distributive 
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principles at the global level. Second, it reinforces Miller’s liberal nationalist account 
of distributive justice, setting it firmly within the terrain of the global justice debate, 
as it demonstrates that liberal nationalism could in principle subsume both humanist 
cosmopolitanism and statism. Lastly, it shows that the further institutionalisation of 
global citizenship is feasible in principle because a deliberative procedure could aim 
to develop a collective identity and a shared public culture among human beings in 
the long term. However, due to the limited scope of this thesis, the question remains 
as to how the institutions of global citizenship based on a deliberative democracy 
would be designed and what actual steps should be taken to motivate such a political 
transformation at the global level. In a sense, this is inevitable, because Miller’s 
account of deliberative democracy fails to offer any suggestion regarding its design, 
despite the fact that it is based on a republican conception of citizenship and it aims 
to facilitate a nation-building process. As such, it is open to a wide range of 
interpretations that could fulfil the two abovementioned basic conditions. The 
incorporation of Habermas’s conception of communicative action places further 
constraints on how the institutions of citizenship would be envisioned, insofar as 
Habermas has explained a legally institutionalised communicative action in detail in 
his latest work, Between Facts and Norms (1997). Still, I do not think that 
Habermas’s discussion of communicative action would exhaust all possibilities for 
designing a suitable deliberative procedure, because many other accounts based on 
the republican conception of citizenship may prove to be consistent with both Miller 
and Habermas’s understanding of deliberative democracy.  
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